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1. The spreading appeal of the dance metaphor
In recent years the same metaphor has cropped up time and
again in very different areas of communication studies. In
ape language research (ALR), Sue Savage-Rumbaugh ob-
serves how the origins of language comprehension lie in
“interindividual routines,” which are like “a delicate dance
with many different scores, the selection of which is being
constantly negotiated while the dance is in progress, rather
than in advance” (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993, p. 27). In
nonverbal communication research, Michael Argyle de-
scribes how “a speaker starts gesticulating and looks away
as he starts to speak, and reverses this when he stops. There
is an intricate co-ordination of pausing and looking within
turns, followed by head-nods, smiles, and gazes. Interac-
tional synchrony has been called a ‘gestural dance,’ and
likened to a waltz” (Argyle 1988, p. 118). In infant devel-
opment research, Daniel Stern recounts how, at the age of
four months, an infant “passes into the Immediate Social
World. In this world of the ‘here and now, between us,’ he
reports on the rich choreography between himself and his
mother, on the subtle moves by which they regulate their
flow of feelings. Thus, Joey introduces us to the basic dance
we all play out with other people throughout our lives”
(Stern 1990, p. 7). What is it about this dance metaphor that
so appeals to scientists who are interested in the dynamics
of communication and language development?
We will explore this question through consideration of
two major projects within ALR, the Animal Model Project,
initiated by Duane Rumbaugh at the Language Research
Center at Georgia State University, and Sue Savage-Rum-
baugh’s research with the bonobo Kanzi. We start by noting
that the terms used to describe a dance are radically differ-
ent from those used in the information-transmission meta-
phor that has hitherto dominated the study of communica-
tion (King & Shanker, in press). The transmission metaphor
treats communication as a sequential process in which 
partners take turns emitting and processing one another’s
messages (Argyle 1988). The dance metaphor focuses on
co-regulated interactions and the emergence of creative
communicative behaviors within that context (Fogel 1993).
Whereas the information-transmission metaphor prompts
one to conceptualize communicative exchanges in terms of
such constructs as signal and response, sending and receiv-
ing, and encoding and decoding, the dance metaphor leads
one to conceptualize communicative encounters in terms
such as engagement and disengagement, synchrony and
discord, and breakdown and repair.
The chief appeal of the transmission metaphor is that
communication is treated as a rule-governed system, with
predictable causal sequences. Given the premise that sig-
nal A is invariably followed by response B in conditions xyz,
one looks for the multiple variables that determine the un-
folding of communicative sequences. The scientist adopts
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an objectivist stance, focusing on one individual at a time:
on how she processes/responds to the signal she has re-
ceived, and where these signals and responses are broken
down into units that can be objectively measured.
The chief appeal of the dance metaphor is that it draws
attention to how communicating partners continuously es-
tablish and sustain a feeling of shared rhythm and move-
ment. Such an activity of mutual attunement is established
through a number of different modalities. Communicating
partners not only adjust to each other’s specific behaviors,
facial expressions, vocalizations, and so on, but may also at-
tune to one another cross-modally. For example, an infant
suddenly jerks her arms and her mother “responds with a
sharp ‘Oh!’ that has the same temporal and intensity con-
tour as the infant’s arm movement” (Fogel 2000, p. 7), or
the tone of voice prompts the other to move closer or far-
ther away. Whereas the transmission metaphor sees com-
municating partners in discrete states – that is, an agent is
either sending or receiving – the dance metaphor sees both
participants in the communicative activity as continuously
active and interactive.
The information-transmission metaphor brings to mind
the image of two computers or fax machines transmitting
information back and forth (Pinker 1994). The dance meta-
phor brings to mind several different images: it summons
up a Vygotskean picture of a novice being guided by a more
experienced partner; a picture of awkwardness and friction
when two partners are not in harmony with one another;
and a picture of fluid movement when two partners are ef-
fortlessly communicating with one another. The dance
metaphor also suggests how difficult it can be to identify
one partner as the “initiator” of an exchange: Is it the one
who asks the other to dance? But then, how much nonver-
bal communication may have preceded the actual issuing of
this “invitation?” Similarly, Schore describes how the young
infant smiles in order to evoke her mother’s gaze, and con-
versely, averts her gaze when she finds too much arousal un-
pleasant (Schore 1994, pp. 82ff). But such behaviors only
occur within the context of being gently held and cooed to,
or recently fed, not to mention all the previous gaze ex-
changes.
This type of affective interaction has been broken down
into six basic levels by Stanley Greenspan; they include 
attention regulation, engagement, intentional affective 
signalling, reciprocal affective problem-solving, affectively
mediated creation of ideas and affectively mediated think-
ing (Greenspan 1997). In The Evolution of Intelligence,
Greenspan and Shanker show how these basic affective in-
teractions are the foundation for human intelligence and
reflective thinking (Greenspan & Shanker, in press). It is no
wonder that the emotional interactions expressed by many
in the context of a dance metaphor has become so popular
in infant developmental research; the field has increasingly
begun to look over the past two decades at interactional syn-
chrony (Greenspan 1979; 1989; Horner 1985; Schore 1994;
Stern 1990; Thelen & Smith 1994). Like two dancers who
are aware of themselves and each other as a single entity,
the members of a dyad are said to be “mutually attuned”
when they are in a similar affective state and rhythmically
synchronized with one another’s movements and moods. In
normal dyadic interactions this is thought to occur as much
as 30 percent of the time; the other 70 percent of the time,
the caregiver and infant are in various degrees of being “out
of synch” with one another (Tronick 1989). Attentive care-
givers are sensitive to these periodic breakdowns and good
at restoring interactional synchrony. When a caregiver is
poor at repairing these breakdowns there is a marked de-
cline in interactional synchrony. Communication break-
downs are even more common with infants who have prob-
lem temperaments or who have trouble developing and/or
responding to conventional communicative behaviors.1
There has been a great deal of research confirming the
findings of Thomas and Chess’ “goodness-of-fit” model
(Chess & Thomas 1984): namely, when caregivers respond
harshly or inconsistently to a difficult child, or to a child who
fails to develop conventional communicative behaviors, pe-
riods of “dyadic dissonance” increase and the child is more
likely to behave aggressively and egocentrically with peers
later in life. But when caregivers are effective at adjusting
their parenting skills to match the child’s temperament or
idiosyncratic communicative behaviors, we see higher lev-
els of interactional synchrony. What is more, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the more secure the attachment, the
more positive the child’s social interactions with her peers
and the more developed her prosocial attitudes (Ainsworth
et al. 1978). That is, the greater the amount of interactional
synchrony between an infant and her caregiver, the better
is the child able to adjust her communicative style and re-
sponsiveness to the rhythms of different dance partners as
she grows older (Greenspan 1997).
What we are witnessing in the growing popularity of
looking at dynamic interactions in infants and caregivers 
in the context of a dance metaphor, therefore, is an indica-
tion of how the information-transmission metaphor, which
Shanker & King: The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research
606 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:5
Stuart G. Shanker is Professor of Philosophy and of
Psychology at Atkinson College, York University. His 
research focuses on the role of social and emotional 
factors in communication and language development 
in young children. Among his recent publications are
Apes, Language and the Human Mind (with Sue Sav-
age-Rumbaugh and Talbot Taylor, 1998); Wittgenstein’s
Remarks on the Foundations of AI (1998); Toward a
Psychology of Global Interdependency: A Framework
for International Collaboration (with Stanley Green-
span, 2002); and The Evolution of Intelligence (with Stan-
ley Greenspan, in press). His honors include Canada
Council Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships; the
Marian Buck Fellowship at Christ Church College, Ox-
ford; the Walter L. Gordon Fellowship at York Univer-
sity; and Research Grants from the Canada Council,
The Unicorn Foundation, The Templeton Foundation,
and Cure Autism Now.
Barbara J. King is Professor of Anthropology at the
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
Her research focuses on communication and cognition
in primates; King and her students currently study on-
togeny of gesture in captive gorillas. Among her publi-
cations are The Information Continuum (1994) and two
edited volumes, The Origins of Language (1999) and
Anthropology Beyond Culture (with Richard G. Fox,
2002). The Teaching Company selected her to create
and teach “Roots of Human Behavior,” a 12-hour audio-
and video-course. Her honors include the Virginia State
Council of Higher Education’s Outstanding Faculty
Award (1998) and a Guggenheim Fellowship (2002–
2003).
treats communication as a sequential, turn-taking process,
is becoming increasingly constrictive for those interested in
the co-regulated dynamics of communication. More and
more, researchers are employing multiple cameras and dig-
ital recorders to analyze the multi-modal coordination of
movements and vocalizations in dyadic interactions, and
conducting longitudinal studies in an effort to understand
how an organism’s particular experiences govern its behav-
ior (Bekoff & Byers 1998).2 The larger question here, how-
ever, is whether these technological and methodological 
advances can be accommodated within the conceptual
framework that underpins the use of the transmission
metaphor, or whether what we see here are the emerging
signs of a paradigm shift in our understanding of the very
nature of communication, and thence, the types of data one
sets out to acquire in ALR and human communications
studies, and the manner in which this should be analyzed.
2. The shift from an information-processing to a
dynamic systems paradigm
The shift from the transmission metaphor to a dance
metaphor represents, we believe, a fundamental shift in
communications theory from an information-processing to
a dynamic systems paradigm. In an information-processing
system, communication, whether between cells, mammals,
prosimians, apes, or humans, is said to occur “when one or-
ganism (the transmitter) encodes information into a signal
which passes to another organism (the receiver) which de-
codes the signal and is capable of responding appropriately”
(Ellis & Beattie 1986, p. 4). In a dynamic system, all of the
elements are continuously interacting with and changing in
respect to one another, and an aggregate pattern emerges
from this mutual co-action. Hence, communication is seen
as a “continuous unfolding of individual action that is sus-
ceptible to being continuously modified by the continu-
ously changing actions of the partner” (Fogel 1993, p. 29).
Thus, whereas the information-processing model looks at
communication as a linear, binary sequence of events, the
dynamic systems model looks at the relation between be-
haviors and how the whole configuration changes over
time.
For example, on the information-processing paradigm
there are said to be a limited number of basic emotions
(e.g., interest, surprise, happiness, sadness, anger, fear) in
nonhuman and human primates that are indexed by stereo-
typical facial expressions. The production of these facial ex-
pressions, and the responses that they evoke, are both
thought to be controlled by genetically determined pro-
grams (see Ekman 1980; Izard 1997). The communication
of basic emotions is treated as a composite form of reflex:
namely, a stimulus triggers a neural program that controls
a neuromuscular/expressive, autonomic, behavioral, and
experiential sequence of events. In this framework, one
studies the facial expressions that index the basic emotions
by isolating a movement in a single region of the face or
combinations of regional movements (Ekman 1980) and
the reactions of another organism to what are construed as
stereotypical facial expressions (Griffiths 1997).
The problem with this approach, stressed by dynamic
systems theorists, is that facial expressions of emotion are
constantly changing in response to the changing dynamics
of social interactions (Wagner 1997). Furthermore, recent
research by dynamic systems theorists suggests that the
stereotypical facial expressions associated with “basic” emo-
tions develop within the context of shared emotional ex-
periences. For example, so-called “Duchenne” smiles are
commonly treated as an index of pleasure (see Ekman
1992) and cited by affect program theorists as a paradigm
example of an innate communicative signal (Ekman 1979).
But Messinger, Fogel, and Dickson’s micro-analysis of the
emergence of Duchenne smiles in young infants revealed
that sometimes the smile only occurred on one side of 
the face, or was stronger on one side; sometimes the smile
contained negative elements (e.g., grimaces); and most im-
portant of all, that smiles were fleeting and “seemed to
change in response to equally swift reactions on mother’s
part. It was out of this fast-paced interactional matrix that
more stable, recognizable expressions seemed to develop”
(Messinger et al. 1997, p. 207). Thus, on the dynamic sys-
tems approach, one studies the development of stereotypi-
cal facial expressions, or the communication of emotions,
by looking at the complexity, detail, and responsiveness of
subjects’ changing facial expressions of emotion in the con-
text of co-regulated interactions.
The shift from an information-processing to a dynamic
systems model thus represents an important transformation
in our understanding of the nature of communication, from
looking at communication as an encryption process, to see-
ing communication as a co-regulated activity. On the in-
formation-processing paradigm, what is communicated is
always information, construed in Shannon’s information-
theoretic terms (Shannon 1948) as something that can be
quantified. The information communicated is about an in-
ternal state or representation. Whether it is a thought, an
emotion, an intention, or a piece of knowledge, the infor-
mation that A communicates to B must be such that it can
be encoded and transmitted. Genuine communication only
occurs when B decodes the message that A encoded.
Hence, A and B must possess the same code in order for
genuine communication to occur. Such a code must either
be genetically predetermined (Chomsky 1972), imprinted
during a critical period (Lenneberg 1967), or acquired
through conditioning (Skinner 1957).
In the dynamic systems paradigm, what is communicated
is not simply information, although, to be sure, an impor-
tant aspect of communication is what kinds of information
a subject can communicate. Indeed, one of the most im-
portant developments in the study of great ape communi-
cation has been learning about the surprisingly complex
kinds of information that great apes communicate to one
another and the complex social situations in which this oc-
curs (see King & Shanker, in press). But, in addition to com-
municating various kinds of information, great apes and hu-
mans also communicate their desires and intentions, fears,
warnings, invitations, attitudes, emotions, and so on, where
none of the latter can be reduced to the former. That is,
what one communicates when one communicates one’s 
desires, intentions, thoughts, wishes, emotions are exactly
that: namely, desires, intentions, thoughts, wishes, and
emotions. Far from being trivial, this tautological statement
lies at the very heart of the categorial distinction that dy-
namic systems theory draws between the communication of
information and the communication of desires, intentions,
thoughts, wishes, emotions, and so forth.
In other words, dynamic systems theory repudiates the
information-theoretic assumption that all communicative
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acts can be construed as the communication of “informa-
tion,” and even, that the particular circumstances in which
great apes and humans do communicate information to one
another can be construed in Shannon’s information-theo-
retic terms (Coulter 1983). What is at stake here is the very
premise that in all acts of communication one organism en-
codes information into a signal that another organism de-
codes. Great ape and human communication, according to
the dynamic systems paradigm, is not a “telementational”
process (Harris 1980a): to communicate a desire, intention,
thought, wish, or emotion, is not to “transmit information”
about an “internal state” that must be “decoded” in order to
be understood. Rather, mutual understanding is something
that emerges as both partners converge on some shared
feeling, thought, action, intention, and so on. Far from fol-
lowing some predetermined format, such a process is in-
trinsically creative.
This last point bears directly on the so-called “problem
of creativity” which, following Chomsky’s review of Skin-
ner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959), has become a defin-
ing issue in the continuity/discontinuity debate over the 
relationship between animal and human (linguistic) com-
munication. For, according to Chomsky, “the fundamental
distinction between human language and the purely func-
tional and stimulus-bound animal communication systems”
(Chomsky 1966, p. 9) is that only the language system is ca-
pable of generating infinitely many novel combinations,
where creativity is a property of the system itself. But dy-
namic systems theory places “creativity at center stage
since the most salient aspect of co-regulated interchange is
the emergence of something novel, something that was not
there before” (Fogel 1993, p. 31). There is thus a striking
difference between where the two paradigms assign cre-
ativity, and in the very manner in which creativity is con-
strued. Whereas the information-processing paradigm sees
creativity as a property of the language system itself, of the
basic principles of that system, dynamic systems theory
views creativity as a property of agents’ behavior in co-reg-
ulated interactions. Indeed, as we shall argue below, the sig-
nificance of recent ALR lies precisely in the creative emer-
gence of novel communicative behaviors.
This emphasis that dynamic systems theory places on crea-
tive actions has important methodological significance for
the study of communication. Ethologists have long stressed
the importance of becoming thoroughly acquainted with
one’s subjects in order to determine the components and
significance of their communicative behaviors. Many would
insist that the development of a comprehensive profile of
an individual’s or a species’ communicative repertoire de-
mands multiple perspectives, for example, observing the
subject interacting with different partners in different set-
tings over extended periods of time. But dynamic systems
theory introduces a further critical element into this matrix.
Not only must one always be prepared for the possibility
that a subject’s communicative acts are highly idiosyncratic,
but further, one must be alert to the new dimensions of
meaning that are co-created in the contexts of ever-chang-
ing and evolving interactions. Even a stereotypical move-
ment that one has observed countless times before – say, an
ape slowing extending a forearm to request a food item –
might suddenly take on some whole new dimension of
meaning as, together, the co-participants treat the gesture
as, for example, a summons to direct their gaze at some dis-
tal event. Thus, one must adopt a hermeneutic stance to-
ward one’s subjects and interpret the significance of their
communications for them, in terms of the context in which
these activities occur, the extent to which the behavior of
the interactants is rigid or ritualized, and the extent to
which it is innovative and responsive.
The shift to a dynamic systems paradigm has profound
implications, therefore, for our understanding of the gene-
sis of communicative behaviors. On the information-pro-
cessing paradigm, we consider the nature of animal signals
as if they have been “designed” for a specific purpose. This
is a shorthand way of saying that we assume that the signals
we observe are the product of natural selection, which has
favored those properties of signals that make them most ef-
fective at conveying information (Halliday & Slater 1983,
p. 43). Thus, we seek to isolate specific behaviors (“signals”)
and establish (through repeated observations) the condi-
tions that trigger those behaviors and the responses that
they evoke. When we look for the reasons why an ape did
such-and-such, we are looking for the reasons why that be-
havior was selected. On the dynamic systems paradigm,
natural selection is thought to apply to the whole develop-
mental manifold (see Gottlieb 1997). Highly predictable
developmental outcomes are seen as the result of canaliz-
ing influences – that is, highly predictable environmental
circumstances (van der Weele 1999) – and not as canalized
traits (i.e., traits that are strongly buffered from environ-
mental perturbations by information that is encoded in an
organism’s genes).
The “canalizing influences” that most stand out in the
case of human communicative development are the close
dyadic relationships in which an infant is nurtured over the
first few years of its life, and the influence of social factors
on her development (see Shanker & Taylor 2001). That is,
the infant is exposed to a highly stable environment: first in
the womb, which provides the foetus with surroundings
that are highly (but not totally) buffered from external
shocks, and then in close dyadic relationships with primary
caregivers. The secondary altriciality of humans thus helps
to ensure that infants experience remarkably similar rear-
ing conditions during the first few years of their lives. In-
deed, one of the most important lessons we have learnt
from the study of developmental disorders is just how seri-
ous are the consequences for a child’s cognitive and lin-
guistic development if, for either endogenous or exogenous
reasons, she is unable to undergo the typical emotional ex-
periences involved in these early dyadic interactions with a
primary caregiver (see Goldstein & Hockenberger 1991).
In general, then, the information-processing and dy-
namics systems paradigms can be contrasted as shown in
Table 1.
One of the most dramatic examples of the significance of
shifting from an information-processing to a dynamic sys-
tems framework can be found in the debate over the inter-
pretation of recent advances in ALR. To some extent, many
of the early ALR studies reinforced the stereotype that ani-
mal communication is functional and stimulus-bound, pre-
cisely because they were based on an information-processing
framework that promoted a static model of communicative
development. In these studies, researchers employed the
sorts of techniques that one sees in behavioral modification
therapy, and attempted to model ape linguistic behaviors –
for instance, by molding apes’ hands into closer and closer
approximation of ASL signs and rewarding the apes with
food treats (see Gardner & Gardner 1969; Premack 1976).
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Terrace’s attack on ALR (Terrace 1979) was really an attack
on the idea that such conditioned behaviors could lead to
truly linguistic behaviors. But, as Terrace himself recognized
(Terrace 1986), Savage-Rumbaugh’s work in ALR intro-
duced an entirely new dimension into these discussions.
What is particularly noteworthy about Savage-Rumbaugh’s
research is that she began within, but then gradually aban-
doned, the information-processing framework that had hith-
erto dominated ALR. As we shall see, the more freely she be-
gan to interact with the apes, and the more freely they began
to interact with each other, the more they became active part-
ners in their own – and Savage-Rumbaugh’s – development.
Shifting the terms of the discussion from an information-
processing to a dynamic systems framework not only high-
lights the striking differences between Savage-Rumbaugh’s
research and earlier ALR studies, but further, it sheds illu-
minating light on the factors that underpin the develop-
ment of communication skills in great apes and humans,
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Table 1. Information-processing dynamic systems theory
Information Processing Dynamic Systems Theory
All communication systems can be modelled in the same way 
Great ape and human communication is a process Great ape and human communication is an activity
Great ape and human communication is sequential Great ape and human communicative interactions are 
co-regulated
Information is transmitted from a sender to a receiver Aggregate patterns emerge from this activity of mutual 
co-action
Communicating organisms are in one of two states: either active Partners are continuously active, continually adjusting their 
or passive, sending or receiving behaviors to each other
The information transmitted is encoded and decoded by sender Communication is not a process, a fortiori, not an 
and receiver encryption process
Communication is governed by fixed codes Communicating partners are constrained by each other, 
their developmental history, their biology, and their 
environment (social, cultural, physical)
There are different categories of information but what is What one communicates when one communicates, e.g., 
communicated is always information one’s desires, intentions, thoughts, wishes, emotions are 
just that, and not different kinds of “information”
The information communicated is about an internal state Desires, intentions, thoughts, wishes, emotions, are not 
or representation “internal states” or “representations.” In the particular 
circumstances where it makes sense to say “P 
communicated a piece of information to Q,” the 
information communicated is not about an internal state 
or representation, but rather, that such-and-such (“that 
there is some ripe fruit over there,” “that John is 
coming,” and so on)
We infer from an organism’s behavior what sorts of mental An organism’s behaviors serve as a criterion for describing 
events it is experiencing it with such-and-such an epistemic operator
Communication is a rule-governed causal sequence, where Co-regulated interactions are intrinsically creative
such-and-such a signal is predictably followed by such-
and-such a response in conditions x,y,z
Creativity is a property of a generative system (i.e., of its Agents act creatively (or rigidly)
basic principles) 
The signals we observe are product of natural selection Highly predictable communicative behaviors are a product 
of canalizing influences
The development of species-typical communicative behaviors The development of species-typical communicative 
is maturational behaviors emerges in the context of co-regulated 
species-typical experiences
The maturation of communicative behaviors can be treated The development of communicative behaviors is the result 
as the simple summation of hereditary and environmental of a nonlinear, complex interplay between maturational 
factors (i.e., H X E) and experiential factors
The scientist adopts an objectivist stance, focussing on one The scientist adopts a hermeneutic stance, looking at what 
individual at a time, isolating specific behaviors (signals)  their behaviors mean to the participants involved in 
and establishing through repeated observations the conditions co-regulated interactions
that trigger those behaviors and the responses they evoke
The communicative significance of a particular gesture, vocalization, The communicative significance of a gesture, vocalization, 
movement, etc., can be decontextualized facial expression, etc., is viewed as a function of its role 
within a communicative exchange (e.g., a hand move-
ment only counts as a gesture in the context of such-and-
such an activity)
and indeed, the relationship between communicative de-
velopment and the development of language. From a dy-
namic systems perspective, the development of language
cannot be understood outside of the rich and complex ac-
tivity of non-verbal communication. One studies, not what
linguistic gestures represent, but rather what they mean to
participants, where meaning is conceptualized – not as the
transfer of some symbolically encoded information, but as
a discovery of the mutual convergence on some shared feel-
ing, thought, action, or intention.
3. Sherman and Austin
ALR has been overshadowed by the debate over whether
the capacity to acquire syntax and semantics is uniquely hu-
man. Discussions have primarily centered on the question
of whether enculturated apes’ communicative behaviors
can be compared with early norms in child language acqui-
sition studies. The most striking results obtained so far have
been with Kanzi, the male bonobo who was born and raised
at the Language Research Center. Hence, there has been a
natural tendency to focus on the linguistic feats of this
extraordinary ape, to the exclusion of other important areas
of ALR. This tendency is unfortunate, however, for two dif-
ferent reasons. One is the obvious risk of overlooking im-
portant findings that have been made with other great apes.
But perhaps the more important reason is that this under-
standable preoccupation with Kanzi’s achievements may
skew the significance of ALR by casting the research as a
matter of establishing whether or not great apes can be
brought to cross the “language Rubicon.”
The danger here is that ALR might be seen as solely a
matter of ascertaining whether great apes can perform
“high enough” on language tests – as measured, for exam-
ple, by how many words they can learn or what sorts of syn-
tactical constructions they can master – so as to refute any
lingering doubts about whether their behavior can be legit-
imately described in linguistic terms. The problem with
such a viewpoint is that it accepts from the outset the as-
sumption, first articulated by eighteenth-century Cartesian
philosophers, that there is a bifurcation between language
and nonhuman primate “natural expressive behaviors” (see
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998, Ch. 2), and that the goal of
ALR is to see whether apes’ productive behaviors can be-
come genuinely “language-like” or remain merely instru-
mental. This framework has engendered a polemical atmo-
sphere in which researchers from opposite ends of the
“continuity/discontinuity” spectrum reach opposite conclu-
sions about how the data should be properly interpreted.
By no means should the research community neglect the
interpretation of the rich corpus of data that has been ac-
cumulated with Kanzi, or with the apes trained to use a ver-
sion of American Sign Language (e.g., the chimpanzee
Washoe [Gardner & Gardner 1969] and her ape compan-
ions [Cianelli & Fouts 1998] or the orangutan Chantek
[Miles 1990]; for a recent review, see Hixson 1998). For
there are many important questions in the existing data that
remain to be answered: for example, what kinds of concepts
have they mastered and in what order have they acquired
linguistic skills (see Kako 1999)? But we must not lose sight
of the fact that the driving impetus behind ALR is to dis-
cover what kinds of communicative skills great apes can
master, and equally important, what sorts of skills seem to
be irrevocably beyond their grasp; how environmental con-
tingencies affect a great ape’s cognitive, socioaffective, and
communicative development; and, perhaps as a result of
this research, the significance of various aspects of the so-
cial environment and caregiving practices on a child’s cog-
nitive, socioaffective, and language development. Thus, as
exciting as the achievements of the “linguistic savants”
clearly are, some of the most important findings may be in
those “grey” areas where the distinction between “natural”
and “linguistic” behavior is hardest to draw.
For this reason, we begin our discussion of ALR with a
review of the Animal Model Project, which was conducted
with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin at the Language
Research Center in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
stated purpose of this research was not to establish that a
great ape could reach such-and-such a level of (age-
matched) linguistic performance, in order to silence the
discontinuity critic. Rather, as Savage-Rumbaugh explained
in Ape Language:
As Sherman and Austin moved from the simplest discrimina-
tion tasks to complex spontaneous communications, it became
increasingly apparent that they were continually learning to do
far more than they were being taught. The issue of whether or
not they had achieved “true” human language was never the
goal. The goal was to improve their communicative compe-
tence and, in doing so, to more clearly define the skills involved,
both at the behavioral and at the cognitive levels (Savage-Rum-
baugh 1986, p. 404).
The reason why the research with Sherman and Austin
provides such an important starting-point for this discus-
sion is because, in their case, we have a fully documented
account of the steps that were taken to enable a great ape
to undergo what Deacon describes as “the shift from con-
ditioned associations to symbolic associations” (Deacon
1997, p. 84). Moreover, we have the added benefit that
Deacon presents a highly sophisticated explanation of this
“shift” on the information-processing model of communi-
cation, which, as we shall see, stands in sharp contrast 
to Savage-Rumbaugh’s own explanation of Sherman and
Austin’s development, which is highly resonant of the dy-
namic systems paradigm. Thus, the contrast between their
two accounts illuminates the different kinds of explanation
that are pursued on the two models of communication out-
lined at the end of the preceding section.
Significantly, Sherman and Austin were both highly com-
municative with Savage-Rumbaugh from the start of the re-
search onwards. She reports that they were especially sen-
sitive to affects conveyed by her tone of voice, to her facial
expressions, and that they frequently gestured to commu-
nicate their desires to her (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986, pp. 38,
56). What they could not do very well, however, was pair
lexigrams with objects. An experimenter would train them
on the association between a food item and its lexigram and
later hold up the food item and ask them with which lexi-
gram it was associated. Even though other great apes had
performed well on this task, Sherman and Austin both ex-
perienced considerable difficulty when they had to choose
between two keys, and despite extensive training, they were
unable to perform above chance if they had to select from
three keys. But dramatic advances occurred when Savage-
Rumbaugh shifted to a “request task” paradigm in which
the experimenter would hold up a food item that the chimp
would immediately receive if he pressed the right key. Now
Sherman and Austin started to make rapid gains in lexi-
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gram-object pairings. But if the expectancy of receiving a
food item by pressing its lexigram key was removed, their
response behavior quickly became fragmented again.
Savage-Rumbaugh then attempted to teach Sherman
and Austin the difference between “requesting” and “nam-
ing” by fading out their food rewards. In her view, another
significant advance occurred when the apes began to use
lexigrams with no expectation of receiving a food reward.
Now,
When a training task was begun, instead of waiting for the
teacher to ask that certain items be given or labelled, the chim-
panzees began naming items spontaneously and then showing
the named item to the teacher. As the chimpanzees decided
which objects were to be named and shown, they also incorpo-
rated many aspects of the teacher’s role into their own behav-
ior. They initiated trials, singled out objects, and actively en-
gaged in behaviors designed to draw the teacher’s attention to
what they were saying. Moreover, these indicative behaviors,
once they appeared, were not limited to training contexts (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh 1986, p. 326).
In other words, Sherman and Austin began to demonstrate
communicative behaviors that are normally seen in a one-
year-old child: they imitated Savage-Rumbaugh’s actions
and they used lexigrams spontaneously, in novel situations,
to refer to objects, direct her attention, and express their in-
tentions. Whether or not such actions are present in the
wild, these were certainly new behaviors for them, and
thus, as Deacon (1997) argues, we need to explain this rad-
ical development in their behavior.
On the information-processing paradigm, communica-
tion is defined in terms of, and is limited to, the number of
channels available to the sender and receiver; the quality of
the medium; and the nature of the “internal states” experi-
enced by sender and receiver. Since neither of the first two
factors was significantly altered by the new training para-
digm, the explanation for Sherman and Austin’s commu-
nicative development must, on the information-processing
approach, lie in the third factor. And this is precisely the
route that Deacon takes: according to Deacon, the qualita-
tive “shift” observed in Sherman and Austin’s communica-
tive behavior was the result of a “radical transformation in
the[ir] mode of representation” (Deacon 1997, p. 87).
On Deacon’s account, this mental transformation was in-
duced, first by training, and then systematically extinguish-
ing, illicit symbol combinations in a combinatorial system
consisting of two “verbs” and four “nouns.” Even such a sim-
ple combinatorial system allows for 720 pair sequences, most
of which are nonsensical. Over the course of thousands of tri-
als these illicit combinations were gradually extinguished. As
a result, the apes learned, not simply “symbol-object” pair-
ings, but “a set of logical relationships between the lexigrams”
(Deacon 1997, p. 86). That is, they discovered “that the rela-
tionship that a lexigram has to an object is a function of the
relationship it has to other lexigrams, not just a function of
the correlated appearance of both lexigram and object”
(Deacon 1997). And this, Deacon concludes, “is the essence
of a symbolic relationship,” which, once grasped, enabled
Sherman and Austin to assimilate new symbols into their lex-
icon, quickly and effortlessly (Deacon 1997). Deacon’s ex-
planation of this phenomenon is presented in the same sort
of terms as one would use to describe a Pattern Recognition
program: namely,
the shift from associative predictions to symbolic predictions is
initially a change in mnemonic strategy, a recoding. It is a way
of offloading redundant details from working memory, by rec-
ognizing a higher-order regularity in the mess of associations, a
trick that can accomplish the same task without having to hold
all the details in mind. (Deacon 1997, p. 89)
Deacon primarily bases his account on the early guide-
lines of the Animal Model Project (see Rumbaugh 1977;
Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh 1979). But Savage-Rum-
baugh has recounted how, soon after these guidelines were
published, she decided that “unlike all previous ape-lan-
guage projects, this one would not have as its goal the pro-
duction of word combinations or sentences. I wasn’t in
search of the linguists’ holy grail. I was going to focus on
words: What does a word mean to a chimpanzee, and how
can we find out?” (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994, p. 49).
She quickly abandoned the earlier approach of training 
the chimps on which cues were irrelevant and which com-
binations were illicit, and began instead to encourage the
chimps to use lexigrams in their day-to-day activities.
Given this difference in their views of the goals and
methodology of the Animal Model Project, it is not sur-
prising that we should see striking differences in the man-
ner in which Deacon and Savage-Rumbaugh conceptualize
Sherman’s and Austin’s communicative development, and
in their explanations of why this occurred. According to
Deacon, Sherman and Austin experienced a sort of “gestalt-
like” mental reorganization: what he calls a “recoding” or 
a “re-representation” of the lexigrams they had originally
learned as indexical pairings. But according to Savage-
Rumbaugh, the “qualitative shift” observed in Sherman’s
and Austin’s communicative behaviors was the result of her
efforts to establish “a much closer physical proximity with
the apes, interacting with them in a social, preschool-like
setting [that] would emphasize communicative needs rather
than promoting teaching efficiency” (Savage-Rumbaugh &
Lewin 1994, p. 49). For Deacon, “the food lexigrams are in
a real sense ‘nouns’ [because they] are defined by their po-
tential combinatorial roles” (Deacon 1997, p. 88). For Sav-
age-Rumbaugh, “it seemed that [Sherman and Austin] re-
ally ‘had words’ [when] they understood that words could
be used to express future intentions and thereby coordinate
actions, rather than simply as a mechanism to get others to
do something for them” (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994,
p. 127). That is, what licenses us to describe Sherman and
Austin as “mastering ‘words’,” is the sorts of acts they per-
formed with the lexigrams, not what might have been going
on in their minds. Thus, for Deacon, the “shift” in Sher-
man’s and Austin’s behavior occurred as the result of a men-
tal transition from learning isolated symbol-object pairings
to learning how new symbols fit into a combinatorial sys-
tem; for Savage-Rumbaugh, the development occurred as
the result of switching from a behavior modification para-
digm to using lexigrams in ordinary social circumstances.
Whereas Deacon’s explanation focuses on what went on
“inside their heads,” Savage-Rumbaugh’s explanation fo-
cuses on the nature of the actions that the apes began to
perform with the lexigrams.
For example, Savage-Rumbaugh recounts how, to teach
them comprehension skills, she hid a food item in a con-
tainer and used the keyboard to tell them what was hidden
in the container:
The first time I did this Sherman rushed to smell the container,
but was unable to detect what was in it. He gestured for me to
open the container, but I refused. Instead, I went to my key-
board, located just outside Sherman and Austin’s room, and
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stated this chow. When I used my keyboard, it made the sym-
bol “chow” appear on projectors located just above Sherman
and Austin’s keyboard. Sherman saw this information and ap-
parently believed me because he immediately used his own
keyboard to say open chow. On the next twenty trials of this
novel situation, Sherman made just two errors, even though I
used many different words. (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994,
p. 71)
In this episode, Sherman’s novel communicative behav-
ior emerged in the context of a complex routine that en-
compassed not only the present circumstances, but also all
of the food-sharing interactions that Sherman had previ-
ously experienced. Furthermore, what Savage-Rumbaugh
was doing was a crucial factor in what Sherman was doing,
just as what he was doing was a crucial factor in what she
was doing. The manner in which each of them was acting
was part of their shared history together and the evolving
dynamics of their co-regulated interactions. The fact that
Savage-Rumbaugh describes Sherman as “believing her”
attests to her perception of the importance of the strong af-
fective undertones that enabled this dyad to make a signif-
icant communicative advance.
Savage-Rumbaugh reports that she soon began to ob-
serve a qualitative change in her interactions with Sherman
and Austin: namely, they began to express their intentions
before acting; to pay far more attention to the conse-
quences of their own communicative actions; and to attend
more closely to her actions in order to ascertain what she
intended (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994, p. 72). Dea-
con’s argument is that there is such a dramatic shift between
their behavior prior to and immediately following the above
event, such that we can infer that they must have experi-
enced some such “mental reorganization” as that described.
Prior to this moment their use of the lexigram board was
merely conditioned, but after the “qualitative shift” their
uses of the lexigram board became symbolic. But Savage-
Rumbaugh argues that the big difference was that, to begin
with, Sherman and Austin were intent on using the lexigram
board to control the behavior of their experimenters (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh 1986, p. 65), and that they became increas-
ingly intent on discerning her intentions and expressing
their own. Rather than viewing Sherman’s and Austin’s
novel communicative behaviors as evidence of a “mental
transformation,” Savage-Rumbaugh treats their behaviors
as a criterion for describing them as developing “linguistic
skills.” That is, we do not infer from their behaviors that
Sherman and Austin had developed such-and-such “men-
tal representations”; it is the behaviors themselves – the
changes in the types of co-regulated interactions in which
the apes began to engage – that licenses us in describing
Sherman and Austin as developing linguistic skills (see
Johnson 2001).
The point Savage-Rumbaugh is making here is reminis-
cent of what Tomasello says about language acquisition in
children. Tomasello argues that:
At around nine to twelve months of age human infants begin to
engage in a host of new behaviors that would seem to indicate
something of a revolution in the way they understand their
worlds, especially their social worlds. (Tomasello 1999, p. 61)
What Tomasello has in mind is the fact that, although in-
fants are gesturing intentionally by eight months of age, it
is only “at nine months of age [that they] begin engaging in
a number of so-called joint attentional behaviors that seem
to indicate an emerging understanding of other persons 
as intentional agents” (p. 61). So too, Sherman and Austin
were clearly communicating intentionally with the lexigram
board from a relatively early point. But, according to Sav-
age-Rumbaugh, the critical factor in their communicative
development was that they not only began to attend more
closely to her actions, but also “to pay close attention to 
each other’s communications; they engaged each other be-
fore delivering their message; they gestured to emphasize
or clarify messages; they took turns” (Savage-Rumbaugh
1986, p. 84).
As a result of this qualitative change in their mutual co-
actions, the chimps began to engage in highly atypical ac-
tivities, such as freely sharing each other’s plant food and
using the lexigram board to cooperate in complex food-
sharing tasks. For example, Savage-Rumbaugh placed them
in adjoining rooms that were separated by a clear plexiglas
window. In Sherman’s room there were a number of boxes,
each baited with a different kind of food, and each needing
a specific tool in order to be opened. Austin was then placed
in another room with all of the tools. He could see all the
different foods through a window, and would signal to Sher-
man which food he wanted. Sherman responded by using
the lexigram board to tell Austin which tool he needed to
open that box. Austin would select the appropriate tool
(e.g., a key or a wrench) and pass this through a small hole
to Sherman. Sherman would then open the right box and
pass the food through to Austin (eating a portion of it along
the way).
Clearly far more was involved here than “mutual instru-
mental behavior.” Savage-Rumbaugh reports how “Joint re-
gard, amplification of symbols with gestures, and sponta-
neous correction of errors were behaviors that emerged out
of the interindividual interactions between Sherman and
Austin” (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986, p. 203). The apes were
not simply monitoring the other’s behavior in order to en-
sure that their communicative intention had been correctly
“decoded” and, when this was not the case, repeating or re-
inforcing the behavior in question. Rather, as is the case
with children who are learning their first words, they were
using lexigrams to “coordinate [their] management of a
complex interactional task” (Taylor 1992, p. 245). Indeed,
they even began to correct themselves, as well as each other.
For example,
On one trial Sherman mistakenly requested a key when a
wrench was appropriate for the task, and he watched as Austin
began to look over the toolkit in response to the request. Austin
picked up the key, and Sherman looked surprised, turned to
look at the keyboard, which still showed the key request he’d
made, and realized his mistake. He rushed to the keyboard and
corrected himself by tapping on the wrench symbol to draw
Austin’s attention to the changed request. Austin looked up,
saw what Sherman was doing, dropped the key, and took the
wrench to the window to give to Sherman (Savage-Rumbaugh
& Lewin 1994, p. 82).
In other words, Sherman and Austin had reached a point
where one wants to say: not only were they able to under-
stand the meaning of the lexigrams they were using, but
they were even able to understand each other using lexi-
grams. The problem that Deacon and Savage-Rumbaugh
are both addressing, therefore, is: What justifies us in de-
scribing Sherman and Austin’s behavior here in such lin-
guistic terms?
Deacon’s answer is that, given the objective structure of
the combinatorial system that they were using, one can in-
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fer that they had both experienced the same mental trans-
formation, and thus, that their behavior can be described in
linguistic terms. Savage-Rumbaugh’s argument is that it is
on the basis of his behavior, and the context in which this
occurred, that one is warranted in saying that Sherman had
meant to ask for a wrench (his gestures, the fact that he
looked surprised when Austin picked up a key, that Sher-
man then rushed to the keyboard and tapped on the wrench
lexigram). That is, one is warranted in describing Sherman
and Austin as understanding the meaning of lexigram sym-
bols on the grounds that they could do such things as use a
lexigram correctly and respond appropriately to its use by
others; initiate spontaneous exchanges with lexigrams; use
lexigrams to express their intentions; jointly attend to lexi-
grams, each other, and another person or object; use lexi-
grams to direct each other’s or another person’s attention;
extend the use of lexigrams to novel (but suitable) circum-
stances; spontaneously assign unlabelled keys to new foods;
closely attend to their own, and to someone else’s use of lex-
igrams; and correct their own or each other’s mistaken uses
of lexigrams.
The natural question to ask here is whether it would 
not be possible simply to combine Deacon’s information-
processing with Savage-Rumbaugh’s dynamic systems 
arguments, that is, to argue that they operate at different,
but ultimately compatible explanatory levels. To appreciate
what the obstacles are to such a synthesis, it is important to
understand how much the two accounts differ from one an-
other in their most basic view of the phenomenon that we
are seeking to explain. Deacon’s argument represents a so-
phisticated reformation of the classic “language Rubicon”
argument: namely, the problem is redefined as asking
whether the primate brain can be brought to a point of
spontaneous “re-representation” where the logical rela-
tionships between a set of lexigrams is suddenly grasped.
But Savage-Rumbaugh is arguing that what matters here is
whether Sherman and Austin’s actions were sufficiently
complex to satisfy the criteria for describing them as un-
derstanding the meaning of symbols, and what implications
this might have for our views about the relationship be-
tween language and communication. If, as would appear to
be the case from the above catalogue of behaviors, Sherman
and Austin can legitimately be described as having acquired
primitive linguistic skills, it is because of the sorts of things
that they began to do with lexigram symbols and the sorts
of co-regulated activities they began to engage in using
those symbols. And herein lies the reason why Savage-
Rumbaugh concluded, contrary to what is postulated by 
the information-processing model of communication, that:
“meaning and intent are not to be found by looking ‘inside’
a speaker” (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986, p. 382). That is, the
explanation of the fact that Sherman and Austin had begun
to understand the meaning of lexigram symbols, and that
they could understand each other using lexigrams, does not
revolve around what (if anything) went on in their minds.
Whether or not a subject understands the meaning of a
symbol, or another speaker, is established by what she says
or does in the context of dynamic interactions (see Johnson
2001).
If anything, the research with Sherman and Austin attests
to just how problematic it is to draw a categorical distinc-
tion between nonverbal communicative behavior and prim-
itive linguistic behavior (see Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998).
For what the research with Sherman and Austin demon-
strates is how verbal behavior – that is, what we describe as
“verbal behavior” – “emerges from and with nonverbal be-
havior, and as it does, it provides for a new means of coor-
dinating interindividual object-oriented behaviors” (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh 1986, p. 31). On this line of thinking, the
ontogeny of language skills lies, not in a genetic blueprint
for “encoding” and “decoding” “mental states” or “repre-
sentations” using a “generative” system of sounds or signs,
nor in a sudden mental shift from “indexical” to “symbolic”
comprehension, but rather, in “interindividual interactions
[that] come to be coordinated through the use of words”
(Savage-Rumbaugh 1986).
The psychological problem we are then left with on the
dynamic systems approach is: What made Sherman and
Austin’s communicative development possible? How did
Sherman and Austin acquire such species-atypical skills as
using lexigrams to communicate with one another and with
humans? Clearly, what was most atypical about Sherman
and Austin was the environment in which they were raised
and the kinds of tasks that they were encouraged to master.
For example, by being physically separated but still able to
see and interact with each other, they were encouraged to
employ alternative means for engaging in food-sharing ac-
tivities. To be sure, the technology that they employed lit-
erally forced them to engage in “turn-taking” exchanges; yet
that does not mean that the communication between them
during these tasks was limited to these exchanges. Rather,
their use of the board was incorporated into their nonver-
bal “dances,” and like the chimpanzees Sultan and Chica in
Köhler’s famous studies, they mastered the use of a tool to
overcome obstacles and achieve their desired goals (Köhler
1925/1951). Unlike Sultan and Chica, however, what Sher-
man and Austin mastered was a communication tool. And
to master that tool and the increasingly complex demands
that Savage-Rumbaugh imposed upon them, required sus-
tained attention and interaction.
But it was not just the task and the tool that made this
cognitive and communicative development possible; the
presence of an unusually responsive and emotionally at-
tuned caregiver was absolutely crucial. That is, we must not
lose sight of the fact that Savage-Rumbaugh herself was an
essential element in Sherman and Austin’s cognitive and
communicative development. For what is clear from her
account is that Savage-Rumbaugh was learning as much
from these social interactions as were the apes. Her own de-
velopment as a primatologist, and her development as an
interactive partner – her growing understanding of Sher-
man and Austin’s temperaments, their attitudes, thoughts,
needs, and of course, communicative intentions – played 
an integral role in Sherman and Austin’s development. In
other words, the socialization of attention that was observed
in Sherman and Austin was a dyadic (and triadic) phenom-
enon.
4. Kanzi
It is not difficult to understand why the story of the Kanzi
research has so captured the general public’s imagination.
All of the ingredients that one looks for in a gripping scien-
tific narrative are here: the infant of a little-known species
of great ape suddenly, and unexpectedly, succeeds where
his adoptive mother, despite extensive training, had failed.
A research program on the brink of losing its funding is sud-
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denly reinvigorated. Paleoanthropologists begin to specu-
late that here at last has been found, if not the “missing
link,” then at any rate a plausible model of the “common an-
cestor” (before chimpanzees and hominids moved off on
their separate evolutionary paths). Psychologists are forced
to reconsider their preconceptions about the cognitive and
communicative bifurcation between animals and humans.
And society as a whole is forced to reassess the morality, and
perhaps even the legality, of its attitudes towards apes (see
Wise 2000).
Given the larger ethical as well as scientific implications
that hinge on this research, it is not surprising that it has be-
come so important to catalogue the exact nature of Kanzi’s
linguistic achievements. This record is now widely known
(see Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh
et al. 1993; 1998): When he was two years old, Kanzi could
use eight symbols on a lexigram board to request various
food items. By the time he was three, he was using 20 sym-
bols, and when he was eight he had mastered the produc-
tive use of over 250 symbols. He uses these signs purpose-
fully, without cuing or imitation, to do such things as refer
to objects and locations in the immediate, present sur-
roundings, as well as to others that are “absent,” and even,
to comment on events that occurred in the past, ask ques-
tions, play games, or simply provide information (both re-
quested and unsolicited).
Even more significant than his use of signs on the lexi-
gram keyboard is Kanzi’s ability to understand spoken En-
glish sentences. When he was eight years old Kanzi was ex-
tensively tested on the same data-set as Alia, a two-year-old
child (see Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). The sentences on
which they were tested involved such requests as to put
something on or in something; to give or show something
to someone; to do something to someone; to take something
to a distal location; to fetch an object or objects from a dis-
tal location; or to engage in some make-believe sequence.
Almost all of the sentences were new to Kanzi, and many
involved somewhat bizarre requests in order to ensure that
he was not able to derive their meaning solely on the basis
of semantic predictability.
The results of this comparative study are fascinating:
Kanzi was correct on 72 percent of the 650 sentences on
which they were tested, while Alia was correct on 66 per-
cent. Even in the cases that were classified as errors, Kanzi
was usually partially correct. For example, if asked to fetch
two objects from some location he might return with only
one. Or he might give the right item to the wrong person,
or the wrong item to the right person. In those cases where
both Kanzi and Alia were completely mistaken in their 
responses, it was generally either because of inattention 
or because they responded to some atypical request (e.g.,
“Put the knife in the hat”) with a customary action (Kanzi
attempted to cut a bar of soap with the knife and Alia at-
tempted to cut an apple).
Perhaps the most striking difference between Kanzi and
Alia was in respect to their memory abilities: Alia could tol-
erate fairly long delays before she executed the task that 
had been requested, whereas Kanzi needed to act fairly
promptly if he was to succeed. Yet Kanzi actually performed
better than Alia when asked to go to a distal location to fetch
an object. Interesting to note, both experienced difficulty
when confronted with conversational implicatures. For ex-
ample, they were asked to “Go outdoors and get an orange”
while seated in front of an array of objects that included an
orange. Half of the time Kanzi would pick up the object im-
mediately in front of him and then go to the location named,
while Alia responded in a similar fashion 25 percent of the
time. But when the ambiguity was removed and he was
asked, for example, to ‘Go get the orange that’s outdoors,”
Kanzi responded appropriately 91 percent of the time.
These controlled studies confirmed Kanzi’s ability to un-
derstand English sentences displaying a variety of syntactic
patterns. Some of these sentences exhibited a degree of
syntactic complexity, including the use of embedded con-
structions. And many of the sentences were paired with
their semantic inversion so as to ensure that Kanzi was re-
sponding to the syntactic structure, and not simply to se-
mantic cues. This proven ability to understand spoken sen-
tences in English represents a new dimension in ALR. But
what are the implications of this advance for our under-
standing of nonhuman primate communicative capacities,
and perhaps, for our understanding of language acquisi-
tion? Once again, the contrast between Deacon’s discussion
of this issue and Savage-Rumbaugh’s is highly illuminating.
Deacon’s argument is a definitive example of the subtlety
that is possible on the information-processing paradigm.
He begins by placing Kanzi’s current linguistic proficiency
at around the level of a three-year-old child, which is more
than high enough to pose a formidable challenge to nativist
theories of language acquisition (Deacon 1997, p. 125). But
then, this leaves us with a paradox. Assuming that Kanzi ac-
quired the rudiments of language whereas Matata did not,
simply because he was exposed to a language-enriched en-
vironment from birth whereas she was wild-born and was
ten years old when Savage-Rumbaugh started working with
her, why should Kanzi’s brain have evinced a “language-spe-
cific critical-period adaptation” when apes in the wild do
not possess language (Deacon 1997, p. 126)? Furthermore,
Deacon argues that the Kanzi research highlights the same
“basic paradox” that we see in language acquisition: namely,
why should Kanzi have easily mastered a task which, prima
facie, is far more complex than simpler tasks requiring con-
scious memorization of novel associations?
Generativists have, of course, long capitalized on the lat-
ter paradox in order to bolster their claim that a child must
possess innate knowledge of the “principles and parame-
ters” of language (Pinker 1994). But Deacon eschews this
nativist strategy and, in its stead, pursues the same sort of
“less-is-more” solution as Elissa Newport does, arguing that
the child’s general cognitive deficit vis-à-vis problem-solv-
ing may actually be an advantage when it comes to lan-
guage-learning (see Newport 1991). Perhaps this is the rea-
son why Kanzi was able to make the categorial shift from
indexical to symbolic association spontaneously, whereas
Sherman and Austin required extensive training in order to
experience this “mental reorganization.” Perhaps Kanzi’s
mind worked differently, not because there is something
unique about Kanzi, but because there is something dis-
tinctive about the brain of an infant primate. Indeed, per-
haps there is something unique about the structure of lan-
guage that renders it ideally suited for an “immature” mind
to acquire.
By no means is Deacon challenging the premise that a
child – or an ape – must acquire grammar when he or she
acquires language; for grammar, he insists, is “essential 
to successful [symbolic] communication” (Deacon 1997,
p. 128), insofar as it enables a subject to predict which sym-
bol combinations are licit and which nonsensical. But Dea-
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con’s argument side-steps the whole controversy over
whether Kanzi’s achievements constitute “true” language.
For, on Deacon’s terms, what is clear is that Kanzi has ac-
quired a symbolic system with a simple grammar equivalent
(if not identical) to that of a three-year-old child, and that
in itself is all that really matters here: that is, if we can ex-
plain the psychological mechanism that enabled Kanzi to
acquire symbols and a grammar, perhaps we shall therein
discover the key to the “basic paradox” in the study of lan-
guage acquisition.
The crux of Deacon’s thesis lies in his earlier discussion
of Sherman and Austin. To review his argument: In the
combinatorial system on which Sherman and Austin were
trained, there were 720 pair sequences, most of which are
nonsensical. Granted this is still a large number, but with
enough time and patience it was possible to extinguish the
illicit combinations and overcome Sherman and Austin’s
“natural learning predispositions that worked against their
discovery of the symbolic reference associations of the lex-
igrams they were taught” (Deacon 1997, p. 125). But, with
Kanzi, we are talking about a productive system of 250 sym-
bols and a comprehension system of at least 650 words.
Clearly any thought of systematically extinguishing illicit
combinations is untenable; for the system is large enough
that a version of Gold’s Theorem applies here as much as to
natural languages.
It was undoubtedly because he was exposed to language
from birth, that Kanzi “crossed the same cognitive thresh-
old [as Sherman and Austin] supported mostly by his own
spontaneous structuring of the learning process” (Deacon
1997, p. 125). That is, Kanzi had to undergo the same cog-
nitive transition as Sherman and Austin – from indexical to
symbolic associations – but he did so spontaneously, be-
cause his brain was exposed to this task at a time when his
prefrontal cortex was still relatively under-developed. Thus,
our task is to explain what it was about “Kanzi’s immaturity
[that] made it easier [for him] to make the shift from in-
dexical to symbolic reference and to learn at least the global
grammatical logic hidden behind the surface structure of
spoken English” (Deacon 1997, p. 137). Kanzi’s cognitive
deficits must somehow have resulted in a match between
his “spontaneous structuring of the learning process” and
“the structure of the patterns to be learned” (Deacon 1997,
p. 128).
As noted above, one of the more intriguing contrasts that
emerged in the Kanzi-Alia comparative study was the dif-
ference between their short-term memory capacities. But
this disparity is not surprising, given the rapid pace of a
child’s cortical development in the first two years of life.
Kanzi’s short-term memory capacity would likely be closer
to that of, say, a one-year-old child. This point turns out to
be important for Deacon’s thesis, for he wants to argue that,
in general, the immature primate brain renders it difficult
for infants to attend to surface details. That is, because of
his short-term memory deficits, Kanzi found it difficult to
store specific symbol-object associations. But this turned
out to be an advantage when it came to language-learning,
precisely because grammar and syntax are “surface expres-
sions of the deep web of symbolic relationships” (Deacon
1997, p. 128).
Thus, the reason why Kanzi acquired so much more lan-
guage than Sherman and Austin, and acquired it so much
more easily, has nothing to do with that extra one percent
of “human DNA” supposedly possessed by bonobos (see
Marks 2002); nor the fact that “bonobos manifest a more 
intricate socio-communicative repertoire, including the 
use of more gestures and more vocalization, than common
chimps do” (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994, p. 125).
Rather, Deacon argues that the basic difference between
Sherman and Austin and Kanzi, concerns the stage of cor-
tical development which each had reached when they were
first exposed to language. Given their greater attentional
and short-term memory capacities, the chimps’ natural
learning predisposition was to focus on the details of word-
object relationships, whereas Kanzi’s natural learning pre-
disposition was to inhibit these “surface details.” It was this
initial “learning bias” which enabled Kanzi “to notice the ex-
istence of superordinate patterns of combinatorial relation-
ships between symbols” (Deacon 1997, p. 136).
The reason why Kanzi’s achievements are so relevant to
language acquisition, therefore, is “because if his prodi-
gious abilities are not the result of engaging some special
time-limited language acquisition module in his nonhuman
brain, then such a critical period mechanism is unlikely to
provide the explanation for the language prescience of hu-
man children either” (Deacon 1997, p. 137). That is, “Pre-
cisely because of children’s [general] learning constraints,
the relevant large-scale logic of language ‘pops out’ of a
background of other details too variable for them to follow”
(Deacon 1997, p. 135). Deacon is comparing language ac-
quisition to the perceptual phenomenon in which a stimu-
lus automatically “pops out” from a field of distractors in the
preattentive stage of perception (Triesman 1986). So too,
Deacon wants to argue, with grammar: here, the “distrac-
tors” are the indexical associations between signs and ob-
jects, and what “pops out” are the symbolic associations that
are a function of the distributed relationships among the
symbols in a system.
Thus, rather than supposing that the human brain must
somehow have been “hardwired” during the Pleistocene to
acquire language, it must be languages that have evolved in
such a way as to capitalize on this bias of the immature
brain. That is,
Language structures may have preferentially adapted to chil-
dren’s learning biases and limitations because languages that
are more easily acquired at an early age will tend to replicate
more rapidly and with greater fidelity from generation to gen-
eration than those that take more time or neurological maturity
to be mastered. (Deacon 1997, p. 137)
But then, what the Kanzi research suggests is that what
holds true for the human brain is, in fact, a more general
property of the higher primate brain. Hence, if great apes
in the wild lack language, this presumably must be due to
nongenetic factors.
The idea of the “biases,” which lies at the heart of Dea-
con’s thesis, harkens back to AI’s notion of cognitive heuris-
tics. It is no coincidence that a computational metaphor
should play such an integral role in his theory, for his argu-
ment is fundamentally mechanistic: his notion of “mental
reorganization” is that of a spontaneous processing phe-
nomenon that is brought about by the exposure to appro-
priate inputs during a sensitive period. Thus, Kanzi’s ad-
vanced communicational abilities are the result of a “mental
re-coding” – literally, the acquisition of a symbolic code –
that occurs “spontaneously, without conscious effort or for-
mal instruction [and] is deployed without awareness of its
underlying logic” (Pinker 1994, p. 18). It turns out that the
obstacles to this process – which most of us encounter as
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adults when we try to acquire a second language – are con-
scious effort and attention to the details.
A crucial aspect of Deacon’s argument is the idea that
Kanzi acquired his language skills spontaneously, around
the age of two. But Savage-Rumbaugh places great empha-
sis on the events leading up to that momentous day when
she discovered that Kanzi had acquired eight lexigram sym-
bols without any direct instruction. For example, she tells
us that at around the age of six months, Kanzi “became mes-
merized by the keyboard, staring at the symbols as they
flashed onto the projectors at the top of the keyboard” (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994, p. 129). When he was 14-
months-old, Kanzi began “to press keys on the keyboard
and then run to the vending machine as though he had
grasped the idea that hitting keys produced food” (Savage-
Rumbaugh & Lewin, p. 130). At this stage, his behavior was
similar to Matata’s, who had also grasped the communica-
tive function of the lexigram board, but had great difficulty
with individual lexigram-object associations. When he was
18-months-old, Kanzi started “inventing simple iconic ges-
tures, the first of which indicated the direction of travel in
which he wished to be carried. He did this not with a finger
point, but with an outstretched arm” (p. 134). He even
“added emphasis to his gesture by forcefully turning [Sav-
age-Rumbaugh’s] head in the direction he wished to go. . . .
At other times, as he sat on [her] shoulders, he would lean
his whole body in the desired direction of travel so that
there was no mistaking his intent” (p. 134). And he often
“vocalized while gesturing, which served to catch [her] at-
tention and to convey the emotional affect that accompa-
nied each request.”
Around the age of two, Kanzi started to incorporate lex-
igrams into his communicative repertoire. For example, he
“started deliberately to select the ‘chase’ symbol. He would
look over the board, touch this symbol, then glance about
to see if [Savage-Rumbaugh] had noticed and whether
[she] would agree to chase him” (p. 134). Also interesting,
on that first day after Matata’s departure, when he was left
alone at the lab with Savage-Rumbaugh, the first thing
Kanzi did with the board “was to activate ‘apple,’ then
‘chase.’ He then picked up an apple, looked at me, and ran
away with a play grin on his face” (p. 135). Throughout that
day he repeatedly “hit food keys, and when [Savage-Rum-
baugh] took him to the refrigerator, he selected those foods
he’d indicated on the keyboard. Kanzi was using specific
lexigrams to request and name items, and to announce his
intention” (p. 135).
Savage-Rumbaugh’s explanation of Kanzi’s language de-
velopment proceeds from essentially the same starting-
point as Deacon’s; for she too would argue that “if early 
exposure to language is even part of the explanation for
Kanzi’s comparatively exceptional language acquisition,
then it must be attributable to something about infancy in
general, irrespective of language (Savage-Rumbaugh &
Lewin 1994, pp. 126–27). But, as is clear from the forego-
ing account, the focus of her argument is on the importance
of Kanzi’s communicational development for the develop-
ment of his language skills. In many ways, Kanzi’s acquisi-
tion of lexigram symbols is reminiscent of the effects of pre-
literate experiences on a child’s acquisition of reading skills;
for, typically, the more a caregiver reads to an infant, the
more the child understands about the function of the
printed word, and thus, the faster the child learns how to
read (see Adams 1998). Moreover, one cannot ignore the
dominant role of affect in communicative development; for
the most effective speech-language therapies for children
with severe language delays are those that mobilize the
child’s affects (see Thomson 2001). Significantly, Kanzi’s
first “language act” with the board the day after Matata was
taken away was not to obtain a food that he wanted to eat
but to engage Savage-Rumbaugh in one of his favorite pas-
times.
In Savage-Rumbaugh’s mind, the most important deci-
sion that they made was to “abandon any and all plans of
[formally] teaching Kanzi and simply to offer him an envi-
ronment that maximized the opportunity for him to learn 
as much as possible” (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994,
p. 137). This decision demanded that they create new lexi-
grams for the most important aspects of Kanzi’s day-to-day
activities: for example, the names of foods, caregivers, other
apes, locations in the forest, toys and games. No symbols
were inserted solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether
Kanzi could grasp some abstract concept. If anything, we
should look at the board in the same way that we look at
motherese; for the board was not designed to test or to in-
struct: it was designed to facilitate interactions by providing
Kanzi with an artificial communication tool (and a fairly
cumbersome one at that). As a result, Kanzi’s “communica-
tions soon began to revolve around his daily activities, such
as where we were going to travel in the forest, what we
would eat, the games we wanted to play, the toys Kanzi
liked, the items we carried in our backpacks, television
shows Kanzi liked to watch, and visits to Sherman and
Austin” (p. 139). The conclusion that Savage-Rumbaugh
reaches is the opposite from Deacon’s: Far from being the
result of a spontaneous “mental reorganization,” she argues
that Kanzi’s language development was a prolonged process
that occurred because he “was aware that we employed the
keyboard as a means of communication and apparently felt
keenly motivated to do so as well” (p. 139).
It might be tempting to conclude that one could simply
combine these two arguments: that is, treat Deacon’s infor-
mation-processing account as providing the underlying
psychological explanation of the communicative develop-
ment described in Savage-Rumbaugh’s dynamic systems
approach. But it is important that we recognize just how
much the two paradigms differ, not only in their explana-
tion of how Kanzi acquired his prodigious abilities, but also
in their understanding of the nature of those abilities. On
Deacon’s argument, the “grammar” of the system that
Kanzi acquired is something that pre-existed his encounter
with it, and the problem that Deacon sets out to answer is:
How was Kanzi able to see and thus acquire this structure?
But the problem that Savage-Rumbaugh addresses is: How
did Kanzi’s verbal skills emerge in the context of, and as a
way of augmenting and co-regulating, his nonverbal inter-
actions? How were Kanzi’s natural communicative abilities
shaped by the co-regulated interactions in which he en-
gaged into linguistic skills: that is, into acts of reference, ut-
terances, truths and falsities, apologies, explanations, cor-
rections, and so forth?
Once again, Savage-Rumbaugh pursues a similar kind of
interactional explanation as that which Tomasello (1999)
explores in The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Ac-
cording to Tomasello, “sounds become language for young
children when and only when they understand that the
adult is making that sound with the intention that they at-
tend to something. This understanding is not a foregone
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conclusion, but a developmental achievement” (Tomasello
1999, p. 101; our emphasis). This developmental achieve-
ment is only realized when “the two interactants share an
understanding of each other’s interactive goals” in whatever
the context in which they are engaged (p. 99). To see how
this argument relates to Kanzi’s linguistic development we
might consider a few scenes from the NHK video, Kanzi:
An Ape Genius: The Cookout. Kanzi and Savage-Rum-
baugh are engaged in a clearly defined joint activity. When
asked by Savage-Rumbaugh, Kanzi collects and breaks
sticks for the fire. He chooses long sticks to break and picks
up short sticks that he does not break. When Savage-Rum-
baugh tells him that he can get the lighter from her pocket,
he immediately responds by reaching one hand into her
pocket. Savage-Rumbaugh stands up in order to make the
pocket more accessible. The moment she says he can use
the lighter to start the fire, he is already starting to do so.
He tries several times to light the fire and only stops, and
drops the lighter in the fire, when he sees that the flame has
taken. Interesting to note, he chooses to light the paper and
not, say, one of the larger branches. He then stares very in-
tently at the growing flames.
4.1. Match-to-sample test
This is one of the most familiar tasks that have been done
with Kanzi. The scene begins with Kanzi seated in front of
a large lexigram board while Rose is standing behind him,
and Sue and a male worker are standing at a small window
in an adjacent room around five feet away, giving him in-
structions through a microphone. The test begins with
Kanzi half-turning in his seat to look at Rose, who says
“Let’s listen some more.” He turns back to the board, then
orients to the right to the sound of his name, then immedi-
ately turns back to the board when Sue says his name, rec-
ognizing that this is his cue to look at the board. When he
hears the spoken word he quickly points to the correct sym-
bol and Rose says, “Yes.” Kanzi vocalizes and it sounds like
he too may be trying to make the same sound [yz]. Sue says
“ice,” and as he points to the key, he vocalizes [ice?]? He
and Rose then interact in a play tickle (initiated by Rose).
Then the male worker says “balloon”: Kanzi can be seen to
be leaning towards him at this precise moment, and it is not
clear whether Kanzi is leaning in response to the vocaliza-
tion (perhaps to hear better), or his leaning is cuing the 
vocalization. He scans the board left-to-right and doesn’t
move until he has spotted the correct key, and then extends
his left index finger. (Throughout this sequence he always
points at the selected key with his left index finger. He al-
ways withdraws the point as soon as the synthesizer articu-
lates the sound.)
The sequence is repeated, with Kanzi seated before the
board but looking over his right shoulder at the male worker
until he says a word. Rose says “Good Kanzi” when he gets
it right, and he can be seen to dip his head when she says
this. The worker then says “chicken” and Kanzi methodi-
cally scans the board, left-to-right, right-to-left, then left-
to-right again (6 seconds in total) before he sees the key. He
does not begin to point until he has found the key. The male
worker says “hot dog” and again Kanzi scans left-to-right
and points with his left index finger. Now Rose says (for the
first time): “Perfecto,” and raises her arms and stands with
her hands open. She says this with a different tone of voice,
which seems to indicate that the task is over, as does the ges-
ture (inviting hug?). Kanzi vocalizes himself, and it sounds
like he’s trying to imitate her vocalization. Then he turns
and starts to get off the chair, suggesting that he too thinks
that Rose’s vocalization indicated that he was finished. But
Sue interrupts saying “one more.” He immediately sits back
down and turns back to the board. The worker says “grapes”
and Kanzi quickly points to the key. Rose has been stand-
ing with her arms raised all this time. When Kanzi points to
grapes she says, in an even more emphatic tone: “Success.”
As she says this, she lowers her arms and starts to move to-
wards him. He interprets this as indicating that the task re-
ally is over and stands up, but he moves to the window and
not to Rose (who is advancing towards him). He looks out
the window (to see if Sue is getting him food?) while Rose
hugs him from behind. Hugging him Rose says “Good job,”
with a rising intonation, then repeats “Good job,” with a
falling intonation. There can be no doubt now that the ses-
sion is over. He begins to look towards Rose and she fixates
directly on his eyes and, with her own eyes very wide open
says: “And then we’ll get some more grapes.” He vocalizes
([yz]?) and Rose, turning and moving away, says “How does
that sound?” It is Kanzi’s turn to respond excitedly, vocaliz-
ing, standing upright, and swinging his arms, which draws
Rose back to him. The two of them start to move and vo-
calize together excitedly, their arm movements and vocal-
izations mimicking each other.
4.2. Kanzi and Tamuli
In this scene, Sue is seated on one side of a chain-link fence
and, immediately opposite her are seated Kanzi and Tamuli,
his adoptive half-sister at the LRC who has received little
exposure to language. The contrast between Kanzi’s and
Tamuli’s behavior in this scene is fascinating. It starts with
Sue repeatedly saying Tamuli’s name and pointing at her 
to get her attention. Then Sue says: “Tamuli, could you slap
Kanzi? Tamuli, you (pointing), slap Kanzi.” Tamuli does
nothing, but Kanzi himself starts to gently slap Tamuli on
her back. Then he shakes her arm (which is resting on his
leg) and vocalizes quietly. Tamuli is looking all around and
seems to regard all this as a game, for there is a large play-
grin on her face, and she is uttering play-grunts. Sue tries
something else: “Tamuli, could you give Kanzi a hug?” As
Sue says this Kanzi leans forward towards Tamuli, lowers
his head, and hugs her. Sue laughs, starts to say “Kanzi
is . . .” But Tamuli continues to look all around with a play-
grin on her face. Sue tries a third request: “Tamuli, could
you groom Kanzi?” The moment she says this Kanzi picks
up Tamuli’s left hand and raises it to his chin while making
a facial gesture (rounded lips). He looks intently at Tamuli,
but when she fails to respond he shrugs off her arm. But
Sue immediately repeats “He’s asking you to groom him,”
and as she says this Kanzi engages in the exact same action,
holding Tamuli’s hand up to his chin and leaning forward.
As he does this, Sue is saying “look, he put your hand up
there . . . Isn’t that nice?” But again Tamuli doesn’t re-
spond, and Kanzi drops her hand. As he does so, Sue says
“look, he’s showing you.” But at this point Tamuli has lost
all interest in this game and moves off to play with someone
else, while Kanzi looks after her, then turns back to Sue and
receives a treat.
In all of these scenes (and several other examples in
Kanzi: An Ape Genius) we see Kanzi totally engaged in a
joint activity for a sustained period. There is a seamless web
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of communication between him and his caregiver in multi-
ple modalities and not just through spoken English. Much
of the communication occurs without Kanzi looking di-
rectly at the researcher as she speaks. In the first of the
three episodes, Kanzi clearly understands what he is being
asked to do. He knows what size of stick is needed for the
task and roughly how many sticks are needed. He under-
stands that Savage-Rumbaugh isn’t just informing him that
there is a lighter in her pocket, but that she is giving him
permission to fetch the lighter from her pocket in order to
start the fire.
The second scene demonstrates how Kanzi can attend to
multiple speakers and even grasps whom he should respond
to at any given moment. The task itself is clearly something
he can easily perform despite the complexity of the array.
In a couple of cases it is clear that he doesn’t know where
the symbol he needs is situated, but rather than searching
randomly, he systematically scans the board until he’s found
the right symbol. The manner in which this session ends is
also interesting: rather than any one of the participants for-
mally signalling an end to the task, we can see them nego-
tiating with each other before they are satisfied that they
have reached a closing.
In the final scene Kanzi recognizes immediately that
Tamuli has not understood what she is being asked to do. It
is significant, not only that he wants to help her, but also,
that he repeatedly tries to show her what she is being asked
to do. The difference between the manner in which this ses-
sion and the previous scene ends is also interesting. Her at-
tention no longer engaged, Tamuli simply wanders off; but
Kanzi remains seated with Sue and turns back to her, at
which point they jointly negotiate an end to the activity.
In each of the preceding three paragraphs we have relied
heavily on the use of epistemic operators to describe Kanzi’s
behavior. To appreciate how such an argument differs from
an information-processing approach, one has to go back to
the argument introduced in the preceding section about the
language-games in which these terms are used. For the ar-
gument here does not turn on what may or may not have
been going on inside Kanzi’s mind. Rather, the crux of this
argument is that Kanzi behaves in a manner that satisfies
the criteria for describing him as “understanding what he is
being asked to do”; as “knowing that Savage-Rumbaugh is
giving him permission to fetch the lighter”; as “recognizing
that Tamuli has not understood what she is being asked to
do”; and so on. For example, we do not infer that Kanzi un-
derstands Savage-Rumbaugh’s request to “Go wash the
potatoes, cut them up, and put them in a pot on the stove”
when we observe him turn on the kitchen faucet, wash the
potatoes, fetch a knife, cut the potatoes into pieces, place
all these in a pot, fill the pot with water, and then place this
on the stove. This behavior is just what is called “under-
standing the request.” If one insists on further criteria be-
fore one is prepared to sanction this description of Kanzi’s
behavior (e.g., that Kanzi is able to do this with different
kinds of vegetables, that he can pick out a potato from a
table laden with different kinds of vegetables, that he un-
derstands the relation between potato and vegetable, etc.),
this merely signifies that the application of “understands
the request” may sometimes demand greater behavioral
complexity than might be afforded by a simple or a single
comprehension task, and not that comprehension is some
epistemically private mental process or state underlying an
organism’s behavior.
There are many other scenes that we could have dis-
cussed that demonstrate equally striking examples of lin-
guistic behavior. Scenes in which Kanzi can be seen to cor-
rect himself, or explain something, or apologize for an
action; scenes in which he engages in pretend-play, or more
formal types of games (like Pacman); scenes in which he en-
gages in both imitative and creative problem-solving and
tool-making; or in which he seemingly understands what
someone is thinking or feeling; scenes in which he em-
pathizes with someone else’s feelings or mood. In other
words, the behavior that we observe in this video is very
much, as Deacon emphasizes, like that of a three-year-old
child.
For this very reason, Kanzi has been widely perceived as
something of an anomaly in ALR. His “prodigious abilities”
have been viewed – and in some cases even dismissed – as
a misleading indicator of nonhuman primate communi-
cative capacities, precisely because of the unusual circum-
stances in which he was raised; that is, in which he was
literally “raised” to an “unnatural” cognitive and commu-
nicative level, because he “receive[d] a kind of ‘socialization
of attention’” (Tomasello 1999, p. 35). That is, “responding
to a culture and creating a culture de novo” are seen as “two
different things” (Tomasello 1999, p. 36). As far as we know,
“apes in their natural habitats do not have anyone who
points for them, shows them things, teaches them, or in
general expresses intentions toward their attention” (p. 35).
Elsewhere (King & Shanker, in press), we look in some
detail at the issue of whether, or to what extent, great apes
in their natural habitats have displayed elements of such 
behaviors. The point we would like to focus on here is
Tomasello’s suggestion that when apes are raised in a hu-
man-like cultural environment, in which “they are con-
stantly interacting with humans who show them things,
point to things, encourage (even reinforce) imitation, and
teach them special skills,” they experience a “socialization
into the referential triangle – of a type that most human
children receive – that accounts for the special cognitive
achievements of these special apes” (King & Shanker, sub-
mitted, p. 35). Indeed, one of the principal effects of being
deprived of these socializing experiences – whether be-
cause of endogenous or exogenous reasons – is that both a
child and an ape develops the sorts of social and commu-
nicative deficits that are labelled “autistic” (Greenspan
1997; Harlow & Zimmerman 1959).
As we saw in the preceding section, Tomasello talks about
the “nine-month revolution” that occurs when an infant
starts to “‘tune in’ to the attention and behavior of adults to-
ward outside entitites” (Tomasello 1999, p. 62). From this
point on, the infant’s communicative behavior is marked by
gaze following, extended bouts of social interaction, joint
engagement, social referencing, imitative learning, and de-
ictic pointing (directed gaze, imperatives, declaratives). It
seems likely that the regularities observed in the appear-
ance of these behaviors are related to “critical periods” in
the child’s neurobiological development (see Johnson 1997).
But then, one must not overlook the importance of a care-
giver’s behavior (e.g., smiling, facial animation, body pos-
ture, gaze, etc.) during these “critical periods” for the
child’s cortico-cortical and neurohormonal development
(see Schore 1994). That is, here too, the significance of the
developmental manifold cannot be divorced from what
might appear to be strictly maturational events (see Gott-
lieb 1997).
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Moreover, every one of the above communicational be-
haviors has been observed in Kanzi. This suggests, not only
that the development of these abilities is not confined to
humans, but more important, that the development of
these abilities is not genetically predetermined. Rather, the
child’s growing ability to engage with her caregivers in com-
plex communicational activities, express her intentions and
desires, and describe and express her ideas and feelings, all
develop in the context of close dyadic relationships with her
primary caregivers. And herein lies the crux of the dynamic
systems alternative to Deacon’s information-processing
view about what it is “about infancy in general, irrespective
of language,” that enables a primate to develop language
skills.
We are not concerned here with what might or might not
have gone on “inside Kanzi’s head” that enabled him to de-
velop language skills; nor is language viewed as a combina-
torial system whose “structure” he had to “grasp.” Rather,
language is viewed as a particular type of reflexive activity
in which Kanzi was enculturated (see Shanker 2001; Taylor
& Shanker, in press). The psychological issue we are con-
cerned with here is how Kanzi’s attentional capacities, his
use of lexigrams, and his comprehension of spoken English,
developed as a result of being nurtured in language-
enriched interactions with his caregivers. We saw in the
opening section how, in the dynamic systems paradigm,
communication is viewed as a “continuous unfolding of 
individual action that is susceptible to being continuously
modified by the continuously changing actions of the part-
ner” (Fogel 1993, p. 29). Hence, the ability to attend to an-
other subject’s actions – and all of the other executive func-
tions (see Russell 1997) – are both vital to, and continue to
develop as a result of, the “communicational dances” in
which the infant engages with her caregivers.
On this line of thinking, what the research with Kanzi ul-
timately shows us is how an infant’s cognitive and commu-
nicative development involves an ongoing and complex 
interplay between biological, social, and cultural factors,
rendering it not just difficult, but conceptually misguided,
to attempt to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between a
child’s communicative and her linguistic development.
Language does not suddenly appear at some predeter-
mined age, or in predetermined stages, but rather, gradu-
ally emerges as a means of co-regulating and augmenting
such primal activities as sharing, requesting, imitating, and
playing. The child or ape is increasingly motivated to use
and develop these potential communicational tools so that
she may achieve context-dependent, interactional goals:
goals which themselves develop as a function of the child or
ape’s developing communicational environment, and her or
his growing abilities and increasingly differentiated affects.
5. The implications of the new paradigm
The basic premise of the information-processing paradigm
which has hitherto governed the study of ape communica-
tion is that, given that great apes are “penultimate” to hu-
mans (at least, in the existing natural order), we can expect
them to possess sophisticated, but not quite fully human
communicational abilities: for example, conscious and in-
tentional, but not normative or creative. If one adopts a Pi-
agetian model of cognitive development, one would expect
to find that great apes consistently perform at an early stage
of human cognition: for example, the sixth sub-stage of sen-
sori-motor development. That is, one would expect to find
them confined to a point that is just prior to when human
infants burst forth into the world of creative thinking, hu-
man social cognition, and language.
The mind of the great ape is thus thought to be at the
stage where it is just starting to become purposive and in-
tentional, but is still characterized by poor abstract thinking
(e.g., perceptually-bound) and is highly egocentric (see
Parker & McKinney 1999). Hence, the challenge rendered
by the information-processing paradigm is to establish the
fixed parameters of great ape communicative behaviour: for
example, the basic manner in which they communicate
(both send and receive/respond); the kinds of messages
that they communicate; the stimuli that prompt them to
communicate; and the functions of their communications.
It is thought that, in answering these questions, we shall
deepen our understanding of great apes’ cognitive and
communicative capacities and perhaps thereby illuminate
the more “primitive” elements of human communication
that underpin or accompany linguistic communication; that
is, those aspects of human communication that are said to
be “paralinguistic” (see Argyle 1988).
The problem with the information-processing paradigm
is that, not only does it set an upper limit on the communi-
cational complexity of the species being studied, it also
shapes how that complexity is conceptualized. In the early
days of information-processing studies, when great apes
were still being viewed as stimulus-bound creatures, it was
natural enough to think of their communicative behaviors
in linear terms. But it is difficult to see how great apes could
engage in the complex and sustained interactions that have
been documented over the past decades if their commu-
nicative behaviors were limited to a signal/response mode.
The idea of creative communicative behaviors emerging
from such discrete interactions is rendered virtually impos-
sible; but some of the most striking advances in recent years
have been in regard to learning just how creative is the mind
of the great ape (see Allen & Bekoff 1997).
As useful as the information-processing paradigm might
be for cybernetic systems, or for some simple organisms, it
is difficult to account for the kinds of communicational
complexity that we observe in nonhuman primates in
terms of turn-taking sequences in which the subject is ei-
ther sending or receiving, either active or passive. For,
great apes are continuously active when communicating,
continually adjusting their gestures and vocalizations to
one another (see Johnson 1993; 2001). The quantity, type,
and manner of gesturing vary with age, social conditions,
activity, and the subject’s wishes. Species-typical gestures,
such as slapping, clapping, pounding, and chest-beating,
have been seen to vary from one group to another, from
one individual to another, and from one age to another
(Tanner & Byrne 1999). Infants have demonstrated a
growing awareness of the communicative significance of
their own gestures (King 2000; Parker & McKinney 1999).
Individuals have been observed to create new gestures,
and possibly, to generalize these idiosyncratic gestures to
other communicational situations (Tanner & Byrne 1999).
Individuals have been observed to restrain their sup-
posedly innate and automatic gestures (Tanner & Byrne
1999). And extremely subtle variations have been observed
in “species-typical” behaviors: for example, whether an ape
touching another moves its hand vertically or horizontally;
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quickly or slowly; lightly or more heavily; with a pushing or
a pulling motion.
Furthermore, we have to absorb the implications of the
startling advances that have been made in ALR. In addition
to the surprising number of symbols and syntactical pat-
terns that bonobos have mastered, it is also important to
note that they have demonstrated the ability to play games
that are based on complex rules; engage in sophisticated
make-believe and role-playing; solve complex tasks imita-
tively and creatively; perform remarkably well on match-to-
sample tasks (even when the instructions are delivered
through earphones or by different speakers); deal easily
with simple Theory of Mind tasks; and even engage in nor-
mative behaviors such as justifying or explaining their own
actions, or trying to teach or correct another ape’s actions
(see Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998; Shanker & Taylor 2001).
One might object that such studies tell us little about nat-
ural great ape abilities, insofar as it is only human interven-
tion that has enabled apes to rise to these cognitive and
communicative levels (see Tomasello 1999). But then, that
is surely the point of such studies; for by demonstrating the
plasticity of great ape capacities, we are learning about the
significance of caregiving practices for nonhuman primate
development.
Taking all these factors together we can see how, far from
being fixed and invariant, great ape communicative behav-
iors in the wild, as well as in research facilities, are carefully
nurtured and culturally variable. In place of the informa-
tion-processing model that has hitherto dominated the
study of ape communication and ALR, therefore, we be-
lieve that it is imperative that we shift to a dynamic systems
paradigm, which places the emphasis on the dyad rather
than on the isolated individual; which sees great ape com-
munication as a co-regulated activity rather than a linear
and discrete sequence; which focuses on the creativity of
ape communicative behaviors rather than treating them as
phenotypic traits; which is better able to account for both
the social complexity and the developmental character of
nonhuman primate communicative abilities; and which
looks at how language skills emerge as a means of co-regu-
lating and augmenting such primal activities as sharing, re-
questing, imitating, and playing.
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NOTES
1. We follow conventional practice in referring to the care-
giver-infant dyad as the primary context for infant development,
but endorse Fivaz-Depeursinge and Corboz-Warnery’s (1999) ap-
proach to studying triadic interactions in early infancy.
2. As in the case in child developmental research, we see am-
ple evidence in the primatological literature of the effects of good
versus poor caregiving on an infant’s development. In particular,
as we shall discuss below, Savage-Rumbaugh’s work with the chim-
panzees Sherman and Austin, and with the bonobo Kanzi, has dra-
matically demonstrated just how significant the effects of caregiv-
ing can be on an ape’s communicative development (infra). Pri-
matological research is amassing ever more extensive evidence of
social modifiability in several different modalities (see Seyfarth &
Cheney 1997; Snowdon 1999).
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Ethnography should replace experimentation
David F. Armstrong
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Abstract: This paper points to the need in ape language research to shift
from experimentation to ethnography. We cannot determine what goes on
inside the head of an ape when it communicates with a human being, but
we can learn about the nature and content of the communication that oc-
curs in such face-to-face interaction. This information is fundamental for
establishing a baseline for the abilities of an ape-human common ancestor.
Bishop Berkeley hinted darkly,
if I can’t see you, you can’t be you.
I begin my commentary with this bit of philosophical doggerel be-
cause it reflects the important epistemological and methodologi-
cal issues that are raised by Shanker & King (S&K). Moreover, it
points to an equally important question of perception and judg-
ment that their article also attempts to answer. The epistemolog-
ical issue concerns the impossibility of knowing what goes on in-
side an ape’s head when it engages in communicative behavior
with other apes or with human beings. Critics of ape language re-
search (ALR) generally raise this issue and go beyond it by assert-
ing that apes cannot have the sort of mental representation sys-
tems that are presumably required to support the use of language.
Understanding these putative systems in human beings has been
a major goal of cognitive science. S&K want to move us beyond
this epistemological barrier by proposing that, at some level, the
question is irrelevant. This may be especially true for those of us
interested in how the communicative behavior of apes bears on
the origins of human language. We will never know what went on
inside the heads of australopithecines or early representatives of
genus Homo either, but it is vitally important to know what sorts
of behaviors these hominids might have been capable of, and ALR
can help us to establish a baseline.
In proposing that we move from an information-processing to
a dynamic systems paradigm, S&K are also hinting at a method-
ological shift in ALR from formal experimentation to ethnography
as the principal means of gathering data, a position that has been
argued forcefully by Savage-Rumbaugh (1999). Ethnography is
here construed as “participant observation.” We may not be able
to get inside the ape’s head, but at least we can enter into its social
circle in a meaningful way, and that is the location from which
shared meaning emerges. It is only by interacting with another hu-
man being or with an ape that we can judge whether or not com-
munication has taken place. As S&K put it (target article, sect. 4.2)
when evaluating Kanzi’s appropriate responses to complex re-
quests: “This behavior just is what is called ‘understanding the re-
quest.’” For many years now, anthropology has insisted that a great
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deal of this sort of interaction must precede any judgments about
the language and culture of exotic groups of humans.
Let us now move to the questions of perception and judgment
that I introduced above. How do we perceive apes, how do we
judge their behavior, and why are these questions important? I be-
gin with this quotation from Sapir (1921) on the signed languages
of the deaf:
Still another interesting group of transfers are the different gesture lan-
guages, developed for the use of deaf-mutes, of Trappist monks vowed
to perpetual silence, or of communicating parties that are within seeing
distance of each other but are out of earshot. Some of these systems are
one-to-one equivalences of the normal system of speech; others, like
military gesture-symbolism or the gesture language of the Plains Indi-
ans of North America (understood by tribes of mutually unintelligible
forms of speech), are imperfect transfers, limiting themselves to the
rendering of such grosser speech elements as are an imperative mini-
mum under difficult circumstances. (p. 21)
This is interesting because it represents two prejudices that were
shown to be wrong by Stokoe (1960) and subsequently by many
others: Language is spoken and the signing done by deaf people
is simply a substitution code for speech (if it is even that sophisti-
cated). An early goal of sign language linguistics was to prove to a
skeptical world that these languages of the deaf were full-fledged
human languages, and the early descriptions of them tended to
stress their structural similarities to speech, while asserting that
they were not simply codes for particular spoken languages (see
Taub 2001, p. 3). In a linguistics dominated by the generative ap-
proach, this was taken as further proof of the existence of univer-
sal grammar because these languages were expressed in a novel
medium.
It was only possible to learn how non-Western societies actually
functioned by going out and participating in them in situ. And only
the involvement of linguists fluent in sign, including deaf signers,
could lead to the fuller and richer descriptions of signed languages
and their cognitive and neural underpinnings that are now emerg-
ing (Emmorey 2002; Taub 2001; Wilcox 2000). If we had accepted
the prejudgments of Sapir (1921) we would not have bothered to
study these languages in the first place, and if we had accepted the
prejudgments of a later generation of grammarians there would
have been no need to study them in depth because we could have
assumed that they were simply products of universal grammar,
hence just like spoken languages. The truth has turned out to be
vastly richer and more interesting than either of these sorts of as-
sumptions would have led us to believe.
Non-Western people and deaf people living in industrial soci-
eties are all members of species Homo sapiens, and we should be
willing to license their communicative behavior as linguistic. But
we should recognize, by the same token, that only fairly recently
have the human “sciences,” as developed by Westerners, been
willing to so license their behavior. Previously, their behavior,
communicative and otherwise, was dismissed as inferior, and it
was easy for European scholars to find justifications for this. So,
we should be suspicious of similar offhand dismissals of the be-
havior of animals that are as closely related to us as chimpanzees
and bonobos.
What can all of this tell us about the status of ape-human inter-
action and ALR? Linguistics could be properly defined as the
study of human languages, and language could be defined as
something that is only done by members of species Homo sapiens.
But to adopt this position also seems like something of an intel-
lectual cop-out. Of course, human language must be different
from whatever apes do when they communicate among them-
selves or with human beings. S&K have moved us considerably in
the direction of understanding what it is that occurs during these
interactions, and they have rightly insisted on the importance of
acquiring this knowledge.
A new paradigm?
John D. Bonvilliana and Francine G. P. Pattersonb
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Abstract: Shanker & King argue for a shift in the focus of ape language
research from an emphasis on information processing to a dynamic sys-
tems approach. We differ from these authors in our understanding of how
this “new paradigm” emerged and in our perceptions of its limitations. We
see information processing and dynamic systems as complementary ap-
proaches in the study of communication.
Shanker & King (S&K) assert that a new research approach has
emerged, one in which the interaction between organisms is con-
ceived as continuously changing, multifaceted, and mutually co-
ordinated (a dynamic systems approach), as opposed to the linear,
rule-governed information-processing approach. The authors de-
pict this dynamic systems approach to language as a partnered
dance and recommend a research focus on the interactional syn-
chrony of communication partners.
How new is this approach? The importance of focusing on the
interaction between a caregiver and her infant has a long history in
developmental psychology, particularly in attachment research.
Nearly 50 years ago Mary Ainsworth pioneered this approach in her
longitudinal studies of child development. Earlier investigators of
maternal caretaking typically followed one of two approaches: mak-
ing global impressionistic accounts of the quality of care, or count-
ing the number of discrete behaviors produced by a caregiver. The
latter approach had advantages over the former in that counting dis-
crete behaviors often resulted in high intercoder agreement and
numerical data amenable to statistical analyses. Ainsworth’s impor-
tant insight was that a critical aspect of a caretaker’s behavior is not
the total number of times a caregiver produces a particular behav-
ior, but whether the caretaker produces the behavior as a response
to the infant’s signals. The research focus thus should be on the in-
fant’s signals and the caregiver’s responses to these signals.
Ainsworth and her associates subsequently showed that a child’s
development is dependent in part on the nature of the interaction
between mother and infant. Infants typically experienced more or
less successful outcomes depending on the nature and quality of
their interaction patterns with their caregivers. This focus on the
nature of the interaction between caregiver and child also proved
effective in discerning maltreating parents (Crittenden 1981) and
in the development and assessment of intervention programs for
maltreated children.
Although S&K allude to Ainsworth’s contribution (cf. Ains-
worth et al. 1978), no mention is made of the pioneering research
in interactional synchrony in psycholinguistics. Beginning in the
early 1960s, William Condon conducted studies using very fine-
grained analyses of the movements of a speaker and listener in 
accord with speech production. Condon showed that there are 
numerous movements by the speaker (self synchrony) and the 
listener (interactional synchrony) in association with the speaker’s
utterance. This research approach not only underlined the precise
and complex pattern of human communication, but also provided
compelling evidence that the processing of spoken language input
to children with autism may be markedly abnormal (Condon 1976).
If Condon’s approach of examining self and interactional syn-
chrony was such a substantial breakthrough in the understanding
of communication, then why was it not adopted more widely by in-
vestigators? We speculate that one important reason is that carry-
ing out the microkinetic analyses involved is extremely time-con-
suming. Condon often made dozens of measurements of different
head, limb, and body movements in association with vocal produc-
tion for each second of film. Although these interactional- and self-
synchrony approaches revealed a very rich psycholinguistic fabric
in human communication, many investigators may have been re-
luctant to invest the numerous hours needed to conduct such de-
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tailed and complex analyses. Other reasons for not embarking on
this approach may be the lack of agreement among investigators
about the size and scope of the processing units that should be an-
alyzed, confusion about the statistical procedures to employ, and
lack of awareness about the interactional-synchrony approach.
If S&K want additional investigators to use the interactional-
synchrony approach, then they will need to clearly delineate the
methodological techniques that investigators should employ. This
information is absent from their paper. Should one use the same mi-
crokinetic analyses as Condon? Defining and analyzing the nature
of the interactional units is an important and difficult step, but one
that is necessary before such an approach will be widely adopted.
The title of the target article (“The emergence of a new para-
digm in ape language research”) seems to imply that the focus on
interactional synchrony is new (it actually has a long history in psy-
cholinguistics) and that it will supplant information-processing ap-
proaches. We doubt that the latter will happen. The information-
processing approach has been an effective methodological approach
in linguistics for a long time. The interactional-synchrony ap-
proach underscores the richness of communication, but it is lim-
ited in many linguistic analyses. Rather than seeing the two ap-
proaches as incompatible, we see them as complementary.
S&K also advance the idea that the best way to study the lin-
guistic behavior of apes is by abandoning rather artificial training
plans and offering a more natural, immersive, and nurturing learn-
ing environment. The authors champion Savage-Rumbaugh’s work
as being a watershed in this regard. Yet, other investigators in ape
language research, particularly those employing sign language
(e.g., Gardner & Gardner 1994; Miles 1997; Patterson 1980; Pat-
terson & Linden 1981), reached this conclusion long before. Their
work has much to offer to this discussion.
Finally, we have reservations about the use of an interactional-
synchrony approach with the lexigrams used in Savage-Rumbaugh’s
research. The interactional-synchrony approach in psycholinguis-
tics emerged from analyses of speech and the listener’s movements
associated with its production. To the extent that sign language use
involves the sequential production of linguistic symbols in a com-
municative setting, we would expect it to be a worthwhile candidate
for interactional synchrony analyses. We are not as confident about
whether microkinetic analyses of a communication partner’s move-
ments would yield equivalent information when lexigrams are the
linguistic units. Lexigrams are relatively discrete units that are acti-
vated by touch and do not vary in production characteristics. Before
recommending analyses of interactional synchrony through investi-
gations involving lexigrams, the authors should examine how the in-
formation obtained from lexigrams resembles that obtained from
other language modes. Moreover, whereas speech and sign com-
munication emerged within human social interaction over many
eons, the same evolutionary communicative history would not ap-
ply to lexigrams. Even in spite of our concerns, however, we believe
that the interactional-synchrony approach, properly applied, will
make an important contribution to ape language research.
Language evolution in apes and autonomous
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Abstract: Computational approaches based on autonomous agents share
with new ape language research the same principles of dynamical system par-
adigms. A recent model for the evolution of symbolization and language in
autonomous agents is briefly described in order to highlight the similarities
between these two methodologies. The additional benefits of autonomous
agent modeling in the field of language origin research are highlighted.
The shift from information processing to dynamical system para-
digms has recently interested numerous research fields, in addi-
tion to that of ape language. In particular, the interdisciplinary
field of cognitive and behavioral modeling has not only undergone
such a change but has greatly contributed to its development. This
has been strongly influenced by the development and dissemina-
tion of computational approaches based on autonomous agents.
Such methodologies have been employed in the study of evolu-
tionary and adaptive behavior (Meyer & Wilson 1991), cognitive
science (Beer 2000; Parisi 1997), neuroscience (Ruppin 2002),
and language research (Cangelosi & Parisi 2002; Steels & Kaplan
2000). The autonomous agent methodology is characterized by
the following principles: (1) agents are situated and embodied sys-
tems, such as robots, continuously interact in their environment;
(2) the environment is in constant change due to the action of
agents, the dynamical properties of objects in it, and evolutionary
and learning phenomena; and (3) complex behavioral and cogni-
tive patterns emerge from this mutual interaction among agents
and between agents and environment. Additionally, in models
used for studying language, the communication between agents is
the result of a dynamical process depending on the sensorimotor,
social, cognitive, and neural abilities of autonomous individuals.
All of these principles are remarkably common with the prop-
erties and examples of the ape language dynamical system para-
digm discussed by Shanker & King (S&K). It is therefore surpris-
ing that the authors do not acknowledge the contribution of this
computational approach. As a matter of fact, a recent autonomous
agent model of language evolution (Cangelosi 2000; 2001) has di-
rectly referred to the relationship of ape language studies and the
evolution of symbolization. This model is briefly summarized here
and is used as an example that reinforces the similarity between
the dynamical systems paradigms of ape language research and
that of evolutionary autonomous agents. In addition, the benefits
of this comparative approach for language origins and evolution
are highlighted.
Some experiments on language acquisition in chimpanzees
have explicitly investigated symbolization abilities in apes (Savage-
Rumbaugh 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh 1978; Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1980). These studies make a clear operational
distinction between nonsymbolic and symbolic languages. When
animals use language in a nonsymbolic way, they simply learn con-
ditional associations linking signals and objects. Alternatively, real
symbolic languages are based on the learning of symbolic (e.g.,
syntactic) relationships between communication signals (Dea-
con 1997; Harnad 1990). Ape language studies have consistently
shown that chimpanzees can learn real symbolic relationships, al-
though only under specific experimental conditions. Moreover, it
has been shown that apes can also invent new symbolic rules
themselves (Greenfield & Savage-Rumbaugh 1990). These data,
and other literature on symbolization, were used by Deacon to
propose that the gap between spontaneous animal communica-
tion systems and human languages is explained by significant dif-
ferences between the cognitive abilities and neural structures of
such species. Only animals that are evolutionarily close to humans,
such as apes, can partially overcome some of their cognitive and
symbolic limitations, under specific and extensive experimental
conditions.
Autonomous agent modeling has been recently used to com-
pare the evolution of language in apes and simulated agents (Can-
gelosi 2000; 2001). This model investigates the symbol acquisition
abilities of evolutionary autonomous agents. An artificial neural
network constitutes the “brain” that controls the agent’s behavior.
The task performed by simulated organisms is directly inspired 
by well-known ape language experiments (Savage-Rumbaugh &
Rumbaugh 1978; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1980). A population of
agents evolves according to their ability to navigate and forage in
a simulated mushroom world (Cangelosi & Harnad 2000). In ad-
dition, agents undergo a language acquisition stage during which
they learn to name foods by listening to their own parents. They
learn the names of three edible food categories and also a com-
Commentary/Shanker & King: The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research
622 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:5
mon verb for the edible mushrooms. The same learning takes
place for three categories of toadstools. An important aspect of
such a model is that researchers do not impose a predefined lexi-
con. Instead, each population evolves its own set of meanings and
the corresponding signals. This is achieved through the dynamic
learning interactions between children and parents, and through
the interdependence between the evolving behavioral abilities
(e.g., categorization of mushrooms) and the learned linguistic
skills.
The simulation results showed that populations evolve shared
lexicons that optimally facilitate the foraging task. The majority of
such languages are compositional. They contain two words to
name the action (e.g., avoid/approach) and three words to name
the three individual categories of mushrooms. To test whether
these apparent compositional languages are actually based on real
symbolic relationships, a symbol acquisition test, similar to that in
Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh’s (1978) chimpanzee experi-
ments, was used. The test consisted of three learning stages. In the
first stage, organisms learn to label only four foods (two edible and
two poisonous mushrooms). Subsequently, they learn to associate
the four names with two new verbs. In the final stage, the names
of the remaining two foods are taught. The association with pre-
vious verbs is not explicitly taught because, in a real symbolic lan-
guage, the logical relationship between new names and verbs is
expected to be made by generalization. Data showed that the ma-
jority of populations successfully generalize the association of
verbs with new names, thus demonstrating that a real symbolic
language has been acquired.
This simulation shows that it is possible to build autonomous
agent models that manifest behavioral, cognitive, and neural phe-
nomena similar to those observed in experimental studies. In ad-
dition to sharing with new ape language research the benefits of a
dynamical system paradigm, this modeling approach provides
other advantages. This is especially true in the field of language
origin research. Computational models require that language ori-
gin theories be defined in clear operational terms (necessary to
implement the computer program) so that hypotheses can be ver-
ified during simulation (Cangelosi & Parisi 2002). Autonomous
agent models permit the simulation of past language origin sce-
narios by manipulating various evolutionary, behavioral, neural,
and social variables. This also helps in overcoming the limits of
other computational approaches, such as classical connectionism
(Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), which can only study ontoge-
netic changes. Finally, constraining the models to known empiri-
cal facts related to language evolution (Tomasello 2002) produces
a virtuous circle. Models generate new predictions and insights,
and subsequent experimental studies verify them and generate
new predictions, which can be tested again in simulation.
Dynamic systems theory places the scientist
in the system
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Abstract: Dynamic systems theory is a way of describing the patterns that
emerge from relationships in the universe. In the study of interpersonal
relationships, within and between species, the scientist is an active and 
engaged participant in those relationships. Separation between self and
other, scientist and subject, runs counter to systems thinking and creates
an unnecessary divide between humans and animals.
What does it mean to have an individual mind? One could say it
means to have the ability to think and reason, to make decisions
independently of others, and to have a unique point of view and
the ability to formulate intentions and actions consistent with that
point of view. But most human minds work along the channels of
thought and reason acquired by speaking and acting with other
people (Piaget 1965; Vygotsky 1978). Our “private,” “original,”
and “independent” thoughts are always phrased in cultural lexi-
cons of imagery, myth and story, gesture, language, or mathemat-
ical formalism. To demonstrate the independence of our minds,
we say things, do things, and build things with words, gestures, and
materials that are sociocultural in origin.
Being-in-relation, participating in an interpersonal relation-
ship, is a fundamental, irreducible, primary, way of being. Indi-
viduals are born into interpersonal relationships. We never, not for
a single moment of life, exist outside of relationships even when
we are physically alone. Our thoughts, our movements, the arti-
facts carried with us are all grounded in cultural processes that
were conceived, composed, and codified by individuals-in-rela-
tion (Fogel 1993).
It is ironic, then, that Western cultural and linguistic imagery
gives the illusion that individual minds take precedence over be-
ing-in-relation. As scientists of mind and communication, we can
use the cultural lexicon to distinguish human and animal worlds,
self and other, inner and outer, emotion and cognition, and verbal
and nonverbal. On the other hand, as human beings immersed in
the act of communicating, such distinctions become arbitrary and
meaningless. Shanker & King (S&K) suggest that we can either
gain knowledge about the phenomenon under study or – by our
own experience – gain intimate knowledge of the same phenom-
enon (James 1890). Is it possible to be a scientist while relating to
our subject matter as a fully participating human being?
S&K compare and contrast two paradigms aimed at answering
such scientific inquiries. They observe the behavior of individual-
istic world-view thinkers who come back from their solitary jour-
neys into the mind and attempt to communicate their insights.
Deacon is chosen to represent this style of science, studying phe-
nomena from a distance, attempting to break them into indepen-
dent parts, and subsequently reassembling them into a model of
reality. Deacon is asking, “What are the limitations of an ape’s lan-
guage capacities? What abilities for communication does an ape
have?”
Savage-Rumbaugh, on the other hand, was not content to ap-
proach apes from a distance. She asked, “What are the possibili-
ties for connection between me and Kanzi? How can I change my-
self in order to deepen the relationship between us?” Kanzi and
the other apes become active participants in a courageously alive
interpersonal relationship – not separate minds contemplated
from afar. Savage-Rumbaugh entered the apes’ world by altering
her behavior both physically and emotionally. She gave the apes
the opportunity and tools to communicate, learn, and grow with a
wonderfully engaged partner. By allowing herself to be moved and
changed, she demonstrated the emergence of communicative 
capabilities in nonhuman species in ways that were heretofore
unimagined.
The fundamentally different paradigms of Deacon and Savage-
Rumbaugh represent different theoretical approaches: informa-
tion processing versus dynamic systems. These paradigms also af-
ford entirely different kinds of knowledge: knowledge from reason
and knowledge from the fully human experience of direct en-
gagement.
Dynamic systems perspectives assume a fundamental related-
ness at the heart of the universe, implying that the scientific ob-
server is part of this relatedness. But this raises a central question.
Having gone into a direct relationship with the apes, what kind of
a scientific story can be told? From a dynamic systems perspec-
tive, it is sufficient to know with whom, how, and under what con-
ditions individuals can relate with and connect to each other. For
example, Smuts (2001) described surprising and mutually enrich-
ing encounters with creatures as diverse as dogs, baboons, birds,
and rodents that emerged from the scientists’ “sensitivity and hu-
mility” (p. 301).
Dynamic systems is not a new behaviorism. It is not uninter-
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ested in mental and emotional processes. Rather, dynamic systems
suggests that knowledge of the other can arise only in relation to
the other. Acts of separation run counter to dynamic systems
thinking, creating a sense of human versus apes rather than hu-
mans with apes. Thinking about the ape’s mind in the absence of
a close relationship is not the same as the direct experience of an-
other mind through sharing actions and feelings, such as playing
games with mutual delight or aligning intentions to achieve a 
common goal. These shared experiences give the observer a sense
of direct certainty that she is engaging with another intentional 
being.
We now know that Kanzi and other bonobos can – with an en-
gaged human partner – comprehend spoken English, produce
English-based speech sounds, make stone tools, and write lexical
symbols (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001). It is difficult to imagine
how these scientific discoveries could have been made outside of
a relationship of engagement and mutual commitment between
scientist and ape. The theory arises from this observation. Com-
municative skills like language and gesture, within and between
species, can only emerge by engaging in meaningful interpersonal
relationships built up over time (Bruner 1983; Fogel 1993). The
telling of what happened in those remarkable relationships is all
one needs to know in order to replicate the findings – that is, to
recreate a similar relationship.
But this is not the whole story. As Kanzi and the other apes
changed in relation to the scientists, those scientists changed in re-
lation to the apes. Instead of being humans who viewed animals
as separate and different, they became humans who changed their
ways in order to invite animals into the realm of engaged, intelli-
gent, feeling beings. This is a form of moral courage: to open our
own minds to change, to expand what it means to be human by
acts of love that transcend the ordinary.
The proper study of chimpkind
R. Allen Gardner
Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557.
gardner@unr.edu
Abstract: The target article issues a stirring call for more appropriate
treatment of chimpanzees in experimental laboratories. This commentary
heartily endorses that position with examples of methods and results found
in sign language studies of cross-fostered chimpanzees.
It is heartening to read this eloquent call for more appropriate re-
search with great apes. Through nearly three decades of articles
and books, Beatrix Gardner and I, and our collaborators, have in-
sisted that judicious comparisons between chimpanzee and hu-
man intelligence depend on comparable laboratory conditions.
Savage-Rumbaugh’s (1984) published description of her work
with Sherman and Austin seems to contradict the description in
the target article. If Savage-Rumbaugh has indeed treated Kanzi
with the warmth described in the target article, that would be a
step beyond the usual laboratory conditions of caged apes. But, it
would fall far short of cross-fostering in which infant chimpanzees
are maintained from birth under nearly human conditions.
Washoe at about 9-months, followed by Moja, Pili, Tatu, and
Dar within days of birth, entered a laboratory of rigorous cross-
fostering. They had all the usual toys, games, and picture books
that human infants get. They lived in quarters in which humans
had lived, ate human food at tables from dishes with forks and
spoons, and drank from cups. They also helped set and clear their
tables, clean their quarters, and put away their playthings. They
dressed and undressed themselves and used human toilets, wip-
ing themselves, flushing, even asking to go potty during lessons
and naptimes. Most important, at least one human member of
their foster families stayed in close attendance throughout their
waking hours. Never caged, they were as free as human infants to
move about the world with supervision. When they slept, human
family members listened on intercoms to comfort troubled infants
during the night (Gardner & Gardner 1989).
We, Gardners, always acknowledged our debt to Kellogg and
Kellogg (1933) and Hayes and Hayes (1951), who pioneered rig-
orous cross-fostering. Chimpanzees lack human vocal apparatus
and vocal habits, dooming the Kellogg and Hayes projects because
rigorous cross-fostering entails conversational give and take in a
common human language. Our innovation was to use American
Sign Language, a naturally occurring human language without
speech. A common human language is essential for comparisons
with human children who grow up with spoken and signed lan-
guages (Gardner et al. 1989).
The only advantages of Rumbaugh lexigrams are those claimed
for other synthetic studies of “ape language.” It is impossible to
know what relationship, if any, these synthetic codes have to nat-
ural languages that human children acquire in homes. Unlike
Washoe, Moja, Pili, Tatu, and Dar, who could sign to themselves
and to each other, Kanzi needed a lexigram panel and a human 
interlocutor. Excursions from the computer room required a
portable panel with painted patches for lexigrams. When a human
attendant unfolded the panel, Kanzi could touch the lexigram
patches (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986). Human observers re-
ported which patches he touched. In Kanzi’s fourth year, a video-
taped sample of sessions with the portable panel showed 80%
agreement between observers reading Kanzi live and observers
reading from tapes (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986, p. 217).
In their fourth year, we video taped informal conversations of
Tatu and Dar with a human interlocutor. Independent tran-
scribers agreed on 81% to 84% of the chimpanzee signs in these
tapes. Tatu signed at the rate of 441 and Dar at 479 utterances per
hour. On average, 35% of Tatu’s and 49% of Dar’s utterances in-
cluded two or more signs (Gardner & Gardner 1998b). These
numbers are within the range of human infants (Bloom 1993). By
contrast, in his fourth year sample, Kanzi averaged 10.2 utterances
per hour. In a late sample from Kanzi’s sixth year, Greenfield and
Savage-Rumbaugh (1990) reported that on average 10.7% of
Kanzi’s utterances included two or more lexigrams. They also re-
port that the experimenters themselves failed to achieve fluency
with lexigrams. As in other research that the target article rightly
criticizes, lexigrams may be suitable for testing fashionable theo-
ries about “ape language” but they prevent spontaneous conver-
sation.
Size of vocabulary, appropriate use of sentence constituents,
number of utterances, proportion of phrases, inflection, all grew
robustly throughout five years of cross-fostering. Growth was pat-
terned growth and patterns were consistent across chimpanzees.
Wherever there were comparable measurements, patterns of
growth for cross-fostered chimpanzees paralleled characteristic
patterns reported for human infants. As for phrase patterns, nom-
inative and action phrases appeared first, attributives second, and
experience/notice appeared latest in the developmental samples
of each chimpanzee – the same sequence that appears in studies
of child development (Gardner & Gardner 1998a).
In extensive vocabulary tests, cross-fosterlings named objects
they had never seen before under double-blind conditions. Be-
cause they could answer questions with any sign in their vocabu-
lary, rather than having to choose from among a few forced alter-
natives, their errors were informative, often more informative
than their correct responses (Gardner & Gardner 1984; Gardner
et al. 1992). Conversational skills were systematically tested in ex-
periments that inserted prescripted probes seamlessly into com-
mon daily conversations. Van Cantfort et al. (1989) showed how
they grew and developed like human children in using sentence
constituents to answer Wh-questions. Bodamer and Gardner
(2002) and Jensvold and Gardner (2000) showed how the contents
of chimpanzee rejoinders depended on the contents of probes in
patterns like those found in children, and they showed that chim-
panzee patterns resembled patterns of older and more competent
children. Bodamer and Gardner (2002) and Shaw (2001) showed
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the chimpanzees’ skill and human-like development in pragmat-
ics of turn-taking. Chalcraft (2002), Drumm et al. (1986), and
Rimpau et al. (1989) showed how they used pronomial inflections
and stress, devices that are integral to human sign language.
Warm attachment to committed, long-term human experi-
menters made it easy to adapt cross-fosterlings to rigorous exper-
imental procedures. Gardner et al. (1989) described sign language
studies of cross-fostered chimpanzees in detail. All nine of the re-
views of this book that I have found commented favorably on its
rigorous research methods (Anderson 1990; Boysen 1990; Byrne
1990; Chizar 1991; Hauser 1990; Hunt 1990; King 1991; Lieber-
man 1991; and Miles 1991). According to Chizar, “the book could
be used in courses on measurement and experimental methods
just as well as it could be used in courses dealing with compara-
tive psychology, communication, and psycholingusitics” (p. 439).
Perhaps the target article’s stirring call for appropriate compara-
tive methods will attract readers to research cited in this com-
mentary.
Is there empirical evidence for the dynamic
nature of communication systems?: 
The role of synchronization and 
inferential communication
Karl Grammer
Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institute for Urban Ethology at the Insitute for
Anthropology, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
karl.grammer@univie.ac.at Web: evolution.anthro.univie.ac.at
Abstract: Communication is a multichannel, multiunit process that works
on different levels. It is sequential with specific information carriers on a
cognitive accessible level, and dynamic for the regulation of relationships
at the same time. One function of communication is the broadcasting of
internal states that can be assessed by inferential communication.
The assumption that communication is a dynamic system is not
entirely new. The failure of many research attempts to clearly link
signals to outcomes, social cognitions, and changes in the rela-
tionship between the communicators has led many to declare that
the information processing approach is too simplistic (Grammer
1991; Grammer et al. 1997; 1999). The reasons for this failure are
manifold, including the fact that the traditional behavior and sig-
nal description uses categories, and that we already impose theo-
ries about behavior on the structure of behavior in the analysis. I
believe that although the theory of communication presented in
the target article provides a thought-provoking contrast to the tra-
ditional sequential theory of communication, it does not present
a viable, empirically testable alternative because it does not take
into account the possible coexistence of multilayered communi-
cation systems.
Markl (1985), in his seminal analysis of communication theo-
ries, drew attention to the fact that stimuli have releasing effects
(behavior consequences) and motivating effects (changes in the
receiver’s motivations), which are two ends of one communica-
tive spectrum: an information processing communicative system
and a dynamic system, which operate on the level of pairs. The 
two systems coexist on the simple level of behaviors and the re-
sulting function for relationships. Communication is a process
continuously changing in time and composed of multisignal and
multichannel units (a string of many events interrelated in “com-
municative” space and time) that are highly graded and context-
dependent (e.g., depending on the sex and age of the sender, the
number and identity of spectators, etc., a smile may convey
friendly readiness for contact, embarrassment, or cynical satisfac-
tion at a mishap). On the unit level, nonverbal behaviors may be
coded either as language-like (a smile conveys happiness), or as
very loose probabilistic associations between movement patterns
and external situational referents (Scherer 1982).
Central to the dynamical system communication approach is
the synchronization of body movements and mutual rapport, but
the road to the empirical analysis of synchronization in social in-
teraction is filled with unsuccessful attempts. Grammer et al.
(1998) showed that rhythmical patterning of movements alone,
and not their content, is responsible for creating positive feelings
in interactions. In these analyses we were unable to demonstrate
a relation between synchronization defined in terms of sequential
units, and subjective experience of pleasure and interest in an-
other person. Significant results were found only for a phenome-
non we describe as hierarchically patterned synchronization. If a
female is interested in a male, highly complex patterns of behav-
ior with a constant time structure emerge. The patterns are pair-
specific and independent from behavioral content. This clearly
underlines that such dynamic processes exist in social interactions
and that communication is a dynamic pattern creation process.
However, one result did not fit into this picture: Generally none
of the behaviors commonly denoted as human courtship signals by
Moore (1985) went into the patterns, suggesting the existence of
a parallel information processing communication system running
on another level.
The second problem dismissed by the dynamic communication
systems approach is the communication of internal states. Shanker
& King (S&K) explicitly deny this possibility. In the context of the
biological functions and constraints of communication, this does
not make sense because any communicative agent should try to
access this type of information. The reasons for this are many.
First, information about the internal states of a communicative
agent would allow a receiving communicative agent to assess the
action tendencies of an opponent. Both the sender and the re-
ceiver would benefit from this because they would be able to use
this information to structure their own future actions, and com-
municative agents would be able to break down the search spaces
for action in planning. Second, the ability to track the internal
states of an opponent would help to prevent deception, as well as
help in the search for honest “signals” (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).
Markl’s analysis of mutualistic communication within groups of so-
cially living organisms concludes that these organisms should in-
form their partners only as accurately as necessary to achieve the
communicative purpose.
Grammer et al. (1997) showed that the quality of female body
movements, and not their content, changes with female estrogen
levels, and that males react to these changes with higher excite-
ment (i.e., they start to move more). Therefore, it is not the cog-
nitive signal processing itself that induces a communicative effect;
it is the way a movement is performed in terms of speed, empha-
sis, information content, and complexity. We concluded that the
assessment of internal states by movement inference might be
crucial to interaction and so cannot be easily dismissed. We hy-
pothesized that the recently discovered mirror neurons (Gallese
et al. 1996) appear to form a cortical system matching observation
and execution of motor actions. Such a system may provide a nec-
essary bridge from “doing” to “communicating” and also could be
responsible for the inferential communication of internal states.
Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) offer a hypothesis on how this gap
might have been bridged. Whenever an individual is about to per-
form an action or observes another individual performing an ac-
tion, pre-motor areas are activated. The actor recognizes an in-
tention in the observer, and the observer will notice that his
response affects the behavior of the actor. We thus predict a sim-
ple communicative system in which communicative agents can as-
sess internal states directly from the perception of motion by in-
ference through body movement.
There is empirical evidence for a dynamic communication sys-
tem, but it appears to be coexisting with an information process-
ing system. I would suggest that there are two systems working in
parallel: a high level system where signals are exchanged and a low
level system that regulates relationships. If a new model for com-
munication is to emerge, it will need rigid formalization and this
formalization should allow for empirical testing. As it is presented
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here, and as convincing it might be, anecdotal evidence is not suf-
ficient. Communication research must rely on empirical research
on the level of physical information exchanged in interaction.
Information, information transfer, and
information processing
Ulrike Hahn
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3YG, United Kingdom.
hahnu@cardiff.ac.uk
Abstract: Shanker & King (S&K) fail to provide substantive reasons for a
paradigm shift in the study of communication because nonstandard and
equivocal use of terminology obscures and undercuts their arguments.
Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) article advocates a shift in the study of
primate communication from an information-processing systems
to a dynamic systems paradigm. However, their use of these terms
is problematic, obscuring both what we are meant to be shifting
from and what we are meant to be shifting to, and why.
The supposedly standard paradigm of communication is infor-
mation transfer or information transmission, whereby communi-
cation is said to occur when “one organism encodes information
into a signal that is transmitted to another organism that decodes
the signal” (target article, Abstract). “Information” in this para-
digm is explicitly equated with Shannon’s information theoretic
notion: “On the information-processing paradigm, what is com-
municated is always information, construed in Shannon’s infor-
mation-theoretic terms (Shannon 1948) as something that can be
quantified” (target article, sect. 2). But is there really such a par-
adigm? These terms are used widely, and typically loosely; defini-
tions of communication are legion (e.g., see Hauser 1997, Ch. 1)
as are uses and definitions of information (e.g., Kay 2000, Ch. 3).
Undoubtedly, the notion of communication as information trans-
fer has widespread intuitive appeal, but how many researchers are
committed to the particular interpretation of “information” at-
tributed here? Doubts arise because the notion of information 
in information theoretic terms does not incorporate semantics:
“The word ‘information’ in this theory is used in a special sense
that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In particular,
information must not be confused with meaning” (Weaver 1949/
1962, p. 99). In particular, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and a meaning-
less jumble of words could potentially be exactly equivalent from
an information theoretic standpoint, because in this framework 
information is a measure of freedom of choice in selecting the
message (Weaver; see also Dretske 1981 for extensive discussion).
Hence, this seems unlikely to be the meaning of “information”
ubiquitously used by supposed proponents of a communication-
as-information-transfer approach. Hauser (1997), for example,
speaks of communication in terms of information, senders, and
perceivers, but explicitly disavows the abstract information theo-
retic sense, and a closer reading of Ellis and Beattie (1986), who
are quoted by S&K as proponents of this view, also suggests that
they are using the term in a different, namely semantic, sense. Just
how far the information theoretic notion is from the notion of 
semantic content is exemplified by the extensive (and deeply
problematic; see, e.g., Godfrey-Smith 1989) attempts of Dretske
(1981) to build on the information theoretic notion in order to de-
rive a new informational semantics.
An immediate consequence of S&K’s misattribution of a highly
restrictive notion of information to the supposedly dominant com-
munications paradigm (see target article, sect. 2) is that any argu-
ment for a paradigm shift (sect. 2) on the grounds that communi-
cation is more than just communication of information (e.g., it is
emotions, wishes, and desires) breaks down. For such an argu-
ment to have substance, it would have to be shown that it actually
applies given standard usage of the term, which seems unlikely.
Confusion is further compounded by the fact that the chosen
terms for the two communication paradigms, information-pro-
cessing and dynamic systems, are those used in a debate about the
nature of agent internal processes: information-processing versus
dynamical systems accounts of human cognitive behavior (see,
e.g., van Gelder 1998a). Are these two things – information-pro-
cessing views of communication and information-processing ac-
counts of cognition – meant to be the same thing? Is communi-
cation as information transmission meant to imply “cognition as
information-processing” on the part of the participating agents,
and is “communication as a dynamical system” to imply a dynam-
ical systems view of agent internal processes involved?
At the very least, the relationships between the various uses of
these terms need to be explicitly clarified. According to S&K,
communication is a dynamical system in that “what is communi-
cated is not simply information” (sect. 2) and “all of the elements
are continuously interacting with and changing in respect to one
another, and an aggregate pattern emerges from this mutual co-
action” (target article, Abstract). It is not clear that this has any-
thing to do with the use of “dynamical system” in the context of
agent internal behavior, defined by van Gelder (1998a) as a system
that is “quantitative in state” – that is, with distances in state or
time as determined by an independent metric, such that these dis-
tances matter to behavior (see van Gelder for further discussion
and alternative definitions; but see also Chater & Hahn 1998).
What is clear is that “information” in the Shannon-Weaver sense,
is no more routinely implied in information-processing accounts
of cognition than in information transfer characterizations of com-
munication (see Dretske 1981, for extensive discussion of the re-
lationship between “information” as used in information theory
and as used by cognitive scientists; for an example of the latter, see
Marr’s classic work Vision [Marr 1982]).
The equivalence between the communications paradigm and
the paradigm for agent internal explanation is never explicitly
stated, but seems implied from the use of much of the rhetoric as-
sociated with the debate about agent internal cognitive explana-
tion. In particular, the paper repeatedly adopts an anti-represen-
tational stance (but see, e.g., van Gelder’s Author’s Response on
internal representation; van Gelder 1998b).
Useful dynamical systems accounts of behavior provide an al-
ternative, but equally detailed, nuts-and-bolts explanation of a par-
ticular behavior. Simply telling us not to “look into the head” nei-
ther answers, nor does away with problems. What mechanisms are
required in order to acquire language? In particular, how do we de-
termine the references of terms which, logically, are vastly under-
determined? What cues (social and other) operate here? The prob-
lem persists for both the acquisition of conventionally regulated
meanings (i.e., words of English) and novel, emerging referential
terms. Likewise, how do we, or primates, extract, represent, and
productively apply syntactic patterns? These are standard ques-
tions that proponents of information-processing views of language
processing and development have been concerned with, and the
fact that communication is dynamic and co-regulated neither re-
solves them nor makes them redundant. S&K may be interested in
other problems but that does not make these problems go away,
and without any clear outline of specific alternative explanations
there are no grounds for a shift to a new mode of explanation.
Certainly, the mere fact that communication between two
agents is “dynamic” in some sense of the word says nothing about
the means by which this process is internally mediated. There is
no clear general inference from the nature of the interaction be-
tween agents to the nature of agent internal processes. Nor is it
feasible to argue that two particular instantiations of a class of 
account are incompatible in order to establish an incompatibility
between the respective classes: Even if one were to grant that
Deacon’s (cognitive) information-processing explanation of Kanzi
was incompatible with Savage-Rumbaugh’s dynamical account of
communication (cf. target article, sect. 4), this would not suffice
to establish that the class of dynamical views of communication is
incompatible with the class of information-processing views of
agent internal processing.
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Thus, there is no real argument for a paradigm shift even if the
equivocations on terms were removed.
Communication and communion
Tim Ingold
Department of Anthropology, School of Social Science, University of
Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, Scotland. tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk
Abstract: Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) dynamic systems approach converges
with developments in social anthropological studies of communication
which were long ago anticipated in the writings of Volosinov and Schutz.
Following a review of these writings, this commentary suggests that a dy-
namic systems approach should distinguish communion from communi-
cation. It concludes with a remark on the evolutionary implications of the
approach.
I am much in favour of the dynamic systems approach, of which I
count myself as an advocate (e.g., Ingold 2000a; 2000b; 2001).
Therefore, where Shanker & King (S&K) systematically contrast
this approach with the alternative, information-processing ap-
proach, I find myself nodding in agreement on every point. I am
also encouraged by the news that a paradigm shift towards theo-
rising in terms of dynamic systems is well underway. Such a shift
will not only release biological and psychological studies of com-
munication from the straitjacket of hard-core cognitivism and
neo-Darwinian fundamentalism in which they have been confined
for so long, but it will also provide the basis for effective collabo-
ration between practitioners in these fields and those in my own
discipline of social and cultural anthropology, which in recent
years has witnessed a shift in theoretical focus almost identical to
that reported by S&K. In her recent, wide-ranging review of an-
thropological studies of communication, Ruth Finnegan noted
how a number of approaches, some of which date back some 
time, are converging on a “fresh view of speech and communica-
tion: not independent systems of signs for conveying decontextu-
alised pieces of information but modes of social action, created 
by interacting human agents in specific situations” (Finnegan
2002, p. 7).
Yet, talk of paradigm shifts sometimes exaggerates the novelty
of perspectives that have been around for generations, albeit as
subversive undercurrents to mainstream positions. In what fol-
lows I first draw attention to two foundational texts that long ago
anticipated the advent of “dynamic systems” thinking, and then
move on to consider whether the concept of communication
should really have a place in this way of thinking at all. I conclude
with a remark on its implications for our understanding of evolu-
tion.
In his remarkable study Marxism and the Philosophy of Lan-
guage, first published in Russian in 1929, V. N. Volosinov argued
that the idea of language as a formal system that is somehow in-
stalled in the mind, independently of its instantiation in speech, is
a pure abstraction. In reality, language is not expressed in the cur-
rent of speech, it exists in it. Moreover, this current is not mono-
logical but always (at least) dialogical; thus speech exists only in
contexts of social interaction. And through this interactivity, forms
and meanings are not so much revealed as continually brought
into being. All these points are succinctly tied together in Volosi-
nov’s proposition that “language is a continuous generative process
implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers” (Volosi-
nov 1929/1986, p. 98). A contemporary rereading of Volosinov’s
work would be worth the effort, lest we expend undue effort in
painfully rediscovering what he had taught us all along.
Coming from a quite different direction, and pioneering a phe-
nomenological approach to human sociality, Alfred Schutz’s clas-
sic paper “Making music together” (1951) suggested that at the
core of all social interaction is a “mutual tuning-in relationship.”
According to Schutz (1951), to listen to the speech of a consociate
is not so much to decode an utterance as to enter into the very
process of its production. We understand one another because,
having made the other’s purposes our own as well, we converge on
the same meaning, a meaning that is drawn from our joint in-
volvement in a specific context of interaction. As the title of
Schutz’s paper implies, the prototype for the “tuning-in relation-
ship” is the mutual attentiveness of the members of a musical en-
semble, for each of whom both listening and playing are integral
to one and the same current of action. The speaker in a social set-
ting, just like the musician in the ensemble, is able continually to
adjust his or her gestural movement to resonate with the gestur-
ing of others without ever interrupting the flow, because the
process of action is itself a process of attention (Ingold 2000a,
p. 415).
The musical analogy, however, raises a doubt in my mind as to
whether the mutual understanding that emerges from shared feel-
ing and action should be regarded as an instance of communica-
tion at all. Do musicians really communicate with one another and
with their audience? The music, after all, inheres in the sound it-
self; it is not an idea that is conveyed by means of sound. And this
sound is there in the environment for anyone who would attend
to it, just as there are all the other sounds that envelop us as we go
about our lives. We may attend and respond to the sounds of the
wind, or the rain, or the waterfall, but we do not imagine that these
phenomena are communicating with us. Rather, their sounds are
simply there, as the acoustic signatures of their phenomenal pres-
ence in the world. Likewise, if I sing a wordless song, however full
of feeling, is this not just one way in which I manifest my presence
in the world – a presence to which others may or may not attend
and respond? Singing, like music-making of any kind (or like danc-
ing or gesturing), is a mode of presence, not a mode of communi-
cation (Ingold 2000a, pp. 104–105).
Why, then, should it be any different with speech? In the West,
we routinely distinguish between speech and song on the grounds
that what counts in speech are not the sounds themselves but the
ideas that are encoded in sound. But that is to invoke a Cartesian
distinction between inner mental states and their outward physi-
cal expression, which S&K rightly reject. In everyday experience
people are present for one another through their voices and ges-
tures just as much in their speech as in their song, if indeed the
two can be distinguished at all. (In many of the non-Western so-
cieties studied by anthropologists, they are not distinguished or, if
the distinction is drawn, it runs along quite different lines.) Bro-
nislaw Malinowski (1923) classically described the mutual copres-
ence established through speech and song as “phatic commu-
nion.” His point was that all communication of information is
founded in a communion of copresence. That point is S&K’s too,
but I feel it might be made more convincingly by keeping the con-
cepts of communion and communication distinct (on this distinc-
tion, see Ingold 1986, pp. 272–77), for, however much we might
wish to avoid it, mere mention of the word “communication” tends
to conjure up the image of a sender, a receiver, and a message.
Finally, what are the implications of a dynamic systems ap-
proach for our understanding of evolution in general, or, more
specifically, for the evolution of language? One implication, as
S&K rightly observe, is that the linguistic capacities of apes and
humans are not genetically determined. But it is not particularly
helpful to attribute their development, instead, to “an ongoing and
complex interplay between biological, social, and cultural factors”
(target article, sect. 4.2, last para.). What is a biological factor, as
distinct from a social or cultural factor? It is difficult to see how
such factors could possibly be isolated, let alone brought into play
with one another. One other implication of the dynamic systems
approach, surely, is that we should cease slicing up the world of in-
teracting organisms in this arbitrary way. If the capacities (includ-
ing linguistic capacities) of organisms are emergent properties of
the entire system of relations or “developmental manifold” set up
by virtue of their positioning within an environment, then the evo-
lution of these capacities must be understood in terms of the prop-
erties of dynamic self-organisation of the manifold itself. I do not
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deny that natural selection occurs, leading to cumulative changes
in the genome along ancestor-descendant sequences. But (pace
Gottlieb 1997; Griffiths & Gray 1994) it occurs within the context
of the evolution of dynamic systems, rather than bringing this evo-
lution about (Ingold 2001, p. 125).
The Vygotskian advantage in cognitive
modeling: Participation precedes and 
thus prefigures understanding
Christine M. Johnson
Department of Cognitive Science, University of California San Diego, 
La Jolla, CA 92093-0515. johnson@cogsci.ucsd.edu
Abstract: Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) proposal is consistent with a Vygot-
skian model of development which assumes that cognition is first social
and visible, and only later internalized and invisible. Rather than slipping
into positing “epistemic operators” like understand or intend as generative
of behavior during language learning or theory of mind tasks, this approach
profits from keeping its focus on charting the ontogeny of embodied in-
teractions.
Shanker & King (S&K) are to be lauded for taking on the daunt-
ing task of applying the dynamical systems model to cognitive phe-
nomena, and they do a commendable job of grappling with the
subtleties of the argument. Their reinterpretation of ARL re-
search makes clear how such efforts can yield rich dividends in re-
vealing insights heretofore hidden in existing data and in generat-
ing a host of new questions to address. Even so, like most of us,
they were no doubt originally trained to think of cognition as the
invisible, individual events responsible for behavior, and of its
study as essentially an inferential science. Such training is difficult
to overcome, and undertaking its revision demands that we chal-
lenge each implicit assumption that may lead to a confounding of
the models that S&K are attempting to contrast.
As one case in point, consider their use of the following from
Tomasello’s (1999) Cultural Origins of Human Cognition: “sounds
become language for young children when and only when they un-
derstand that the adult is making that sound with the intention
that they attend to something” (Tomasello 1999, p. 101; emphasis
mine). Given that Tomasello has perhaps done more than any
other contemporary investigator to advance our understanding of
the relation between culture and cognition (although see Cole
1996; D’Andrade 1980), citing him in a discussion of the interac-
tive nature of language development is highly appropriate (cf. tar-
get article, sect. 4). And yet the particular quote chosen by S&K
represents, to my mind, the one aspect of Tomasello’s approach
that runs counter to the model the authors are advocating. That is,
suggesting that some kind of shared understanding is a prerequi-
site for linguistic behavior places what is “inside the head” as the
source and cause of that which is observable, rather than empha-
sizing that behavior – or, more accurately, interaction – is the
source and cause of what ultimately must end up “inside the
head.” What makes this difference in emphasis significant enough
to merit treatment in BBS is its consequences for how science is
done, both in terms of the methods that are employed and the in-
terpretations that are supported.
Adopting the stance that cognition is best studied as an observ-
able, distributed event (e.g., Hutchins 1995a; Johnson 2001; Vy-
gotsky 1978; Wertsch 1985) rather than as an invisible, mental
one, need not prevent us from recognizing that positing the latter
may be necessary to a complete account of human, or ape, cogni-
tion. However, positing mental states and then designing experi-
ments to discriminate the behaviors required to confirm them has
led both human and comparative cognitive research down many a
garden path. For example, because our working definitions of
mental states have tended to be based on adult introspection and
language use, they are often rendered in the shorthand mentalese
(e.g., “know,” “desire,” “intend,” etc.) that adults adopt after years
of experience with interpersonal and environmental interactions.
In the “theory of mind” literature, for example, subjects (usually
children or nonhumans) are typically hypothesized to know or not
know what another person knows or does not know.
Furthermore, it is this mental state of knowing that is presumed
to endow each subject with the capacity to perform correctly on a
critical experimental task. However, this presumption becomes
suspect when we realize that adults can, and do, experience a va-
riety of mental states, at different times and sometimes simulta-
neously, while engaging in such tasks. These can range from ex-
plicit propositional reasoning involving terms like “know,” to cued
heuristics (like an expression of puzzlement predicting prolonged
searching behavior), to intuitive affect-laden biases that are not
readily articulated or experimentally assessed. Similarly, imple-
menting such research has demonstrated that context (the partic-
ular phrasing of the experimenter’s question, the use of three-di-
mensional dolls vs. drawings, etc.) can have significant effects on,
for instance, the age at which a child is likely to succeed (see Ast-
ington et al. 1988). In addition, the performance of nonhuman pri-
mates on related tasks are replete with complex ambiguities (e.g.,
Heyes 1993; Povinelli 1994) that, together with the above, suggest
such models and methods may obscure, more than reveal, the role
of ontogeny and phylogeny in the emergent adult abilities.
In contrast, one of the great advantages of S&K’s approach is its
integration of the Vygotskian insights that cognition is first social
and visible and only later internalized and invisible, and that the
study of changes in the relative contributions of novice and expert
(observable, e.g., in detailed video analysis of interactions over
time) best capture cognitive development. As a result, this ap-
proach can inform models of mental representation by charting its
ontogeny through embodied interactions in the infant and its care-
taker (e.g., Fogel 1993), the juvenile and its cohorts (e.g., Rogoff
1990), and the adult and its society (e.g., Hutchins 1995a; 1995b).
In this view, “theory of mind” shifts from being a “representation
of the representations of others” to being a complex set of propen-
sities and sensitivities in a range of related contexts. For example,
in the first few years of life, a child participates with more profi-
cient others in an array of interactions in which attention, and es-
pecially co-attention, directed at an object early in an interaction
tends to correlate later with efficient searching for that object, and
movement of that object without the accompanying co-attention
correlates with circuitous and often unsuccessful searching (see
Karmilov-Smith 1992). As the child becomes more of an active
agent in such interactions (e.g., taking on the roles of mover or
searcher) as well as engaging in a variety of other co-attention-me-
diated activities, there is improvement in the child’s sensitivity to
the relevant cues, the timing and relevance of the child’s actions
and associated affect, and the range of contexts in which the child
can appropriately participate. From this perspective, what the
child who succeeds at a theory of mind task has learned is not what
others know or do not know, but the nature of effective (and inef-
fective) coordination for any player in that class of interactions
(see Wittgenstein 1953).
More than a substitution of one set of jargon for another, such
a restructuring reveals aspects of cognition that are not liable to
be detected under the traditional approach. S&K’s analysis of
Kanzi’s performance, for example, highlights many qualities of his
coordination during language interactions (e.g., that he can attend
to multiple partners, respond in and to a variety of media, scaffold
the activities of more novice participants, etc.) that have been lit-
tle noted in the literature on ape language research and yet open
a whole vista of important research questions that beg further in-
vestigation. However, even as they strive to explain that epistemic
operators such as understand or intend are best used to refer to
sets of behavior rather than to mental states, I fear that their fre-
quent use of such terms may only make it harder for us to focus as
we should on the stuff that we can actually see. Until we get bet-
ter at doing systemic cognitive analyses of embodied interactions,
I recommend that we limit our use of such terms. If we confine
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ourselves to using them only when we must, their meanings
should, in time, become clearer to us all.
What ape language research means for
representations
Edward Kako
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081-
1390. ekako1@swarthmore.edu
http://www.swarthmore.edu/socsci/ekako1
Abstract: Shanker & King (S&K) rightly stress that recent ape language
research has important implications for language development and ori-
gins. But the evidence does not warrant their conclusion that we can dis-
pense with representations. Indeed, their own discussion of the nature of
communication highlights the central role that representations must play
in our models of communicative competence, in and out of language.
Shanker & King (S&K) quite rightly claim that recent ape lan-
guage research should be taken seriously, and that it has impor-
tant implications for the origins of human language. As I have 
argued elsewhere (Kako 1999), Kanzi’s abilities (particularly his
comprehension of spoken English) are indeed impressive. His
ability to distinguish “Put the ball on the hat” from “Put the hat on
the ball” suggests that he understands the links in English between
the syntactic position of an object label and the role it plays in the
event that the sentence describes. This, in turn, suggests that the
prerequisites for such abilities may antedate modern humans
quite substantially. However, the major implication that S&K wish
to draw from the success of these projects – specifically, that mod-
els of communicative competence can do without representations
– is not warranted by the evidence.
S&K point out that communication can take place even when
information about mental states is not being transmitted. Facial
expressions, for example, can communicate fear or surprise; a
movement of the hand can communicate affection or a desire to
reconcile after conflict. These communications do not involve the
transmission of information per se, nor do they occur embedded
in any kind of elaborate code. For the communicative act to suc-
ceed, the participants need not represent their own mental state
or that of their partner. These acts are, nonetheless, meaningful to
both participants in the interaction.
The evidence that some communication is distinct from infor-
mation transmission and can take place in the absence of repre-
sentations does not, however, warrant the claim that we are per-
mitted to dispense altogether with the notions of information
transmission and representation. I do not mean to say that human
communication takes place only in language, or that it always re-
quires codes and the representations that participate in those
codes. On the contrary, human communication, most broadly con-
strued, takes place in multiple channels. Through some of these
channels, communicative partners can converge on shared mean-
ings without the benefit of any structured representations. But for
some forms of communication, structured representations and
the codes that assemble them are absolutely indispensable.
In fact, the contrast that S&K try to make between information
processing and dynamic systems theory (DST) reinforces the cen-
tral role that representations must play. In their Table 1, they write
that, according to DST,
Desires, intentions, thoughts, wishes, emotions, are not “internal states”
or “representations.” In the particular circumstances where it makes
sense to say “P communicated a piece of information to Q,” the infor-
mation communicated is not about an internal state or representation,
but rather, that such-and-such (“that there is some ripe fruit over
there,” “that John is coming,” and so on). (target article, sect. 2; S&K’s
emphasis)
Tellingly, both of their examples require the thinker to repre-
sent entities (fruit, John), the relationship between those entities
and the thinker (roughly, “not here”), and properties of those en-
tities, either now or in the future (ripe, coming). It is not clear what
these are, if they are not representations of the world as it is or
soon will be. Any system capable of communicating the content of
these statements must rest on representations. Moreover, the sys-
tem itself must be structured in a way that allows the listener to
reconstruct in his or her own mind the representation that exists
in the mind of the speaker.
S&K consider at length the achievements of the chimpanzees
Sherman and Austin, whose facility with lexigrams was indeed
quite impressive. They are right to emphasize the importance of
the situations into which Savage-Rumbaugh placed the chim-
panzees and they are right to conclude that the success was not
due entirely to the information Sherman and Austin extracted
from the combinations in which the lexigrams appeared. But
again, S&K’s conclusion that we can dispense with representations
in accounting for their success is unwarranted. Even if the lexi-
gram combinations provided no help whatsoever to Sherman and
Austin, a proper description of their competence requires the ad-
mission of representations. Once again, S&K’s own words are
telling:
one is warranted in describing Sherman and Austin as understanding
the meaning of lexigram symbols on the grounds that they could do
such things as . . . use lexigrams to direct each other’s or another per-
son’s attention; extend the use of lexigrams to novel (but suitable) cir-
cumstances; spontaneously assign unlabelled keys to new foods; closely
attend to their own, and to someone else’s use of lexigrams; and cor-
rect their own or each other’s mistaken use of lexigrams. (target arti-
cle, sect. 3, fifth last para.)
In order to use lexigrams in these ways (and use, for S&K, is crit-
ical), they must have been able to represent the attentional state
of others relative to their own, such that they could detect a match
or mismatch; and they must have been able to represent both the
links between lexigram and meaning and intentions (their own
and others), again in such a way that they could detect a match or
mismatch.
To claim that representations are essential is not to deny or de-
value the importance of social interaction for Sherman, Austin, or
Kanzi (or, for that matter, for human children). Nor is it to deny
that rich communication can take place in the absence of infor-
mation transmission traditionally conceived. But, as S&K’s own
words strongly suggest, it is impossible to eliminate representa-
tions altogether. Indeed, I would argue that Sherman, Austin, and
Kanzi are such extraordinary cases precisely because we cannot
escape the notion of representations when we talk about them.
The lesson of ALR is not that we should declare humans and their
primate-relatives “representation-free,” but that we should em-
brace nonhuman primates as “representation-rich.”
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Dancing on thin ice
Stan A. Kuczaj, Joana A. Ramos, and Robin L. Paulos
Department of Psychology, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg,
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Abstract: The “new” paradigm proposed by Shanker & King (S&K) is nei-
ther new nor a significant advance in our understanding of communica-
tion. Although we agree that social interaction is important, ignoring the
roles of mental processes and the significance of information exchange is
theoretically dangerous. Moreover, the “communicative dance” is se-
quential. If one partner does not lead, how is the other to follow?
Shanker & King (S&K) propose a “new paradigm” for ape lan-
guage research and boldly state that the “shift from an informa-
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tion-processing to a dynamic systems model . . . represents an im-
portant transformation in our understanding of the nature of com-
munication” (target article, sect. 2). We believe that their para-
digm is neither new nor a significant advance. To the contrary, the
dynamic systems approach they advocate raises more questions
than it answers. Consequently, over-reliance on such an approach
would be a serious theoretical mistake.
S&K note that early attempts to train apes to use language re-
lied on operant conditioning principles and that the results of such
attempts were typically disappointing. The failings of early ape
language research are not surprising, given that the principles that
underlie behavioral modification play minimal roles in human
children’s acquisition of language. In fact, the inadequacy of sim-
ple stimulus-response explanations of language development has
been recognized for decades (Brown 1973; Chomsky 1959; Kuczaj
1977; McNeill 1970). S&K’s characterization of contemporary in-
formation-processing approaches as simple linear stimulus-re-
sponse systems is misleading (see Klahr & MacWhinney 1998),
and sets up information-processing as a flimsy straw man for them
to knock down.
Much of the rationale for the arguments in the target article
comes from the successes reported by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh
once she began to interact in a more fluid fashion with Kanzi. We
agree that her work has produced remarkable results, but we are
stunned by the claim that the work with Kanzi provides a “new”
basis for understanding human child language development. De-
spite everything that Kanzi has accomplished, he has not acquired
the language skills of a normal human child. Attempting to equate
Kanzi’s accomplishments with those of human children is mis-
leading and inappropriate. It takes away from both Kanzi’s and hu-
man children’s significant achievements, and muddies the water
in terms of understanding and comparing Kanzi’s acquisitions with
those of human children.
The dynamic systems approach advocated in the target article
is based on a dance metaphor, where “communicating partners
continuously establish and sustain a feeling of shared rhythm and
movement” (sect. 1). In the communicative “dance,” partners ad-
just their communicative efforts based on each other’s behaviors,
which might include gestures, facial expressions, vocalizations,
and so on. For S&K, the appeal of this approach is the liberation
from sequential analyses and the recognition that aspects of the
communicative process are in a state of constant flux. But what
does the dance metaphor actually gain us?
According to the dance metaphor, communication partners
“adjust” to each other. Adjustments require that each partner pay
attention to the other, and so they do not occur in a temporal vac-
uum. Adjustments are inherently sequential unless one assumes
that partners share some sort of amorphous psychic connection;
therefore the dance metaphor does not “free” us from the need to
consider and understand the sequential flow of information be-
tween partners. Consequently, S&K’s proposal to neglect the se-
quential flow of communication is based on the unfounded as-
sumption that the communicative dance is not sequential.
The most important aspect of the dance metaphor is the em-
phasis on social interactions. Such interactions are significant as-
pects of communicative development, and are likely essential for
normal development to occur, as others have noted (e.g., Bruner
1975; Messer 1994). However, even though social interaction may
be necessary for normal development, it is not sufficient (Kuczaj
1982; Pinker 1994). Thus, any explanation of language develop-
ment that excludes all factors outside of the social realm is des-
tined to fail.
We are also confused by S&K’s disparaging use of the term in-
formation. They suggest that the notion that information is ex-
changed in communication is flawed, and that instead of commu-
nicating information, partners communicate desires, intentions,
thoughts, wishes, and so on. We disagree wholeheartedly with
their proposal that communication exchange does not involve in-
formation. If one communicates one’s disappointment, one is in-
forming another (or others) of this disappointment. This is infor-
mation. We admit that we do not understand the distinction that
they are trying to make between information and noninformation.
Because they never define information, it is not clear what they
mean when they use this term; however, it is clear that they do not
think information is exchanged in communication, whatever in-
formation means to them.
S&K also suggest that communication should be viewed as an
activity rather than a process. The distinction they wish to draw
between activity and process is not clear, but given the general
themes in their argument, we suspect that they would view activ-
ity as some sort of overt behavior and process as some sort of in-
ternal phenomenon. If this is the case, it seems that the distinc-
tion they wish to make concerns the level of description rather
than the best way to characterize and explain communication. An
adequate explanation of language, be it ape language, child lan-
guage, or full-blown adult human language, will require appreci-
ation of what happens during discourse events (which seems to be
their emphasis), understanding what the organism brings to the
task of learning language, consideration of the processes involved
in development, and the determination to integrate these compo-
nents into one coherent explanation. Simply sweeping untidy
components of the phenomena under the proverbial rug will not
get us closer to a satisfactory explanation.
You can dance if you want to
Valerie Kuhlmeier and Paul Bloom
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.
{Valerie.kuhlmeier; Paul.bloom}@yale.edu
Abstract: We argue that the dance metaphor does not appropriately char-
acterize language. Indeed, language may be a red herring, distracting us
from the intriguing question of the nature of apes’ social interactions.
We are not dancing. As you read this, you are learning about our
beliefs and desires – we are communicating – but there is no non-
trivial sense in which we are now dynamic systems engaged in mu-
tual coaction. This is not because of the abstract nature of this
topic. When we communicate about more concrete matters – the
berries in the forest are poisonous, give us food or we will kill you,
nice day today, isn’t it? – we are still not dancing. It is also not be-
cause this is written; we could convey all the same information by
speaking. Of course, we could gesture, and respond to your ges-
tures, and engage in all sorts of synchrony, but we certainly do not
have to. We could simply say “the berries in the forest are poiso-
nous,” and you would understand what we mean.
Clearly, dancing is not necessary for language. It is also not suf-
ficient. There is an important difference between asking your
child “Do you want milk?” versus “Do you want cookies?” and it
has nothing to do with dynamic systems or coregulated interac-
tions. It has to do with the words “milk” and “cookies.” Similarly,
the difference between “I like milk better than cookies” versus “I
like cookies better than milk” emerges not from dynamic interac-
tion but from the ordering of the words and phrases – in other
words, from the syntax.
On the face of it, knowing a language has much to do with know-
ing the meanings of words and how they are combined to form
meaningful utterances. Languages must be learned because
words and syntax vary across different languages, and any account
of how speakers successfully communicate must make reference
to knowledge of the words and rules of a given language. We do
not see these claims as particularly controversial, but it is not clear
how they are captured in the dynamic systems paradigm that
Shanker & King (S&K) describe. In any case, it is clear that danc-
ing and language, though possibly somehow related, are quite dif-
ferent things.
In fact, language might well be a red herring here, one that dis-
tracts the reader from the theoretical and empirical insights that
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lie within this very interesting paper. There is plainly a sense in
which apes really do seem to be engaging in a dance, and the study
of the nature of this dance can tell us much about how their minds
work (hence our title, inspired by the song by “Men Without
Hats”). The obvious question is: What goes on in this dance? At
what level do we interpret the apes’ behavior? You can imagine
scenarios of different complexity, from the instinctive mimicry of
a newborn baby to the conscious debating of polished politicians.
Where within this range do the apes’ social interactions fall?
S&K are generous in their interpretation. When describing the
actions of Kanzi, Sherman, and Austin under the dynamic systems
paradigm, they assume underlying mental attribution abilities such
as a recognition of another’s intentions, feelings, desires, and
knowledge states. The chimpanzees must discover the “mutual
convergence on some shared feeling, thought, action, or intention”
(target article, sect. 2). They are portrayed in some circumstances
as beginning to “attend more closely to [Savage-Rumbaugh’s] ac-
tions in order to ascertain what she intended” (sect. 3). Indeed, in
one situation, Kanzi is described as recognizing that “Tamuli has
not understood what she is being asked to do” (sect. 4.2).
Is this characterization of the dance correct? Perhaps, but it has
not been shown yet. Apes are good candidates for such attribution
abilities. Recent studies, for example, have suggested that chim-
panzees follow the gaze of conspecifics (Tomasello et al. 1998),
know what conspecifics can and cannot see (Hare et al. 2000), and
perhaps even recognize what a conspecific knows and does not
know (Hare et al. 2001). But this is all controversial; we have only
begun to demonstrate these abilities and still need to examine
whether they represent a theory of mind like that assumed to ex-
ist for humans, or whether chimpanzees solve such tasks using al-
ternative problem-solving strategies. They might dance, but not
know that they are dancing, or even that they are interacting with
intentional agents. To make assumptions regarding the level of in-
teraction without first examining what is happening in the mind of
the ape subjects is putting the cart before the horse. Only with
careful empirical research may we be able to discover the nature
of the dances S&K report.
On the public nature of communication
David A. Leavens
Psychology Group, School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University
of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex BN1 9QH, United Kingdom.
davidl@cogs.susx.ac.uk http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/davidl/
Abstract: Comparative and developmental psychology are engaged in a
search for the evolutionary and developmental origins of the perceptions
of “intentions” and “desires,” and of epistemic states such as “ignorance”
and “false belief.” Shanker & King (S&K) remind us that these are merely
words to describe public events: All organisms that can discriminate states
of “knowledge” in others have learned to do this through observation of
publicly available information.
In this thought-provoking target article, Shanker & King (S&K)
invite us to reconsider several of the widespread assumptions that
underpin much of contemporary research into the comparative
and developmental psychology of communication. Among these
assumptions is that intentions and desires are invisible causal fac-
tors that can be invoked to explain or predict overt behavior. Bate-
son (1972b) pointed out that mental phenomena work differently
from physical phenomena, insofar as in the physical world noth-
ing cannot cause anything but in the mental world, in the world of
communication, inaction can carry a great deal of meaning with
measurable consequences. To borrow his example, “the income
tax form which you do not fill in can trigger the Internal Revenue
boys into energetic action” (p. 452). Failure by a low-ranking
chimpanzee (or wolf or human) to exhibit submissive behavior in
the presence of more dominant animals will earn rebuke. When
every social encounter constitutes an episode of negotiation of our
relationships, then, as Bateson frequently noted, we cannot not
communicate. A snub is defined as the absence of an expected
overture. Thus, a particular social interaction is the Ding an Sich,
and what we might label an “intention to communicate” is also the
thing itself as manifested in coordinated social activity or, in other
words, publicly observable behavior (e.g., Bateson 1972b).
A great deal follows from the kind of shift in perspective advo-
cated by S&K, not the least of which is that, in this view, it becomes
difficult to cling to an essentialist definition of humanity in viola-
tion of established principles both of natural history and ontogeny.
Folk psychologies appeal to unseen causative agents that evolved
uniquely within the human lineage, be they language acquisition
devices, intentions to communicate, or demonic possession (cf.
Thompson 1997). To suggest that “an intention made me do it” is
as scientifically relevant as to suggest that “the Devil made me 
do it,” as both statements are equally immune to independent ver-
ification. Folk psychologies are neither geographically nor histor-
ically constant (e.g., Lillard 1998; Vinden 1999). Thus, as S&K
suggest, the behavioral sciences would be better grounded em-
pirically if they adopted a more agnostic stance toward the inten-
tional stance. In other words, that we can and often do talk about
“intentions,” “demonic possession,” and other such occult mental
phenomena does not constitute evidence of their existence.
Whence intentions and desires? The fullest answer to this ques-
tion will derive from the richly descriptive practice required by
dynamic systems theory. What we trade off in data reduction to-
day will pay dividends when comparative and developmental psy-
chology mature tomorrow. S&K are heralding an imminent revo-
lution in comparative psychology, long overdue, which will be
manifested in the realization that just as reference is not a prop-
erty of words but of people in action (people refer to things some-
times with words and sometimes through other means), neither is
intentionality a property of minds; rather, it is manifest in what
people and other organisms do in relation to each other (cf. Bate-
son 1972a; Reddy 2001). For a case in point, consider pointing.
Only a decade ago it was widely held that only humans pointed
(e.g., Corballis 1991; Donald 1991). Long-term field studies had
failed to identify pointing as a major constituent of the gestural
repertoire of any ape species (e.g., Goodall 1986), though more
recently there have been reports of some pointing by wild chim-
panzees (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa 1997) and bonobos (Veá
& Sabater-Pi 1998). Recent large-scale laboratory studies have
shown that apes in captivity very commonly point to food outside
their reach when, and only when, a human observer who is in a
position to retrieve that food for them arrives on the scene (e.g.,
Leavens 2001; Leavens & Hopkins 1998). They do this with no ex-
plicit training whatsoever. Thus, apes in captivity spontaneously
exhibit the capacity to capture and redirect the attention of a 
human observer to a distal entity; their gestures are manifestly
“about” objects in the environment and therefore are intentional,
by definition. Their pointing constitutes an attempt to manipulate
human behavior – to condition their human observers or to “train”
their trainers – not by virtue of their possession of some unseen
and scientifically unverifiable abstract representation of others’
mental states, but because that is what pointing does in the real
world and they’ve learned this, presumably, through observations
of the consequences of their actions, which, also presumptively, is
how people learn to manipulate other people.
There is extraordinary variation between captive apes in the op-
portunities they will have had to experience coordinated activities
with humans. Consider the typical environmental circumstances
of chimpanzees housed in a biomedical research center: Their
feeding schedules are largely divorced from their own commu-
nicative activities (i.e., food delivery is not typically contingent on
their communicative bids) and their often vigorous, even hysteri-
cal, appeals to dissuade veterinary technicians armed with tran-
quilizer dart guns are utterly futile. Chimpanzees housed in these
conditions experience on the order of four minutes per day of pos-
itive face-to-face interaction with their human caregivers (Bard,
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personal communication, 1998). Is it at all surprising that apes
raised in such circumstances often exhibit less facility or skill in
tasks involving the establishment of joint attention with humans
than do human children, who have both profound emotional
bonds with and, in comparison with most captive apes, extraordi-
narily more experience interacting with humans? What is aston-
ishing is that these apes, in the face of so much futility, persist in
their attempts to manipulate people through intentional commu-
nication.
S&K remind us that the facility evinced by chimpanzees to train
their human observers to act as extensions of the chimpanzees’ in-
strumental goals is related in a systematic way to their develop-
mental histories, their biology, and their social, cultural, and phys-
ical environments. They invite us, therefore, to reconsider the
significance of the ape language studies; to wit, when we raise apes
in environments that mimic, in important particulars, the rearing
circumstances of our children, they start to behave a lot like our
children do.
Dancing with humans: Interaction as
unintended consequence
John L. Locke
New York University, New York, NY 10003. JLL7@nyu.edu
Abstract: Parallels to Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) proposal for a model of
language teaching that values dyadic interaction have long existed in lan-
guage development, for the neotenous human infant requires care, which
is inherently interactive. Interaction with talking caregivers facilitates lan-
guage learning. The “new” paradigm thus has a decidedly familiar look. It
would be surprising if some other paradigm worked better in animals that
have no evolutionary linguistic history.
Shanker & King (S&K) advocate a model of language teaching
that values dyadic interaction. The need for such a model is surely
understandable where the learners, anthropoid apes, are highly
communicative but lack the evolutionary history, hence genes, for
language. Here I will discuss instructive parallels in a different
group of learners who are also highly communicative but lack the
maturation and experience for language.
My 1996 article in the Journal of Child Language asked, “Why
do infants begin to talk?” and a subtitle promised to treat language
as “an unintended consequence” (Locke 1996). I asserted that
when infants begin to talk they draw on vocal material that is
learned in the first year of life, building on attentional biases pres-
ent in the first few weeks. A corollary was that infants store strings
of sound long before they can possibly be aware that ambient fig-
ures, in talking, are actually exercising a system of arbitrary sound-
meaning relations that is regulated by an equally arbitrary mental
grammar. Thus, it was proposed, the actions and developments
that nudge infants along the path to language could only involve
proximal benefits that are inherently nonlinguistic (Locke 1996).
The central thesis of the “Why” article was derived from more
basic evolutionary processes relating to bipedalism, pelvic nar-
rowing, and truncated gestation, leading to “premature birth” and
a protracted period of postnatal dependency and care (Locke, sub-
mitted). It is significant that the unusually intense stimulation as-
sociated with routine caregiving – feeding, comforting, carrying,
and, in modern humans, talking – is experienced during a period
of equally intense brain development (Locke 1993).
With weaning and ambulation – changes that potentially reduce
interactions between infants and their caregivers – attachment
grows stronger. This ensures continued valuation of faces, eyes,
and voices, and therefore persistent sensitivity to the organs of
spoken language. Conveniently, the faces that command infants’
attention also move when people talk, the eyes that offer oppor-
tunities to share emotional space also link words and environ-
mental referents, and the voices that identify caregivers and their
feelings happen to be what vowels and other speech sounds are
made of. Thus, infants, merely by dancing with mature humans –
who happen to spend most of their time talking – take on linguis-
tic knowledge.
Not that systems for the analysis of linguistic material are un-
available to the infant, for they are, or soon will be. But mecha-
nisms that operate on stored utterances must be supplied, and this
is where social observation and interaction come in. This becomes
evident when one considers a nearly opposite circumstance. In the
case of autism, faces and possibly voices are largely ignored, if not
avoided. These dispositions make it almost impossible to know
whether there is something wrong with the usual linguistic ma-
chinery, since – lacking an interest in people who talk – there are
too few experiences of the sort that, in normally developing chil-
dren, produce material for linguistic processing.
In the apes, a great deal more of the brain develops prior to
birth, at a time when the fetus is shielded from ambient vocal 
stimulation and, one deduces from studies of vocal behavior (cf.
Tomasello et al. 1985; 1989), is only rarely exposed to maternal
calls and screams. After birth, neonatal apes begin independent
movement and foraging at an early age. In the unusual case of the
captive bonobo, Kanzi, talking humans appeared on the scene im-
mediately, with the training success that Savage-Rumbaugh and
her colleagues have documented.
Savage-Rumbaugh’s training program, like the ocular and vocal
interactions of human infants and their caregivers, produced a
number of unintended consequences. As S&K point out, Kanzi
“volunteered” to interact in a number of instances. He ad-libbed
and he responded to speech even when doing so was not in the
empirical script. These voluntary interactions hint at reasons why
Kanzi learned the sounds and meanings of his caregiving talkers,
but they also present us with an apparent paradox. Whereas hu-
man infants, while interacting with talkers, typically happen to
learn a language, an infant ape, when enrolled in a language-train-
ing program, happens to develop a taste for spontaneous human
interaction. So what was the “ape language project” really about?
I have argued elsewhere that children develop the capacity for
language gradually, in several discernible phases (Locke 1997);
these include vocal learning and storage, phases that precede the
child’s first use of words. At this point, there is usually little for the
investigator to observe but social behavior. Researchers on the Ge-
nie project learned the hard way, if they learned at all, that one
cannot get to grammar without passing through social interaction,
a passage they may have inadvertently blocked – thwarting their
own theoretical goals – when they removed the matron who be-
came “too close” to Genie at the beginning of the project (Rymer
1994). Was the purpose of the research to encourage a modern-
day “wild child” to develop trust and affection for her caregivers,
or to create novel utterances through the application of grammat-
ical rules? The theoretical stakes were clearly linked to the latter,
but there is no way the “critical period” hypothesis can be tested
if the learner lacks previous success in the area of emotional de-
velopment and attachment.
When Savage-Rumbaugh tried to teach language she got in-
teraction, just as the human infant’s interaction with talking 
caregivers naturally produces vocal learning and the storage of 
speech. Thus, one sees reasons for concern about definitions of
language that emphasize the information that is sent rather than
the thoughts and feelings that are shared. The informationally 
oriented paradigm that was, or seemed to be, available when ape
research began was inspired by theoretical mathematicians –
Shannon and Weaver (1949) – at least one of whom was also a
cryptographer. These theorists designed a measure according to
which communication was impossible if the “receiver” already
knew the information “contained” in a message, but in reality peo-
ple frequently interact precisely so they can have the experience
made possible by their shared knowledge (Locke 2001).
Definitions of language grew up around such rational assump-
tions. Little surprise, then, that S&K would suggest, a half century
later, that a different paradigm is needed for apes, a species in
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which parents rarely vocalize or donate information to their young
(King 1994a; 1994b). The new training procedures, they suggest,
should be based more on social interaction (it is not clear that dy-
namic systems theory is actually needed here) and less on infor-
mation processing. But this “new” paradigm has a decidedly fa-
miliar look, for as every good developmentalist knows, interaction
– to the neotenous members of a gregarious species – is the only
game in town. It would be surprising if some other “paradigm”
worked better in animals that have no evolutionary linguistic his-
tory.
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Can dancing replace scientific approach:
Lost (again) in chimpocentrism
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Abstract: In communication studies, in contrast to the approach of the 
information-transmission hypothesis, the dynamic systems theory tackles
the problem of continous feedback between interactors. However, Shanker
& King’s (S&K’s) account seems to lack methodological elaboration, for
the reader is presented with anecdotes. Furthermore, in contrast to the
authors’ beliefs, chimpanzees (and humans) are not the only animals able
to show coregulated communicative interactions, for similar phenomena
can be found in other animals, as for example in dogs.
Contrasting the “information-transmission” and the “dynamic
dance” metaphors is not a good way of approaching the study of
communication. First, as the authors correctly recognize, “infor-
mation” is just as much a metaphor or a hypothetical scientific
construct as is the “dance” metaphor, so the existence or nonexis-
tence of information or dancing is not the main question. Any
model of communication should be able to form predictable and
testable hypotheses for experiments. The information-transmis-
sion hypothesis (ITH) was successful in providing researchers
with testable problems in both animals and humans, the assump-
tion being that communication occurs if the uncertainty (as per-
ceived by an external observer) of the receivers’ behaviour de-
creases after the sender emits a signal. Note that the receiver’s
behaviour is used here only as an indicator because, for an etho-
logically based approach to communication, it is the sender who
invests and therefore should get the gains (Slater 1985). But in the
target article, when S&K state in Table 1 that “communication is
governed by fixed codes,” “what is communicated is always infor-
mation,” and “development of species-typical communicative be-
haviors is maturational” (target article, sect. 2), the ITH is mis-
leadingly presented because these features are not necessary
attributes of this theory and are not fulfilled for most mammalian
species.
Second, ITH is portrayed as relying on sequences of behav-
ioural actions, and dynamic system theory (DST) communication
is described as a coregulated process. This simply cannot be true
because any string of actions by definition occurs in time. Even
parallel actions are not immune to time, and this is even truer if
we observe communicative (or any other) interaction between two
or more individuals. Coregulation does not free one from the pass-
ing time in which we all live. Nevertheless, the authors correctly
feel that there is difference between the two models in how they
treat communicative interactions. In my view, the main difference
is that ITH takes communication as a one-way process without 
being interested in the effect of the receiver’s feedback on the
sender. In contrast, the DST model places more emphasis on 
the feedback effects by modeling communication as a two-way
process. Naturally, in one-way communication there is no need for
regulation; in contrast, if the role of the sender or actor changes
over time (turn taking) then regulation becomes a critical issue.
Therefore the problem is not whether any information has been
transmitted, but at which level of complexity the communicative
interaction is modeled.
The authors apparently feel that chimpanzees have been left
out of the Homo club (again), and by appealing to DST they could
be smuggled in through the backdoor. But for ethologists there are
no clubs and backdoors. Instead, there are selection processes and
functional compatibility to the environments for species, as well
as behaviour mechanisms and ontogenetical processes that allow
individuals to interact with their environment on a daily basis.
The assumption that the DST approach reveals special abilities
for apes and humans reminds me of the classic error of chim-
pocentrism. Some examples are given here from our research with
dogs (for examples of related research projects with parrots, see
Pepperberg 1991, and for projects with dolphins, see Herman &
Tavolga 1980). Dogs have been selected for living in human social
setting, and today most individuals of this species are members of
family groups of humans. Over time, dogs must have been trans-
formed to some extent to be able to survive among humans. We
(Miklosi & Soproni 2003) and others (Hare & Tomasello 1999)
have hypothesized that there has been a genetic adaptation of dogs
to enable them to live in human society, and changes in their abil-
ity to communicate with humans could be one of them. First, dogs
might have acquired novel abilities to “understand” human com-
municative actions. We have shown that dogs can perform better
than most “socialized” apes in situations where humans are sig-
naling hidden food by pointing (e.g., Soproni et al. 2002). Second,
it seems that dog’s communicative behaviours are less rigidly 
constrained by genetic influences, and can be molded by interac-
tion with humans, leaving room for developmental ritualisation
(Tomasello & Call 1997). This is supported by many everyday ob-
servations (Pongrácz et al. 2001) and staged experiments (Miklosi
et al. 2000) showing highly variable idiosyncratic processes of
coregulation in communicative situations between owner and dog.
Although these interactions might not be as complex as those in-
dicated for Kanzi or other apes, the difference is clearly not in
quality but in quantity.
To take another example, S&K note that the ability to take turns
is an important aspect in regulation of communicative interac-
tions. We observed this ability in dogs when they were working for
their blind owner (Naderi et al. 2001). Analyzing the behaviour of
the human and the dog we found that there is a high frequency of
turn taking as the role of the initiator changes in the dyad. Based
on this we have hypothesized that blind leading is not solely the
task of the dog but is a result of coregulated cooperative interac-
tion of both participants. All this suggests that dogs, and not only
chimpanzees, possess prerequisites for taking an active role in dy-
namic, creative, coregulated interactions.
Although one should not blame the authors for taking the danc-
ing metaphor too seriously, I mention it because of their poor pre-
sentation of supporting data to the DST approach. What is needed
here are clear questions and experimental tests (and not film ex-
tracts), and, most of all, statistically processed data. As a better ex-
ample, take the research on courtship dance in humans, which can
be viewed in a functional framework by hypothesizing that it is a
means for males to signal (send information about) their quality to
attractive females (Grammer 1990). Thus, the female can judge
the male’s competence and decide whether she finds him attrac-
tive. Although one could insist that some information has been
transmitted, the metaphor breaks down because the result is the
outcome of a joint interaction, and no clear one-to-one transmis-
sion can be traced. Therefore, we need theories and means to de-
scribe the mechanism that contributes to dancing behaviour. Be-
cause humans usually find synchrony more pleasurable that
asynchrony, one could assume that the synchrony achieved by the
dancers plays a key role in the maintenance of this activity. Gram-
mer et al. (1998) supposed that the higher the interest of the
dancers in each other, the more synchronized the dance should
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be. Using a newly developed search algorithm by Magnusson
(1996), they found little evidence overall for one-to-one synchro-
nization by position mirroring or echoing in the partners’ behav-
iour, but a female interested in a specific male showed longer 
and more elaborate dancing patterns that resulted in synchro-
nization to the male’s behaviour. Thus, female interest was ex-
pressed as an active contribution to the level of synchrony in the
dance. This analysis should be a warning that verbal descriptions
of communicative interactions should not be taken at their face
value.
Clearly, what is needed in this research are new methods that
collect data for the assumptions provided by DST, and what is not
needed are anecdotes that are focused on whether or not one likes
to dance with chimpanzees.
Could dancing be coupled oscillation? –
the interactive approach to linguistic
communication and dynamical systems
theory
Erik Myin and Sonja Smets
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy, Free
University Brussels (VUB), B1050 Brussels, Belgium.
{emyin, sonsmets}@vub.ac.be http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~emyin/
http://www.vub.ac.be/CLWF/SS/
Abstract: Although we applaud the interactivist approach to language and
communication taken in the target article, we notice that Shanker & King
(S&K) give little attention to the theoretical frameworks developed by dy-
namical system theorists. We point out how the dynamical idea of causal-
ity, viewed as multidirectional across multiple scales of organization, could
further strengthen the position taken in the target article.
The importance of this target article obviously outstrips the do-
main of animal language.
In fact, the article forms a further step in the unfolding of the
dynamical, interactivist paradigm in which cognitive activity is
seen as the exercise of a potentially ever-developing set of skills
(Myin & O’Regan 2002), rather than as a computational process
in a disembodied brain. It adds to the recent wave of detailed ac-
counts from that paradigm on, for example, (visual) perception
(O’Regan & Noë 2001) and social understanding (Gallagher
2001). Against the common claims that language research is all
about specific neurocomputational processes in brain modules
unique to humans, Shanker & King (S&K) offer a convincing plea
for conceiving of language as a primarily interactive social prac-
tice. In this sense the work of earlier theorists such as Merleau-
Ponty (1945) and Wittgenstein (1953) is being further pursued
within a respectable contemporary scientific context.
We noticed that the authors do not offer a formal detailed elab-
oration on their position within the framework of dynamical sys-
tems theory (Abraham & Shaw 1992; Kelso 1995). Therefore, we
ponder whether they would tend to follow recent cognitive theo-
rists (Beer 1995; Keijzer 2001; Thelen et al. 2000) in attempting
to connect the descriptions they offer at the behavioral level with
a multiscale spanning explanatory dynamical account, where scales
range from environmental events, including actions by other or-
ganisms, to nervous and muscle systems.
A typical dynamical systems story concerns the interactions be-
tween variables and parameters at different scales of organization
and how these create a dynamical set of highly interlinked and in-
terdependent patterns. In the established vocabulary, higher-level
orderly patterns, which are described by collective variables, de-
pend on (possibly simple) control parameters, which in turn often
depend on the collective variables. Such is the case in the by-now
classic example of finger movements described in Kelso (1995),
where the simultaneous movement of the same fingers of the two
hands, when started out of phase (the collective variable), auto-
matically shifts to synchrony when the speed of movement (the
control parameter) crosses a threshold.
Four aspects of the dynamical systems account seem particu-
larly relevant. The first concerns the emphasis on emergence of a
higher scale order, where emergence can be understood as a nov-
elty because it arises out of interactions with parameters that are
nonspecific, in the sense of apparantly unrelated (the specific
value of the speed threshold in the finger example has no straight-
forward relation to synchrony). Second, changes at any level can
have effects in any direction, upward or downward, implying the
necessity to replace the notion of hierarchical level by the notion
of scale (Alexander & Globus 1996). As such, the influence from
higher to lower levels is mutual or, in the term of Kelso (1995), it
can be described as “circular causality.” Third, the dynamical sys-
tems approach seems to apply in particular to systems in which
there are a large number of (nonlinear) interactions between sub-
systems. This last aspect entails a possible compatibility of the dy-
namical approach with the dance metaphor, for a dance almost 
literally can be seen as a coupling of two systems of coupled
oscillations: here we have many coordinated patterns at different
scales in one system (the whole body, the legs, the feet, the toes,
and whatever nervous events that are involved) and harmonious
synchronization effectively depends on the strength of the cou-
pling of two such systems. This dance metaphor can be framed in
dynamical systems terminology where, for example, changes in
lower scale coupling strength or the range of individual oscillator
frequencies that modulate the large-scale systems order are de-
scribed in terms of a control parameter (Keijzer 2001). Fourth,
though it is possible to develop dynamical accounts by referring to
abstract variables and parameters that do not touch on the actual
physical components of systems, some cognitive theorists try to
develop dynamical accounts that specify parameters and variables
that do directly refer to tangible aspects of the environment, other
agents, and various scales of bodily, nervous, and muscular orga-
nization (see the references cited above).
Though there is some passing mention of the cognitive dynam-
ical systems literature in the target article, we feel the authors’
claims could be strengthened by it at various points, of which we
single out two. First, there are sharp discussions of why one can-
not interpret what the authors say as merely a higher scaled 
account of the phenomena, which still could be implemented
through lower scaled mechanisms of a cognitivistic nature (see
S&K’s repeated discussion of Deacon). Basically, the authors’ re-
ply to the cognitivist seems to consist in re-emphasising that cog-
nitivism turns the explanatory order upside down by misconstru-
ing linguistic development as an internal event inside individual
heads. However true this is, such a reply could be strengthened
by reference to multiscales spanning dynamical accounts. As long
as nothing is said about lower scales (and how they relate to higher
ones), it remains possible for the cognitivist to insist there must be
some relevant story to tell at the “subpersonal” symbolic level
about representational processes in individual brains. It can be
validly pointed out that this cognitivist move is empty, in the ab-
sence of further constraints, of what it is for an event at the sub-
personal level to count as a representation. But the multiscale dy-
namical account allows for the further argument that mapping
into subpersonal symbolic representational structures is impossi-
ble precisely because this account is inherently dedicated to mul-
tiplying directed causality rather than to delegating it to a single
symbolic or representational level.
Second, we also think the dynamical multiscale approach could
do justice to the nonreducible aspects of language development
emphasized by S&K when they refer, for example, to the open-
endedness and the possibility for continuous modification inher-
ent in (proto-) linguistic communicative behavior. It is explicit in
the dynamical literature that higher scaled order has a certain de-
gree of autonomy vis-à-vis lower scales in at least two senses. First,
it arises as a consequence from nonspecific triggers (in contrast 
to this, in the cognitivist paradigm, higher level events invariably
emerge from lower level events that are isomorphic to events at
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the higher, behavioral, level). Second, there is the possibility of cir-
cular causality flowing down from higher scales. Perhaps this is the
theoretical counterpart of the fact, brought prominently to the
fore by the story of Kanzi, that achievements in linguistic devel-
opment, such as a new understanding, can serve as the driving
force for ever-novel linguistic development.
On the other hand, the multiscale picture might also remind us
of the possibility of lower scale constraints; probably the specifics
of the human vocal apparatus missing in other species impose lim-
its on linguistic development – for example, by making it impos-
sible for them to speak out loud to themselves (the importance of
which, for the development of thought, has been stressed by many
theorists; see Clark 1997, Ch. 10).
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Does the new paradigm in ape-language
research ape behaviorism?
Joseph J. Pear
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Abstract: Although Shanker & King (S&K) disregard the behavioral par-
adigm, their arguments are reminiscent of those in Skinner’s Verbal Be-
havior (1957). Like S&K, Skinner maintained that communication is not
appropriately characterized as the transmission of information between in-
dividuals. In contrast to the paradigm advocated by S&K, however, the be-
havioral paradigm emphasizes prediction and control as important scien-
tific goals.
Shanker & King (S&K) emphasize the differences between their
paradigm and the cognitive one, while basically ignoring the be-
havioral one. In their only substantive reference to Verbal Behav-
ior (Skinner 1957), they imply that Skinner’s behavioral approach
requires the conditioning of a code whereby one individual trans-
mits information to another (sect. 2, para. 4). Skinner, however,
opposed the use of terms such as idea, meaning, and information
that refer to inner things that are transmitted through speech:
Idioms and expressions which seem to explain verbal behavior in terms
of ideas are so common in our language that it is impossible to avoid
them, but they may be little more than moribund figures of speech. The
basic formulation, however, has been preserved. The immediate suc-
cessor to “idea” was “meaning,” and the place of the latter is in danger
of being usurped by a newcomer, “information.” (Skinner 1957, p. 7)
S&K’s critique of the transmission metaphor echoes Skinner’s
treatment. For example, Skinner discussed an instance of one per-
son telling another that there is gold in the Klondike. The tradi-
tional account of this episode is that the knowledge (or informa-
tion) about gold being in the Klondike has been transmitted from
one individual to the other. However, Skinner rejected this ac-
count:
The fact [that there is gold in the Klondike] is not transmitted from 
one speaker to another. What is “made common” to both listener and
speaker (to take the etymology of communicate) is either a verbal re-
sponse or a resulting nonverbal tendency (to go to the Klondike when
gold is reinforcing). (Skinner 1957, p. 364)
S&K’s statement that “mutual understanding is something that
emerges as both partners converge on some shared feeling,
thought, action, intention, and so on” (sect. 2, para. 6, emphasis in
the original) is reminiscent of the above reference to the etymol-
ogy of communicate (to make common).
S&K state that, in addition to various kinds of information,
“great apes and humans also communicate their desires and in-
tentions, fears, warnings, invitations, attitudes, emotions, and so
on” (sect. 2, para. 5). Skinner would have agreed that these com-
munications are not transmissions of information. To conserve
space, I consider only the first item listed – desires, which Skin-
ner dealt with in his concept of the “mand.” He illustrated with
the example of someone manding candy with the exclamation
“Candy!”, which would traditionally be regarded as having the ref-
erent (or “meaning”) candy:
But “what is communicated” would appear to be “the speaker’s need for
candy,” which refers to the controlling state of deprivation. The concept
of the mand . . . explicitly recognizes both contingency of reinforce-
ment and deprivation or aversive stimulation and is free to deal with
these variables in appropriate fashion without trying to identify a rela-
tion of reference or a process of communication. (Skinner 1957, p. 44;
emphasis added)
In addition, in striking concordance with S&K, Skinner described
the kind of analysis required by verbal behavior as follows:
We need separate but interlocking accounts of the behaviors of both
speaker and listener if our explanation of verbal behavior is to be com-
plete. In explaining the behavior of the speaker we assume a listener
who will reinforce his behavior in certain ways. In accounting for the
behavior of the listener we assume a speaker whose behavior bears a
certain relation to environmental conditions. The interchanges be-
tween them must explain all the conditions thus assumed. (Skinner
1957, p. 34)
Speaker and listener roles alternate, and could be described as a
kind of dance (although I am unaware that Skinner ever used that
particular metaphor). In any case, this description clearly fits
“coregulated activity” as described by S&K.
S&K make much of the tendency for language-trained chim-
panzees to correct themselves or others. These are editing pro-
cesses, which Skinner discussed extensively in Verbal Behavior
(e.g., Ch. 15). It is interesting that humans are not the only species
that engage in this behavior.
In addition to the above consistencies with Skinner’s Verbal Be-
havior, S&K frequently make behavioral-sounding statements, as
illustrated in two examples: “Whether or not a subject under-
stands the meaning of a symbol, or another speaker, is established
by what she says or does in the context of dynamic interactions”
(sect. 3, 4th last para., emphasis in the original) and “Kanzi be-
haves in a manner that satisfies the criteria for describing him as
‘understanding what he is being asked to do’” (sect. 4.2, para. 5,
emphasis in the original). Also characteristic of behaviorists, S&K
eschew the concept of mind in a manner that is reminiscent of
Skinner’s critique of mentalism.
There are differences between the new paradigm and the be-
havioral one. The question that needs to be addressed, however,
is whether these differences justify the new paradigm. To answer
this, we need to decide what purpose we expect a paradigm to
serve. Skinner’s purpose, as expressed in Verbal Behavior, was to
understand verbal behavior in the following sense:
The “understanding” of verbal behavior is something more than the use
of a consistent vocabulary with which specific instances may be de-
scribed. It is not to be confused with the confirmation of any set of the-
oretical principles. The criteria are more demanding than that. The ex-
tent to which we understand verbal behavior in a “causal” analysis is to
be assessed from the extent to which we can predict the occurrence of
specific instances and, eventually, from the extent to which we can pro-
duce or control such behavior by altering the conditions under which it
occurs. (Skinner 1957, p. 3)
S&K’s purpose seems to encompass only the limited under-
standing referred to in the first sentence of this quotation. This is
suggested by their emphasis on creativity as an unanalyzed feature
of verbal interactions and by their advocacy of a hermeneutic
stance. Certainly perfect prediction may be an impossible goal, es-
pecially with regard to something as complex as verbal behavior;
however, given how far S&K have gone in describing their subject
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matter behaviorally, why not continue to the next step, why not ex-
plore how the prediction and control of verbal behavior can flow
from their paradigm?
Research scientist
Irene M. Pepperberg
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Abstract: Viewing communication as a dynamic system is laudable; argu-
ing that the approach is novel is questionable. Some researchers studying
nonhuman communication other than ape language have been using such
an approach for decades. A brief description of an avian system provides
one such example. Interestingly, the dynamic social system described in
the target article may have a developmental neuronal basis.
I applaud Shanker & King (S&K) for examining communication
as a dynamic system. I disagree, however, that Savage-Rumbaugh
originated dynamics in ape language research (ALR), and I dis-
agree with S&K’s primate-centric view. Many nonprimate studies
have long championed this approach (see the reviews in Pepper-
berg 1999; 2001).
ALR dynamics began with Gardner and Gardner (1969). The
Gardners, unfortunately, were not lauded, and in fact were so
strongly attacked (e.g., Sebeok & Rosenthal 1981) that they could
not continue their research. I have no desire, however, to rehash
that controversy.
Concerning avian studies, Todt (1975) was the first to examine
Grey parrot vocal learning dynamics. He tested his hypothesis that
Greys, like songbirds who also live in large social groups, learn by
eavesdropping: watching and listening to a network of social and
vocal interactions, making deductions and assumptions about the
results of such behavior (e.g., Peake et al. 2002). Via his Model/
Rival (M/R) technique, whereby two humans demonstrate vocal
behavior to be acquired, Todt’s Greys learned German phrases in
less than 72 hours. His data strikingly contrasted with previous
failures to train mimetic birds using operant techniques and little,
if any, social interaction (Grosslight & Zaynor 1967; Mowrer
1954). Todt’s parrots, however, replied only to the human trainer
initiating interactions and they learned phrases from only the hu-
man M/R respondent (the Model for the bird’s responses and its
Rival for the trainer’s attention).
My subsequent interspecies communication research with
Greys adapted Todt’s technique: I interchanged the roles of M/R
and trainer, included birds in dialogues, and instituted referential
rewards. A bird observed two humans handling an object; the
trainer then queried the M/R as to “What’s here?”, “What toy?”
The trainer rewarded correct responses with the item, demon-
strating referential and functional label use, respectively, by pro-
viding a 1:1 correspondence between label and object, and model-
ing label use as a means to obtain the object (Pepperberg 1981).
The M/R now also erred and was vocally chided by trainers (e.g.,
“No, you’re wrong”), who temporarily hid the object. When re-
sponses were garbled or incorrect, the M/R was told to speak
clearly or to try again. M/R and trainer reversed roles, showing how
either party could request information or effect environmental
change. After humans modeled interactions 2 or 3 times, the bird
was queried about the object. Initially, any novel utterance related
to the target label (e.g., /i/ for “key”) was rewarded; object labels/
sounds used for other purposes were not. Thus, the bird was part
of a dynamic, synchronous, triadic, interactional network. (Paral-
lels should be evident with Kanzi’s subsequent experience watch-
ing his mother’s training.) Parrots’ results, again, were striking. 
The birds began using English labels referentially, acquired con-
cepts once thought limited to primates, responded to anyone, and
learned all parts of interactions (Pepperberg 1981; 1999).
I then investigated why M/R training succeeded. Previous in-
terspecies communication studies compared different training
methods’ efficacies (Baptista & Petrinovich 1984, 1986; Fouts
1972), or described conditions enabling allospecific learning (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh 1991), without determining what input aspects
were necessary and sufficient for referential acquisition. Begin-
ning in 1991 with naive parrots, students and I varied presence/
absence/relative amounts of functionality, reference, and social
interaction using video and audiotapes, and testing the effects of
joint attention (note Baldwin 1995) and one trainer. We found that
only birds exposed to the full complement of interaction, refer-
ence, and functionality in M/R training acquired communicative
competence (Pepperberg 1999; Pepperberg et al. 2000).
Additional dynamic input, however, was important. Our parrots
spontaneously produced utterances initially lacking language
value (sound play), just as young children do. Children’s vocaliza-
tions quickly acquire value when interpreted by caretakers as
meaningful and intentional; so did those of our birds (Pepperberg
1990). For both birds and children, repeated interactions “con-
ventionalize” both sound patterns and sound-meaning connec-
tions toward standard communication. And, like children (e.g.,
Brown 1958; 1973), birds use caretakers to provide referential in-
formation for relatively novel labels (Pepperberg 2001). For ex-
ample, our youngest subject uttered a label previously used in a
specific context – “wool” for a woolen pompon – while beaking a
trainer’s sweater. Our responses – including high affect and ex-
citement – stimulated him further, revealing the potential power
of his utterances and encouraging further categorization attempts.
Even birds’ initial erroneous categorizations engendered infor-
mation about a correct, new label for an item (e.g., we stated that
almonds aren’t “cork” but “cork nut”; Pepperberg 1999; 2001).
Thus parrots, like children, seemingly have a repertoire of desires
and purposes, driving them to form and test ideas in dealing with
the world; these ideas may be early stages of representation and
categorization in cognitive processing (Pepperberg 2001). Bald-
win (2000) proposed that human infants (12–18 months) use clues
to others’ intentions to guide their interpretation of language,
emotion, and action; with such information, infants avoid poten-
tial errors and quickly learn relevant new skills. Research data sug-
gest that parrots act similarly in learning from human trainers.
Finally, recent mirror neuron (MN) data (Arbib & Rizzolatti
1996; Fadiga et al. 1995; Fogassi 2000) suggest a basis for S&K’s
coregulated activities. Briefly, when a subject does not overtly
replicate an observed action, MNs fire as though it had – creating
the chance for synergy. The human MN system likely evolved to
analyze and developmentally recreate actions (including speech)
to which it is exposed, wherein neurons react which activate mus-
cles not directly observed (Sundara et al. 2001). I propose that ex-
posure to complex speech patterns and everyday combinatorial
behavioral acts in (at least) humans initiates recruitment of neu-
rological paths (involving MNs) that are critical for simultaneous
complex combinatorial behavior, including verbal-nonverbal com-
munication; emergence is a matter of achieving physical compe-
tence and choice to execute such behavior. Although coregulated
behavior seemingly occurs without ostensible training, training in
fact begins at the organism’s birth.
How might avian systems work? Does hearing human speech
and seeing human actions initiate comparable patterns in parrot
brains? If action planning is the ability to select (even uncon-
sciously) appropriate neurons and combine them into patterns of
appropriate temporal activation (Arbib & Rizzolatti 1996), M/R
training could strengthen or help form connections in whatever
system does exist (Brauth et al. 2001).
In sum, the dynamic approach favored by S&K is likely correct,
but it is neither new nor unique to primates.
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Abstract: Shanker & King (S&K) argue that information-theoretic ap-
proaches to communication are too rigid to capture the ebb and flow of
communicative interactions. They advocate instead a dynamic systems ap-
proach based on the metaphor of dance. We focus on two problems aris-
ing from the dance metaphor: first, that its inherently cooperative tone
contradicts basic tenets of behavioral biology; and second, that it risks ob-
scuring rather than clarifying the details of communicative interactions.
Shanker & King (S&K) propose “a fundamental shift in commu-
nications theory from an information-processing to a dynamic sys-
tems paradigm” (target article, sect. 2). The dynamic systems par-
adigm they advocate is based on the metaphor of dance in which
“communicating partners continuously establish and sustain a
feeling of shared rhythm and movement” (sect. 2). Accordingly,
they stress the importance of interactional synchrony, mutual at-
tunement, and affective resonance between participants. They
liken the processes to the choreographed harmony of a waltz.
They illustrate their approach with a thorough redescription of
ape language studies, especially those involving the chimpanzees
Sherman and Austin and the bonobo Kanzi, in which synchrony
and attunement were apparently critical in the emergence of ef-
fective communication between the animals and their human in-
structors.
S&K are probably right to stress that communicative interac-
tions are inherently dynamic. They may also be right that partici-
pants’ affective and motivational systems play an important role in
regulating communicative dynamics. However, their additional
specific emphasis on mutual attunement between participants se-
riously limits the scope of their proposal to situations in which the
motives and interactive goals of communicating parties are largely
coincident. This may be approximately true for many of the com-
municative contexts involved in the ape language studies they re-
view, or, at the least, it may be a productive ideal to foster in fu-
ture efforts to teach language to another species. It may also be
approximately true in some other natural communicative contexts.
For example, in some baboons, pairs of males perform ritualistic
greeting displays that involve a series of coordinated actions that
include reciprocal genital inspection and handling (Smuts &
Watanabe 1990). Considerable behavioral synchrony and possibly
mutual attunement may be central to these greeting interactions.
However, the intrinsically cooperative flavor of the communica-
tion dynamic that S&K stress inherently limits its general applic-
ability to the broad sweep of natural communicative interactions
in these and other species.
If the past 40 years of research and theorizing in behavioral bi-
ology have taught us anything, it is surely that although the inter-
ests and interactional goals of interacting parties are sometimes
overlapping, they are seldom completely symmetric and are often
profoundly asymmetric (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971; 1974).
Consequently, many social encounters are expected to involve ne-
gotiating conflicting motives and objectives, with associated un-
dertones that are the antithesis of mutual attunement. In com-
munication theory, alternative frameworks have been developed
recently that embrace this point and also incorporate the dynamic
nature of communicative interactions. For example, Owings and
Morton’s (1997) “Manager-Assessor” framework explicitly charac-
terizes communication as a back-and-forth dynamic between sig-
nalers trying to influence others as part of a broader effort to man-
age their environments to individual advantage and receivers
assessing both signals and the signaler’s other behavior as part 
of its own broad management effort. Similarly, Owren and Ren-
dall’s (1997) “Affect-Induction” framework views signalers and re-
ceivers engaged in a recursive and reciprocal effort to influence
each other through signals that induce affective responses con-
ducive to their own respective interests. Both frameworks allow
for symmetry in participants’ interests. However, neither frame-
work requires it. Both predict the communicative dynamic as of-
ten to involve negotiation of conflicting goals, each party pursuing
its own objectives while resisting its partner’s. If the metaphor of
dance had to be used, the appropriate step would as often be a
slam-dance1 as a waltz.
The more general problem in S&K’s proposal is the explanatory
reliance on metaphor at all. Both the dynamic systems approach
that S&K advocate and the information-theoretic approach they
critique lean heavily on metaphor. S&K invoke the metaphor of
dance. The information-theoretic framework frequently invokes
the metaphor of meaning. As an analogy to the words of language,
animal signals are held to contain meaning. Communication is
proposed to involve the encoding, transmission, and decoding of
this meaning. These and other metaphors can make useful ex-
planatory shorthand for processes whose details are well under-
stood. The “selfish-gene” metaphor in behavioral biology is a good
example (Dawkins 1976). However, there is the risk of seriously
misrepresenting those details when the metaphor is interpreted
literally or when it is used as an a priori explanation of them.
Consider the following example. Young rodent pups that are
separated from their nest produce ultrasonic vocalizations. The
vocalizations are a by-product of the pups’ physiological response
to cold stress that involves non-shivering thermogenesis in brown
adipose tissue. The increased metabolic requirements associated
with this process involve constriction of the larynx following in-
halation that functions to increase air pressure and oxygen trans-
fer in the lungs. Ultrasonic sounds result during prolonged expi-
rations against this constricted larynx, a phenomenon referred to
as “laryngeal braking” (Blumberg & Alberts 1997). Mothers are
responsive to the ultrasonic calls produced from this laryngeal
braking and rapidly retrieve the pups. Pups do not call in other cir-
cumstances if they are not also cold-stressed, even though re-
trieval in those circumstances would often be appropriate. Here
then is an example of functionally integrated communication be-
tween mothers and pups in which the ultimate interests of both
parties are likely to be quite overlapping if not actually symmet-
ric. Yet, even here there is no requirement of, or evidence for, 
mutual attunement or interactional synchrony. Nor is it easy to 
assign meaning to the pups’ ultrasonic calls: “I’m cold . . . I’m
stressed . . . I’m anxious . . . I’m out of the nest . . . Help me . . .
Retrieve me . . . Warm me. . . .” The calls are an incidental by-
product of a physiological response to cold stress for which selec-
tion has favored maternal perceptual sensitivity and behavioral re-
sponsiveness. Neither the metaphor of dance nor the metaphor of
meaning accurately captures either the mechanisms underlying
signal production and maternal responding or the functional con-
sequences for either party. Surely these are exactly the phenom-
ena that a theory of natural communication aims to explain.
In sum, if S&K’s approach is to represent a paradigm shift in
communication theory, they will need to demonstrate its applica-
bility beyond the limited cases where participants’ interests and
goals are expected to be mutually attuned. They will also need to
cash-out the dance metaphor for a far more concrete explanation
of communicative processes.
NOTE
1. Slam-dancing, or “moshing,” was popular in the 1980s and early
1990s. There were few formal rules or “steps.” Instead, participants at-
tempted to “slam into” others, at the same often trying to avoid being
slammed into by them.
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Great ape communication: Cognitive and
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Abstract: There are good arguments for examining great ape commu-
nicative achievements for what they contribute to our understanding of
great ape cognition and its evolution (Russon & Begun, in press a). Our
concern is whether Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) thesis advances communi-
cation studies from a broader cognitive and evolutionary perspective.
Communication has considerable importance for understanding
great ape mentality. Across domains, communication included,
great apes have been shown to achieve cognitive abilities in the
rudimentary symbolic range (alternatively, representational, hier-
archical, or second-order) – notably, beyond the sensorimotor
level 6 that S&K suggest (e.g., Byrne 1997; Langer 2000; Parker
& McKinney 1999; Russon et al. 1996). The great apes’ cognition
may reach beyond modularity, in that abilities in different domains
may facilitate one another. Communicative experiences are there-
fore probably important contributors to great ape cognitive de-
velopment, insofar as their cognitive abilities are emergent prod-
ucts constructed on the basis of experience (Parker & McKinney
1999; Russon 1999; Suddendorf & Whiten 2001; Tomasello et al.
1993).
Comparative studies represent cognition in great apes as
broadly intermediate between other anthropoids and humans,
and linked with information processing challenges in the realms
of diet, socioecology, and social relations (Russon & Begun, in
press b). It is then important to identify what evolutionary forces
rendered valuable cognitive systems like these, reliant on com-
munication ontogenetically and so highly flexible, loosely chan-
neled, and highly complex. Because some of great apes’ achieve-
ments, communicative achievements among them, are in the
range traditionally considered uniquely human, answers to these
questions have implications for understanding the evolution of hu-
man mentality.
In short, great ape cognitive prowess is manifest in many con-
texts, including communication. It probably owes to numerous in-
terrelated and interacting causes, one of them being selection for
centralized generative mechanisms that construct abilities in in-
dividual problem areas on the basis of communicative as well as
individual experiences. Here we consider S&K’s information pro-
cessing (IP) and dynamic systems (DS) metaphors, the latter pro-
posed as a new paradigm, in light of communication as an impor-
tant dimension of cognitive research.
The information processing metaphor, to S&K, turns on Shan-
non’s concept of information. Views they attribute to the informa-
tion processing metaphor are hard to square with Shannon’s math-
ematical concept. Attitudes and concepts from classical ethology,
behaviorist learning theory (much of it predating Shannon’s work),
and discontinuity models of communication are included, for in-
stance, along with views from models of complex cognitive and
brain processes. S&K characterize information processing by con-
trasting it with dynamic systems in terms of the qualities of be-
havior implied, as innately versus experientially developed, tightly
versus loosely channeled, simple versus complex, sequential ver-
sus dynamic, and rigid versus creative. Modern models of complex
cognitive and brain processes, however, concern developmentally
labile, flexible, and complex behavior – that is, behavior less con-
sistent with information processing than with dynamic systems
metaphors. Further, for us, an equally if not more important con-
trast is between proximate and ultimate causes of communicative
capabilities.
S&K’s evaluation finds the information processing and dynamic
systems metaphors incompatible rather than complementary –
hence, their hailing a paradigm shift (from “Deaconesque” to
“Savage-Rumbaughian”) and the demise of the information pro-
cessing metaphor. This evaluation rests on several factors. The au-
thors dismiss internal states as unknowable and unimportant fac-
tors in language or communicative phenomena: The meaning of
behavior is the behavior itself. This is reminiscent of strict behav-
iorist or postmodernist positions that eschew consideration, or
even the existence, of nonobservable phenomena. We understand
behavior to imply associated internal states within individuals. It
is essential to investigate in great apes the internal states that ac-
company their linguistic achievements as well as the communica-
tive dynamics that affect them. S&K’s criterion for evaluating
Deacon’s and Savage-Rumbaugh’s explanations is sufficiency in
explaining the linguistic achievements of a small number of indi-
viduals of Pan. However, there are other questions about ape lan-
guage for a new paradigm to tackle. In the target article, several
cognitive issues are acknowledged but put aside, including what
kinds of concepts language-experienced apes have mastered and
in what order they are acquired, what communicative skills great
apes master and what seem to be beyond their grasp.
S&K’s dynamic systems metaphor appears to create an impasse
for the study of cognitive and evolutionary dimensions of commu-
nication. If this is so, this metaphor for communication offers little
to these realms of enquiry. As presented in the target article, the
dynamic systems metaphor is a contextual, performance-oriented
communicative dance model that applies to most species; there-
fore, no basis is available for comparing communicative processes
across species or assessing their relationship to one another.
This leaves us asking whether multiple approaches can be
brought together. Features of communication which are of inter-
est to S&K and which are brought out by the dynamic systems
metaphor are context, quality, flexibility, and complexity. These
are all descriptors amenable to cognitive interpretation and analy-
sis. Some cognitive developmental models consider the role of so-
cial forces; some, for instance, have incorporated Vygotskian-like
concepts of the sort that mesh with S&K’s dance metaphor (e.g.,
Fischer et al. 1993). These models have been applied, fruitfully,
to great ape cognition (Parker & McKinney 1999). Efforts like
these suggest integration may be possible.
If a paradigm shift is indeed imminent, as a valuable guide to
research it must inform many approaches. S&K’s dynamic systems
metaphor is so focused on the minutiae of the proximate causes of
communicative achievements that it is doubtful whether it can be
applied usefully to questions of the nature of cognition or of cog-
nitive, communicative, or language evolution. Without informing
our understanding of comparative communication or of the evo-
lution of communication, there is no way to get from observations
of chimpanzee or bonobo communication to insights into the de-
velopment of language, as claimed by S&K. Integrating genera-
tive and experiential approaches with comparative and evolution-
ary approaches may one day produce a fruitful new paradigm.
Contribution of plasticity of sensorimotor
cerebral cortex to development of
communication skills
Barry J. Sessle and Dongyuan Yao
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Abstract: Several lines of evidence have underscored the remarkable 
neuroplasticity of the primate sensorimotor cortex, characterizing these
cortical areas as dynamic constructs that are modelled in a use-dependent
manner by behaviourally significant experiences. Their plasticity likely
provides a neural substrate that may contribute to the dynamic systems
paradigm argued by Shanker & King (S&K) as crucial for development of
communication skills.
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Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) discussion of the recent advances in ape
language research and the emerging conceptual shift to a dynamic
systems paradigm, suggests that such a paradigm sheds light on
the factors underpinning the development of communication
skills and the relationship between communicative development
and the development of language. The authors note that facial ex-
pressions constantly change in response to the changing dynam-
ics of social interactions, which is an example of what they term
“the plasticity of great ape capacities.” Our comments focus on re-
cent neuroscience research into the neuroplasticity of primate
cerebral cortical areas contributing to communication and other
orofacial motor skills.
The transformations in behaviour outlined by S&K reflect al-
terations to higher brain neural circuitry related to cognitive and
affective behaviour, and to output pathways from higher brain
centres that drive the muscles participating in facial expression
and other communicative behaviours. In the case of the primary
somatosensory (SI) and motor (MI) cortices, most studies of their
organization and neuroplasticity in the human and nonhuman 
primate have focussed on limb sensorimotor control (for review,
see Buonomano & Merzenich 1998; Chen et al. 2002; Sanes &
Donoghue 2000; Weinberger 1995). Recordings of neuronal ac-
tivity in limb MI of monkeys and neuroimaging studies in humans
have revealed remarkable neuroplasticity in the motor represen-
tations and neuronal properties within MI as a result of a variety
of manipulations and behaviours ranging from lesions of sensory
and motor nerves to the learning of motor skills and cognitive mo-
tor events. This plasticity can occur when already learned move-
ment sequences are repeatedly performed from memory or when
they are performed in response to sensory cues. Some of these
changes in motor representation or neuronal activity within limb
MI can occur quickly (within minutes) and are reversible, indi-
cating that MI actively and dynamically participates in the neural
changes required for the learning of new motor behaviours. Sen-
sory manipulations or behavioural task acquisition can, in addi-
tion, be associated with neuroplastic changes also in limb SI (e.g.,
an expanded somatosensory representation of those sensory in-
puts that are most critical to the learning of a skill). Moreover,
comparable neuroplasticity has been documented in auditory and
visual cortices (Buonomano & Merzenich 1998; Syka 2002).
However, the organization and learning-associated plasticity
specifically of the face sensorimotor cortex and associated cortical
regions have received little attention in the primate, although
findings in humans and monkeys and subprimates attest to the
plasticity or progressive return of function of face sensorimotor
cortex following cortical damage or trauma to peripheral tissues
(see Buonomano & Merzenich 1998; Chen et al. 2002; Martin &
Sessle 1993; Sanes & Donoghue 2000; Weinberger 1995; Yama-
mura et al. 2002) and its participation in some aspects of speech
(Bookheimer et al. 2000; Cabeza & Nyberg 2000; Price 2000;
Rumsey et al. 1997). We have recently begun investigating the
possible role and plasticity of the face sensorimotor cortex in the
monkey’s acquisition of orofacial motor skills, building on our ear-
lier findings from intracortical microstimulation (ICMS) mapping
and recording of neuronal activity in the awake monkey’s face MI.
The mapping had revealed an extensive representation of the 
orofacial muscles participating in facial expression and other com-
municative behaviours as well as in cyclic jaw and tongue move-
ments associated with ingestive behaviours (e.g., licking, mastica-
tion, swallowing; Huang et al. 1988, 1989; Martin et al. 1999). The
cyclic movements can be evoked not only from face MI but also
from cortical regions more lateral to face MI (e.g., the “cortical
masticatory area,” CMA). These orofacial motor behaviours are
severely disrupted when the face MI or adjacent cortical regions
are transiently inactivated (e.g., Murray et al. 1991; Narita et al.
2002; Yamamura et al. 2002), emphasizing the crucial role that
these cortical areas play in the expression of these diverse motor
behaviours. This view is further supported by findings that many
neurones in face MI discharge in relation to trained tongue or jaw
motor tasks, and those in CMA also are active in relation to cyclic
movements associated with ingestion or facial expression (e.g.,
Luschei & Goldberg 1981; Martin et al. 1997; Murray & Sessle
1992; Yao et al. 2002a). Furthermore, similar neuronal discharge
patterns occur in face SI, and inactivation specifically of face 
SI disrupts both learned motor behaviour and cyclic orofacial
movements (e.g., Lin et al. 1993; 1994; 1998), underscoring the
importance of somatosensory processing in cortical mechanisms
contributing to the guidance, and potentially the learning, of 
articulatory as well as masticatory and other orofacial motor skills.
In our most recent studies of the primate face sensorimotor cor-
tex, we have tested for its plasticity during the monkey’s learning
of a novel tongue-protrusion task (Yao et al. 2002b). The orofacial
motor representations and neuronal activity patterns within face
MI were determined before and after the animal learned this oro-
facial behaviour. Consistent with findings in limb MI (see above),
we found that before the tongue-task training only one-quarter 
of neurones showed tongue-protrusion related activity, whereas
three-quarters of those recorded after training had tongue-pro-
trusion related activity. Furthermore, the proportion of loci in
tongue MI from which tongue protrusion could be evoked by
ICMS was significantly higher than that before training. Such pre-
liminary data are indicative of face MI neuroplasticity and provide
evidence of a role for MI in orofacial motor learning in primates.
These various findings in primate face as well as limb sensori-
motor cortex emphasize that MI and SI are dynamic and adaptive
neural constructs that are modeled by behaviourally significant ex-
periences. It seems highly likely that they are involved in mediat-
ing, at least in part, the complex sensorimotor and cognitive phe-
nomena associated with the development and acquisition of
communication skills, and that they contribute to the neural sub-
strate underpinning the dynamic systems paradigm outlined by
S&K. Future research needs to explore this possibility more di-
rectly, by examining the plasticity of face MI, SI, and adjacent cor-
tical areas involved in orofacial motor behaviour, in relation to the
development of primate orofacial communication.
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Abstract: Shanker & King (S&K) trumpet the adoption of a “new para-
digm” in communication studies, exemplified by ape language research.
Though cautiously sympathetic, I maintain that their argument relies on a
false dichotomy between “information” and “dynamical systems” theory,
and that the resulting confusion prevents them from recognizing the main
chance their line of thinking suggests.
Speaking very generally, information theory is primarily con-
cerned with structure (understood via concepts like compressibil-
ity, probability, entropy, etc.) and dynamical systems theory (DST)
with change (making use of differential equations, trajectories
through state-spaces, etc.). For the purposes of science, the two,
thus understood, are pragmatically complementary and probably
conceptually inextricable (Collier 1999). The behavioral sciences,
in particular, are simultaneously about some distinctive types of
structure and the processes (themselves structured through time)
by which these structures are produced and maintained. Not only
is it not required that we chose between the two, Shanker & King’s
(S&K’s) conception of them as being alternatives is probably in-
coherent.
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As a mathematical apparatus, information theory makes no
claims at all about the nature of cognition. In particular, it does not
demand an episodic turn-taking model of communication between
cognitive systems, require that such communication make use of
conventionalized encryption, require a theory of cognitive pro-
cessing dependent on passive “internal” representations, or entail
anything at all about whether nonhumans are capable of language.
Confusing information theory with these commitments means re-
linquishing crucial tools for rejecting them as requirements for a
model of cognition (e.g., that they demand the execution of un-
likely encoding and decoding tasks), and for developing the details
of a distinctive alternative, insofar as these involve specifying what
acts of discrimination are to take place, under what time con-
straints, in what ways different streams of information processing
relate to one another, and how they manifest in behavior.
Conversely DST, itself a mathematical apparatus, can in princi-
ple be used to describe any distribution of cognitive labor, in-
cluding highly internalist approaches involving just the types of
representation and communication S&K reject. This fact is ob-
scured by S&K’s tendencies to conflate dynamical with “distrib-
uted” as though dynamical systems approaches automatically in-
volve control parameters in the wider environment, and to limit
much of what they say about DST to metaphorical claims about
“dance,” and impressionistic references to coregulation, canaliza-
tion, and so forth.
S&K, then, draw a coherent-seeming contrast, by means of 
two expedients: first, saddling information theory with a range of
nonessential commitments amounting to a restrictive and intrin-
sically implausible conception of mind; and second, providing 
almost no nonmetaphorical detail about DST. Acceptance of the
resulting false dichotomy makes all references to information, en-
coding, and representation seem suspect, thereby leading S&K to
miss their main chance.
I take it, for present purposes without argument, that some of
our most empirically and theoretically powerful treatments of lan-
guage proceed on the assumption that language is in some sense
symbolic and systematic. Many take the fact that language pre-
sents this “digital” aspect as justification for thinking that it is fun-
damentally digital. Even those wary of viewing language as digital
(due to worries about neural implementation, adaptive explana-
tion, developmental plausibility, etc.) nonetheless regard the dig-
ital aspects of language as setting an important explanatory target
for cognitive science. What motivates this caution is recognition
that even if any given theory of language turns out to be incorrect,
we would be unwise to relinquish the data, or the powerful and
economical ways of representing it made possible by treating lan-
guage as in some sense digital. This type of conservatism is entirely
proper, and furthermore provides a key constraint on any “paradigm
change” likely to affect the course of scientific research. By ignor-
ing or undervaluing it, S&K demand too destructive a revolution.
S&K’s positive case involves drawing our attention to a variety
of reasons (some from well-established research programs) for
thinking that nondigital aspects of interactive, situated behavior
are crucially important for language learning and for the func-
tioning of language. I agree, and also grant that taking these as-
pects of behavior seriously (as increasing numbers of researchers
do), could lead to significant changes in how language is under-
stood. The crucial question that S&K’s destructive radicalism pre-
vents them from taking seriously, though, is how do the digital and
nondigital aspects of language relate to one another?
Emotions, which are sometimes coregulated, can be seen (Ross
& Dumouchel 2001) as strategic signals encoding preference in-
tensities (typically more difficult to infer than orderings) in ways
that, unlike standard commitment devices, do not require explicit
construction prior to strategic interaction. By having preference
intensities thus represented (even if roughly), otherwise intract-
able strategic problems can be negotiated. I speculate that dance-
like aspects of interactive behavior could support the digital as-
pects of language, in effect by constraining the computational
searches required for handling symbolic and systematic tasks.
To evaluate this hypothesis would require exploring the rela-
tionships between different streams of information processing
(some overlapping or interacting), different types of control sys-
tem (some enabling coregulation), each with particular processing
capacities, time-budgets, varyingly distinctive histories, and so
forth. It is interesting to know that “cross-modal” matching (tar-
get article, sect. 1, para. 4) takes place, for example, when dy-
namical properties of an infant’s gesture are copied in its mother’s
responding vocalization. But saying we should eschew talk of in-
formation in favor of viewing such activities as part of a “dance” is
unhelpful. As behavioral scientists we want to know how such
matching is possible, and what difference it makes to learning and
using language. This demands asking about the (information) pro-
cessing capacities and properties of different organisms and their
cognitive subsystems, and how these relate to the (dynamical) con-
trol of behavior. If research in this direction is to be pursued,
though, we need to eradicate the reflex to go on the offensive
whenever we hear reference to “signals,” “codes,” or “representa-
tions,” let alone “symbols” or “grammar.”
Information, representation, and the dynamic
systems approach to language
John Symons
Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX
79968. jsymons@utep.edu http://www.utep.edu/philos/symons
Abstract: Shanker & King (S&K) provide a criticism of information-the-
oretic approaches to language, but the real obstacle to their dynamicist ap-
proach is the argument that representations are an indispensable part of
any cognitive theory. Since the dynamicist approach has a prima facie anti-
representationalist bent, the authors must show why dynamicist views can
provide adequate explanations of intelligent behavior.
By now, it should be well beyond doubt that dynamic systems the-
ory (DST) provides a set of mathematical tools that can be applied
to many areas of investigation in a fruitful manner. A growing
number of researchers are finding DST particularly well-suited to
the study of the complex, and often nonlinear processes that con-
stitute cognition in biological settings (Port & Van Gelder 1995).
However, many philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists
shy away from DST because of its antirepresentationalist implica-
tions (Eliasmith 1997). With their target article, Shanker & King
(S&K) contribute to the effort to win over the wider community
to the dynamical approach. While supporting their effort, I think
they do not fully appreciate the reasons so many researchers re-
sist DST.
Objections to DST are obviously not objections to the mathe-
matical tools used in the study of dynamical systems by physicists
and others. Instead, the principal objections involve the explana-
tory merits of the metaphors, models, and explanations derived
from these tools. Much of the target article describes research in-
spired by the dynamicist metaphor of dance, so the authors are
clearly not relying on the authority of established techniques in
physics or mathematics to make their case. Instead, by arguing for
the usefulness of the dance metaphor and for the effectiveness of
the ALR methods inspired by those metaphors, the authors are
taking a clear position on what they think counts as a good way to
look at language. Language, according to the authors, is better
viewed as a dance than as an encryption process.
As the article convincingly demonstrates, the dance metaphor
has led some researchers to treat language development with a
greater degree of sensitivity than do those researchers guided
solely by more traditional approaches. At the very least, one can
agree that it has caused researchers to discover new connections,
to rethink the relative importance of certain details, to construct
revealing new experiments, and so forth. However, the real chal-
lenge for the authors involves going beyond simply showing that
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the dynamical approach provides an interesting and potentially
fruitful new way of looking at linguistic phenomena. If this is to be
a genuinely new paradigm in language research, the difficult con-
ceptual work ahead involves defending the explanatory and pre-
dictive power of the dynamical approach over its major competi-
tors.
By contrasting the dynamical approach with information theo-
retic approaches, the authors have been less successful in making
their case than they might have been had they tackled head-on
their real adversary: the representationalist model of language and
cognition. The article repeatedly mentions the anti-representa-
tionalist implications of the dance metaphor, but it does not make
the case for the reason why representationalists should risk losing
as powerful an explanatory notion as representation. Information
theory per se is not what supports the explanatory power of tradi-
tional theories. Rules and representations, not information, lie at
the core of traditional explanations of cognitive phenomena. In
Deacon’s (1997) case, for instance, very little rests on the notion
of information; instead, it is the establishment of higher order re-
lations between representations that he claims marks the transi-
tion from iconic to symbolic languages in animals.
By targeting information-theoretic approaches, the authors
have chosen the wrong opponent. In part, this is because, in the
brain and behavioral sciences at least, information is such a slip-
pery notion. Fred Dretske (1981) put it well when he wrote that
“its use in telecommunications and computer science gives it a
tough brittle and technical sound, and yet it remains spongy, plas-
tic and amorphous enough to be serviceable in cognitive and se-
mantic studies” (p. ix). Like Dretske, Ken Sayre (1976) pointed
out that uses of the term information in cognitive science are al-
most never connected with the mathematical definition of infor-
mation as provided by Shannon and Weaver. Historically, contexts
in which this term has been given a precise definition include
Shannon’s well-known mathematical theory of communication,
the theory of semantic information of Carnap and Bar-Hillel, and
later the theories of informational complexity associated with Kol-
mogorov and Solomonoff. For the most part, uses of information
by linguists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists conform to
none of these three contexts. In my view, dynamicists are right to
argue for their approach over the unrealistic rules and represen-
tations models we find in many areas of the brain and behavioral
sciences; however, S&K are wrong to pin the failings of traditional
cognitive and linguistic studies on information theory per se.
The principal issue at stake in recent philosophical debates sur-
rounding applications of DST is whether the anti-representational
models, metaphors, and explanations it inspires can shed any light
on distinctively cognitive phenomena. Traditionally, explanations
in cognitive science have been understood to differ from explana-
tions in biology, physics, or chemistry insofar as most cognitive sci-
entists (at least traditionally) have held that genuine explanations
of cognitive phenomena, unlike explanations in the noncognitive
sciences, must involve semantically evaluable and etiologically in-
volved entities. So far, the representationalist strategy has been
the best way to handle the systematic properties that mark intel-
ligent behavior. Specifically, as Fodor (1987) and others have em-
phasized, any psychological theory worth its salt must account for
satisfaction conditions, compositionality, and intentionality. Rep-
resentationalist views can do this, but at the expense of biological
plausibility. So far, we dynamicists seem to have biological and be-
havioral plausibility on our side, but have been less successful in
capturing the systematicity of intelligent behavior. The challenge
for dynamicists is either to show that we too can account for the
same phenomena as the representationalists (and that we can do
it in a more biologically plausible manner) or that Fodor and com-
pany have emphasized the wrong set of properties. The ape lan-
guage research described in this target article goes some way to-
ward doing the former.
My only complaint is that, by focusing on information theory
(which in principle could be compatible with many dynamicist ac-
counts), S&K have not chosen the right target for their criticism.
Doesn’t a dance require dancers?
N. S. Thompsona and Jaan Valsinerb
aDepartments of Psychology and Biology, bDepartment of Psychology, Clark
University, Worcester, MA 01610. {nthompson; jvalsiner}@clarku.edu
Abstract: The dance metaphor of ape-human communication is valuable
and needs to be pressed to its logical conclusion. When couples dance,
they are both choreographers and dancers, and the dance arises dialecti-
cally out of the “peractions” of the dancers. We suppose that the way in
which scientists communicate with their apes emerges by an analogous
process.
We are not friends of the information-transfer metaphor of social
interaction. Thompson (1997), an ethologist, referred to this
metaphor as a commodification of interaction that leads to a dis-
tracting search for mythical substances shuttled between mythical
storehouses. He argued that our urgent task should be to discover
how “communicating” animals go about designing one another’s
behavior through their actions. Valsiner (1989; 2001) has demon-
strated that all culture “transfer” is a bidirectional, coconstructive
process whereby both the sender and the receiver are recon-
structing the message. The notion of reconstruction (rather than
reception) of communicative messages is the norm in human com-
munication research (cf. Karl Bühler’s [1934/1990] “Organon
Model”).
We deplore information transfer talk in part because its popu-
larity is dependent on a pernicious confusion between the inten-
sional and extensional uses of the word information – that is, be-
tween information in the ordinary, language sense (“information
that . . .”) and information in the technical sense of bits of infor-
mation. The intensional use is the most common and is in play any-
time a speaker refers to “information about some state of affairs”
or “information that such and so is true.” The extensional mean-
ing arises from information theory (Shannon & Weaver 1949), and
here the sender has a set of options to choose from (e.g., letters of
the alphabet) and the receiver has the same set of options. By the
use of a channel (such as dots and dashes), the sender reduces the
number of options in the behavior of the receiver. Information is
just this reduction in uncertainty concerning the options of the re-
ceiver. Information theory is about the efficient use of the chan-
nel: maximum reduction of uncertainty, with minimum use of
channel. In information theoretical talk, there is no question of
“aboutness,” of what the message is “saying.” Despite being fun-
damentally incompatible, the two uses of information have sus-
tained each other in the cognitive sciences, the extensional use
providing a dash of quantitative legitimacy and the intensional use
giving the impression that information talk can accommodate the
complexities of human and animal transaction.
In contrast to the commodity-transfer model of animal interac-
tion, the dance metaphor is wonderfully consistent and evocative.
Instead of worrying about what the participants pass between
them, we are led to wonder what they mutually produce. We
therefore applaud Shanker & King (S&K) for their persuasive pre-
sentation of that viewpoint. But we wish they had pursued their
metaphor more faithfully. Their reliance on dynamic systems the-
ory obscures the contribution of agency to the phenomenon they
are trying to explain (Valsiner 2002). To call a social interaction a
dance is to stress the peraction of social agents. When agents per-
act, they act through or by means of one another. Each has a state
of affairs toward which his or her behavior is directed, and that
state of affairs requires certain actions on the part of the social
partner. The behavior of each actor is therefore directed toward
using the other as a tool to produce a particular desirable result.
The dialectic between their peractions is the dance. From an ob-
server’s standpoint, the best dances, like the best chess games and
the best tennis matches, are those in which neither peractant en-
tirely gets his or her own way.
Some peractants use signs as handles by which to grasp their so-
cial partners. Let’s say that my wife and I are at dinner with my
Republican cousins and the topic of the table turns to politics. My
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wife, who has a long experience with my reactions to “the self-serv-
ing, right-wing politics of the rich,” feels my whole body tense up
as I start to rise to the bait. She is uneasy about what is about to
occur, and she places her hand very lightly on my hand, where I
have gripped the table, ready to pull myself forward in my seat.
The warmth and intimacy of her gesture is utterly inconsistent
with the publicness and tenseness of the social context in which it
occurs. My attention is sharply refocused on her, on the human
(rather than the political) dimensions of the conversation, and, ul-
timately, on the humor and absurdity of the situation.
But let us now suppose that in addition to placing her hand on
my hand, she had leaned over to whisper in my ear, “Easy does it!”
It is still possible to accommodate this new move – the speech
move – within the dance metaphor, speech being just another of
the many modalities that are tuning my behavior, instant by in-
stant, as the dinner party goes forward. But it is not easy to avoid
the feeling that this dance move is special. True, the intimacy of a
whisper, the softness of the tone with which it is delivered, even
the tickle of it, all are akin to the intimacy of her hand placed on
mine. But in whatever way these features have meaning, the words
“Easy does it!” seem to have meaning in a further sense. It is as if
your partner on the dance floor, wishing the two of you to swing
about, instead of leaning into your body and throwing you ever so
slightly off balance, had spoken the command, “Let’s swing!”
The difference does not seem to be in the tool relation between
the two peractants. If my momentary goal in the dance is to twirl
my partner glamorously under my arm, then her twirling is a tool
in my grand design. If her momentary goal is for us to swing
around together in an exalting display of our “coupleness,” then
my swinging is a tool in her grand design. Thus, for a dancing cou-
ple, the place where each grips the other is the handle of a tool.
What makes a spoken command a different sort of move in the
dance is that the handle in that case is a sign, instead of the actual
grip on the partner’s body.
Nobody would deny that all chimpanzees are adept at using so-
cial partners as tools. What seems to set the ape language of re-
search chimpanzees apart from that of their wild conspecifics is
their use of signs as handles. We heartily agree with the authors
that the dance metaphor does more than the information-transfer
metaphor to help us understand these animals’ laboriously ac-
quired talent at sign use. Even more useful would be an elabo-
rated version of their dance metaphor in which the dance is a
square dance and every participant is both caller and dancer.
Does the use of the dynamic system
approach really help fill in the gap between
human and nonhuman primate language?
Jacques Vauclair
Centre for Research in Psychology of Cognition, Language and Emotion,
University of Provence, 13621 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1, France.
vauclair@up.univ-aix.fr http://www.up.univ-mrs.fr/wpsycle/
Abstract: The highly recommended transposition of the dynamic system
approach for tackling the question of apes’ linguistic abilities has clearly
not led to a demonstration that these primates have acquired language.
Fundamental differences related to functional modalities – namely, use of
the declarative and the form of engagement between mother and infant –
can be observed in the way humans and apes use their communicatory sys-
tems.
I can only be in sympathy with Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) proposal
that dynamic systems paradigms are better suited than informa-
tion processing models for describing and explaining language
achievements in any species. In effect the kind of approach advo-
cated in the target article places the investigation of linguistic abil-
ities in its proper context, namely, that language and related be-
haviors are worked out in humans through a dynamic system of
coregulations and coconstructions of cognition between social
partners. In that respect, the paradigms on which S&K rely in
their propositions are reminiscent of the Vygostkian approach to
human cognition and language (e.g., Vygotsky 1962), also known
as the “distribution cognition” approach (Johnson 2001).
Two remarks are in order before discussing the use and output
of the dynamic system approach in ape language research (ALR)
studies. Although S&K do an excellent and fair job of summariz-
ing ALR studies, two aspects of potential importance for the par-
adigm they defend are lacking in their review. First, the compar-
ative literature provides evidence that marine mammals possess
abilities of a complexity comparable to that reported for chim-
panzees and bonobos. The California sea lions trained in a sym-
bolic matching technique using gestural signs (e.g., Gisiner &
Schusterman 1992), could comprehend at least 20 signs (modi-
fiers, objects, and actions) in about 200 three-sign combinations.
Experiments with dolphins that followed the same basic experi-
mental procedure also demonstrated excellent abilities of these
animals in comprehending imperative as well as interrogative
strings (e.g., Herman et al. 1993). Interestingly, the studies with
marine mammals were carried out without apparently following
the dynamic approach, for those studies were based on the more
traditional information-processing models.
Second, the achievements concerning language-trained apes
are characterized by a gap between the comprehension of the
communicative signals they have been exposed to and their abili-
ties to produce strings of gestures or lexigrams or both. For ex-
ample, the bonobo Kanzi can comprehend quite complex instruc-
tions given to him in English (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993), but
his productions of gestures and lexigrams are rather poor com-
pared to his comprehension. Thus, the most complex of Kanzi’s
“word” combinations involves three items (usually made of two
gestures and one lexigram; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986). In hu-
mans, lexical comprehension and production work in parallel (e.g.,
Harris et al. 1995; Werker & Tees 1999). The gap observed in the
bonobo makes it difficult to interpret the ape’s achievements in
evolutionary terms unless we assume that comprehension has
evolved in the absence of language, in which case we may ques-
tion the adaptive function of comprehension in the absence of
production. These issues raise the problem of the role of the hu-
man-defined environment (through a process described as encul-
turation; Tomasello et al. 1993) on the emergence of the cognitive
and communicative skills involved in language that may have no
equivalent in spontaneous behaviors and on which no selective
pressure has supposedly acted (Vauclair 1996).
The main point I want to make bears on the linguistic abilities
reported for the bonobo Kanzi, which are undoubtedly, as S&K
correctly state, the most impressive among those exhibited by any
nonhuman species. Considering that the primary function of lan-
guage concerns the exchange of information about the world, and
following the pioneering work of Bühler (1934), two principal
functions (or modalities) can be distinguished in the linguistic as
well as prelinguistic communication among humans (Bates
1979). The first function is the informative function and it takes
two forms: a declarative form that represents states of the world
(e.g., “Jim comes”) and an interrogative form. The second func-
tion is injunctive (imperative) and exclamatory and mostly ex-
presses itself with requests and demands (e.g., “Come!”). Devel-
opmental work with young children has shown that the use of
declaratives (e.g., Bassano & Maillochon 1994; Wetherby et al.
1988) becomes the dominant mode of communication between
1 and 2 years of age (about 60% of all utterances). Declaratives
(Bates et al. 1975) can be words or gestures, and they function
not primarily to obtain a result in the physical world but to direct
another individual’s attention (its mental state) to an object or
event, as an end in itself.
It is quite clear from the published work that the imperative
function appears to be the main (if not exclusive) mode used by
the “linguistically” trained apes. In the case of Kanzi, studies re-
veal (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1985; 1986) that, unlike human chil-
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dren who use language to make indicative or declarative state-
ments, about 96 percent of Kanzi’s productions are requests.
Thus, the difference between Kanzi’s modalities of communica-
tion and the typical declarative mode observed by humans is strik-
ing. In effect, communication in the apes has essentially an im-
perative function (this appears indeed to be the rule for all animal
species and this mode is sufficient to fulfill the biological require-
ments of, for example, warning again predators). In contrast, hu-
mans use not only linguistic signs but also prelinguistic communi-
cation means such as gestures (e.g., pointing) for both imperative
and declarative purposes, as when two persons share an interest
toward a third person (Vauclair 1996; in press). This is further il-
lustrated in a study in which we assessed the behavior of human-
human, human-ape, and ape-ape pairs during object manipulation
(Bard & Vauclair 1984; Vauclair 1984). One of the pairs we ob-
served involved the bonobo Kanzi, his adoptive mother Matata,
and a human caretaker (Kanzi was 8 months old when the obser-
vations started). We found that the communicative styles ex-
pressed by the adult toward the infant differed between species;
thus, in contrast to the human adults, the ape adults rarely acted
on the objects in ways that would direct or engage the infants’ at-
tention. Because our study was devised to focus on the factors of
coattention and coregulation between infants and competent
partners, it fit exactly with the principles of the dynamic system
paradigm or distributed cognition (Johnson 2001). Our results
clearly suggested that the patterns (e.g., joint attention to objects)
which characterize mother-infant communication in humans were
missing in the chimpanzees and the bonobos examined within our
comparative framework.
Human expression and experience: 
What does it mean to have language?
Yves-Marie Visettia and Victor Rosenthalb
aLATTICE-CNRS-ENS, 92120 Montrouge, France; bINSERM XR-324, Centre
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Abstract: We support Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) proposal for a dynamic
systems approach in ape language research, but question their vision of
what it means to have language. Language plays an essential role in the
making of the human mind. It underlies any kind of human interaction 
and codetermines perception and action. Moreover, what gives human
thought the very characteristic architecture of textuality criterially re-
quires a third party.
We are sympathetic with Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) plea for a dy-
namic systems approach in ape language research and share their
critique of the information processing model. But we find their
proposal too general and unspecific with respect to communica-
tive abilities of humans and apes, and we question their vision of
what it means to have language. In our view, the dance metaphor
may be an illustration of interactional synchrony in a dynamic sys-
tem, but it captures little of what may characterize human com-
munication, and we argue the insufficiency of a dyadic relation-
ship for the emergence of language skills in favor of a more
complex triadic structure. What S&K call a “new paradigm” is
reminiscent, both with respect to the idea of dynamic systems and
with respect to the principles of ape cognition research, of the
Gestalt paradigm formulated by Wolfgang Köhler and his Gestalt
colleagues.
Wolfgang Köhler, the author of the most extensive early studies
of “the mentality of apes” (Köhler 1925/1951), first formulated a
dynamic systems approach to brain and cognition (Köhler 1920).
A good deal of what S&K describe as “new” observations of coreg-
ulation, dyadic interactions, creativity and mutual adjustments,
and of the social background of action and interaction, are mod-
ern replica of what Köhler described in his famous studies.
Gestalt psychologists opposed the idea of internalization of the
“outer world” and worked out an original and extremely fertile con-
cept of unity of mind and the physical world. This concept was most
explicitly formulated in Köhler’s theory of physical and phenome-
nal forms which applied, in the same terms, to the realm of mind
and to the “outer world.” The Gestaltists stressed the physiognomic
character of perceptual experience, where physiognomic refers
both to the expressive character of percepts (as though dynamically
expressing “an inner form of life”; Werner 1957, p. 69) and to the
conative dimension of perception whereby the readiness for action
imbedded in perceptual experience “urges” us to act upon, or use,
perceived objects. Perception, action, and expression were thus as-
sumed to be closely intertwined, making up a unified “practical
field” (see Rosenthal & Visetti 1999; 2003). It is precisely this uni-
tary view of perception, action, and expression that may be requi-
site for semiotic interaction, forming a practical basis for commu-
nication since whatever apes, or we, perceive and do is intrinsically
expressive. Yet, in order to communicate, it is necessary to have
something to transmit. Interactional synchrony illustrated by the
dance metaphor falls short of this requirement because it may
amount to simple harmonic adjustments between dynamical sys-
tems. The need to communicate may arise instead when synchrony
breaks down – that is, when dissynchrony occurs and generates in-
stability. Moreover, we do not merely communicate in order to get
hold of, point to, or share a novel experience or object, but also with
the aim of stimulating the ongoing exchange or simply adding an
episode to the history of our selves.
What does it mean to have language, then? Although Gestalt
psychologists failed to properly appreciate the importance of lan-
guage and categorization in the making of human mind, Köhler
perceptively noted that it was the absence of language that pre-
vented his most clever apes from giving an elaborate structure to
time. Language provides the only direct means for entertaining an
explicit relationship to the past or remote future. In the absence
of language, it would indeed be difficult to have a history, to make
up a narrative, or to carry out truly elaborate programs. The emer-
gence of language endowed the human mind with extremely rich
temporality and thereby permitted, inter alia, the incomparable
development of memory.
Narrative, which is inconceivable without language, has been
argued to play an essential role in the making of the human mind.
As Bruner put it:
Narrative deals with the stuff of human action and human intentional-
ity. It mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more
idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires and hopes. It renders the excep-
tional comprehensible and keeps the uncanny at bay. . . . It reiterates
the norms of the society . . . can even teach, conserve memory, or alter
the past. (Bruner 1990, p. 52)
According to Bruner, narrative requires four crucial constituents
to be carried out: (a) agentivity; (b) establishment and mainte-
nance of sequential order (event structure); (c) sensitivity to the
canonical and the exceptional; (d) adoption of a narrator’s per-
spective (because narration cannot be voiceless). There is no
doubt that some apes, especially Kanzi, can handle direct agen-
tivity, and may be able to establish short sequences necessary for
the execution of simple plans. But what is the extent of their ca-
pacity to express and characterize the ordinary and the excep-
tional? Can they explicitly adopt another being’s perspective?
How much of role reversal can they handle; can they cast a third
party to perform an action that is not directly observable?
Although we agree with S&K that a dyad may give substance
to interactional synchrony, we emphasize that a dyad does not
make a society and that language use presupposes a complex 
triadic relationship. The issue is not how many individuals are 
involved in interaction, but the very necessity of a third party
viewpoint, whether the third party is present or absent, real or
fictitious. What gives human thought the very characteristic ar-
chitecture of textuality criterially requires a third party. Gram-
matical devices (person, time, space, modality) universally reflect
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this triadic structure of human symbolic and linguistic experience
(see Rastier 1997).
The pervading use of metaphors, semantic creativity, and poly-
semy are but examples of the irreducibility of language to simple
pragmatics or communication. Language is not only the vehicle
but also the very means of formulating and becoming aware of our
own intentions, desires, or thoughts. We do not convert preexist-
ing thoughts, desires, or intentions into language; rather, it is via
linguistic expression that we discover, realize, and ratify our
thoughts, desires, and intentions as they develop and take shape.
Conversely, language itself evolves and negotiates its own linguis-
tic values as they are deployed in speech or writing.
During the past half-century several linguistic theories con-
tended that language and the world of life are two systems that
evolved independently of one another and then came to interact.
But interaction falls short of social norms and rites, couched in the
very structure of what we have called semantic forms, and mean-
ing involves both usage and Gestalt transformation (Cadiot &
Visetti 2001; Visetti & Cadiot 2002). Language hangs behind any
kind of human interaction as it codetermines perception and ac-
tion. The world we experience is a world proper to language-en-
dowed beings, so that even our most ordinary actions are fash-
ioned by language use (e.g., naming modifies our very perceptual
experience). There is no doubt that Kanzi’s being raised in contact
with language-endowed society where language always played an
important role in everyday interactions had a profound effect on
his cognitive development. Even Kanzi’s perception of objects,
qualities, or events was fashioned by language. Yet Kanzi did not
really acquire language and never crossed the frontier of narra-
tivity, textuality, and many other characteristic features of lan-
guage that make up the human mind. The manipulation of lexi-
grams allowed Kanzi to become a champion of a complex semiotic
tool. This, however, falls short of what it means to have language.
Making meaning
Gabriel Waters and Sherman Wilcox
Department of Linguistics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM
87131. {watersg; wilcox}@unm.edu http://www.unm.edu/~wilcox
Abstract: This commentary discusses the dynamic systems (DS) approach
to communication over an information-processing (IP) model. The com-
menters suggest that the authors of the target article, in their treatment of
the issue, do not identify the central failing of the IP model. Further, it is
suggested that the DS approach should include examination of mecha-
nisms in the emergence of symbolic communication.
We commend Shanker & King (S&K) for recognizing that the in-
formation-processing (IP) model is inadequate for explaining the
nature of communication, and we very much support their call to
abandon that model. We also find their application of the dy-
namic-systems (DS) paradigm innovative. In fact, we believe the
dynamic systems approach may be even more powerful as a model
than suggested in the target article, particularly in regard to the
genesis of complexity and the emergence of symbols in commu-
nication systems.
We agree with S&K in their general approach, but we suggest
that their argument could be strengthened in two ways. First, they
should target more precisely what is wrong with the IP model as
an explanation for communication. Second, we urge them to ex-
plore more fully the DS paradigm as an explanation for how sym-
bols emerge.
How is meaning communicated? The IP model as applied to
the study of communication and language is based on the perva-
sive conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979) for understanding how com-
munication works. The conduit metaphor assumes that words are
containers for meaning, that speakers place meaning into their
words and receivers extract these meanings and thereby under-
stand what the speaker meant; thus, meaning is transmitted in
words. As S&K note, although the IP model may help us to un-
derstand how certain mechanical systems work, it leaves unex-
plained how meaning is communicated, for signals may be trans-
mitted but meaning is not.
By not addressing the question of what the IP model fails to ex-
plain – how communication works – S&K are left dancing around
the edges of the problem. The main problem with the IP model is
not that it focuses on sequential turns, on sending and receiving
signals, or even on encoding and decoding. Challenging those as-
pects of the IP model leads S&K astray, for communicative be-
havior does after all often proceed in turns, communication does
require the production and perception of signals, and expressing
a concept does entail coding “the relationship between a concep-
tualization one wishes to express and the linguistic structures ac-
tivated for that purpose” (Langacker 1991, p. 294).
The central failure of the IP model, which is left unaddressed
by S&K, is its assumption that meaning is transmitted in signals.
We believe that a cognitive approach offers a better explanation
for how communication works, for words and signals, although 
informative, do not “contain” meaning; rather, meaning is con-
structed. The construction process relies on environmental signals
(words and gestures) and conceptual knowledge and processes.
Signals, words, gestures, and expressions do not mean; they are
prompts for the construction of meanings (Turner 1991).
In this alternative, cognitive model of communication and lan-
guage, grammar is not a device for generating structure. Grammar
is an inventory of knowledge used by those communicating to
sanction (both in production and perception) utterances, the
“prompts” that are used to construct meaning.
What is left unexplained in the IP model, and in S&K’s re-
jection of it, is how meaning is communicated. We believe that
clarification requires examining the cognitive abilities that are 
recruited in the construction of meaning, and how it is that sym-
bols, by which we mean mappings of form and meaning, emerge.
Though we concur that a sudden restructuring of the brain of the
type proposed by Deacon does not seem compatible with the data,
we would urge S&K not to throw out the cognitive baby with the
information-processing bathwater.
How do symbols emerge? The target article suggests that com-
munication is creative even when stereotypical gestures are used
in novel contexts. We contend that these situations are more im-
portant to the development of symbolic communication than is
implied in S&K’s analysis. Stereotypical or ritualized gestures are
often automatized and reduced forms of a functional behavior. An
extended arm used to request an item is, both for apes and pre-
verbal children, an automatized reduction of grabbing at the item.
Once ritualized, this gesture is already emancipated from its func-
tionality. Creative use of these ritualized gestures is the mecha-
nism that allows for their emancipation from typical contexts, and
is therefore an early stage in the shift from association to symbolic
representation (Haiman 1998).
The systems introduced to the apes, whether lexigrams or signs,
are a body of ritualized gestures. When researchers introduce these
gestures in communicative contexts beyond requests for an item or
simple naming, they are in a sense performing a guided emanci-
pation of the gestures. Crucial to this guided emancipation is the
response to the ritualized forms by others in the new context.
Given that joint attention and coregulated communication is
not particular to the apes involved in ape language research
(ALR), and that the ritualization and emancipation of functional
behaviors into communicative gestures have been observed in
free-ranging apes (Plooij 1984), what may be special in the exam-
ples from ALR is the breadth of the ritualized gestures that are in-
corporated into the apes’ repertoires and that these gestures are
readily familiar to the researchers.
Finally, we address the implication that the Gardner studies uti-
lized a behavior modification model. In both of the Gardners’ proj-
ects, cross-fostering rather than a system of rewards served as the
dominant methodology (see Gardner et al. 1989). Given that nat-
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ural social interaction across multiple contexts is central to cross-
fostering, it would seem that this body of research would provide
a fertile area for the proposed dynamic systems paradigm. Of note
is that research from these projects has concentrated on such dy-
namic systems approaches as topic maintenance and repair (Jens-
vold & Gardner 2000).
We applaud S&K for recognizing the shortcomings of the IP
model and the utility of the DS approach as a method of examin-
ing communication, but we believe that the mechanisms of un-
derstanding and the emergence of symbols deserve a deeper
analysis. We urge S&K to incorporate both the mental and the so-
cial into their DS model. Communicative gestures occur in social
settings; guided emancipation is a social behavior. Gestural sig-
nals, whether acoustic or optical, do not contain meaning; rather,
meaning is assigned to gestures by ape and human. The assign-
ment of meaning to perceptual events, though it may be socially
constructed, dynamic, and emergent, is also essentially a concep-
tual task. As Fauconnier and Turner (2002) note: “The illusion that
meaning is transmitted . . . is possible only because there is a brain
on each end to handle the construction of meaning” (p. 5).
Blind men, elephants, and dancing
information processors
Chris Westbury
Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G
2E9, Canada. chrisw@ualberta.ca
http://www.ualberta.ca/~chrisw/Westbury.html
Abstract: Whatever else language may be, it is complex and multifaceted.
Shanker & King (S&K) have tried to contrast a dynamic interactive view
of language with an information processing view. I take issue with two main
claims: first, that the dynamic interactive view of language is a “new para-
digm” in either animal research or human language studies; and second,
that the dynamic systems language-as-dance view of language is in any way
incompatible with an information-processing view of language. That some
information is defined in coregulated social interaction guarantees the
dancing. That all information is composed of relevant differences guaran-
tees the information processing.
In a tale attributed to the twelfth century Sufi Hakim Majdud
Sanai, three blind men describe an elephant. One strokes the an-
imal broadside and pronounces that an elephant is a warm soft
wall. A second grasps the pachyderm by the tail and opines that an
elephant is a short thick rope. The third grabs hold of a tusk and
declares that an elephant is a cold smooth pillar.
The fable captures the position in which I find myself with re-
spect to this target article: I agree completely, yet consider it mis-
leading. None of the blind men is incorrect. Each has honestly cap-
tured an aspect of elephantness. It is the implication that a part is
the whole that misleads. The implication I will focus on here is the
one most concretely laid out in the target article: the claim that a dy-
namic interactive emergence view of language and an information-
processing view are in conflict, and that the former is right. In fact,
both views focus on different but compatible aspects of language.
As surely as an elephant is a warm soft wall, language is a dy-
namic interactive emotional process – a dance, to use the pre-
ferred metaphor of this paper. The experimental and observational
empirical evidence and the philosophical motivations behind that
claim are all compelling, multidimensional, and voluminous (for
summaries of some empirical evidence, see Bloom 2000; Hen-
driks-Jansen 1996). It is hard to imagine that there are many peo-
ple interested in language who question the importance of coreg-
ulated social interactions in language learning and use. Among
the many who have advocated their importance, I here briefly
mention three from different disciplines: the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein, the psychologist Jerome Bruner, and the anthropol-
ogist Gregory Bateson.
Ludwig Wittgenstein reminds us how far back the roots of this
“new paradigm” go. As surely as an elephant is a short thick rope,
Wittgenstein’s (1958) Philosophical Investigations is a compilation
of different arguments explaining why linguistic semantics could
only be grounded by interacting organisms sharing nonlinguistic
experiences and behaviors. Shanker & King’s (S&K’s) failure to ac-
knowledge these roots for their ideas seems almost willful at times,
given that one of them authored a book on Wittgenstein. One
hardly knows what to make of a philosopher who would cite Sav-
age-Rumbaugh (1986) as an authority on the point that “meaning
and intent are not to be found by looking ‘inside’ a speaker.” This
is a point that Wittgenstein (1958) made 28 years earlier: “Noth-
ing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity.”
Similarly, a single citation to C. M. Johnson (2001) for the claim
that “whether or not a speaker understands the meaning of a sym-
bol . . . is established by what she says or does in the context of dy-
namic interactions” seems odd when that claim is exactly the main
point of Philosophical Investigations. I didn’t understand in read-
ing this target article why we should be more impressed by the fact
that ape language researchers have tossed aside a few such com-
ments today, than by the fact that the theoretical force behind
those comments was laid out in a compelling manner 50 years ago.
The so-called new paradigm championed in this article was
dubbed “transactional contextualism” by Jerome Bruner, one of
the founding fathers of the information processing paradigm with
which S&K suppose transactional contextualist accounts to be in-
compatible. Over a decade ago, Bruner (1990) wrote:
transactional contextualism [is] the view that human action could not 
be fully or properly accounted for from the inside out – by reference
only to intrapsychic dispositions, traits, learning capabilities, motives, or
whatever. Action required for its explication that it be situated, that it
be conceived of as continuous with a cultural world. The realities that
people constructed were social realities, negotiated with others, distrib-
uted between them. The social world in which we lived was, so to speak,
neither “in the head” nor “out there” in some positivistic aboriginal
form. And both mind and the Self were part of that social world. If the
cognitive revolution erupted in 1956, the contextual revolution (at least
in psychology) is occurring today. [emphasis in the original]
Hendriks-Jansen (1996) explicitly tried to situate Bruner’s trans-
actional contextualism inside an ethological perspective that al-
lowed it to encompass not only human action and language but also
a wide range of other behaviors issued by humans, nonhuman ani-
mals, and intelligent artifacts. He was not the first to try to meld bi-
ology, computation, language, and situated interaction. In the 1970s,
Gregory Bateson wrote a series of books in which animal commu-
nication (including human language) was described as a dance
within what we would now call an information-processing (but he
called a “cybernetic”) theoretical structure. Bateson would not un-
derstand why anyone would argue that there was a contradiction be-
tween language as interactive dancing and language as information
processing. Information is any difference that makes a difference
(Bateson 1972). That some information is defined in social interac-
tion guarantees the dancing. That all information is composed of rel-
evant differences guarantees the information processing.
Although I do not believe that Deacon (1997) is a good repre-
sentative on which to focus the criticism, S&K do correctly iden-
tify a common narrowness of view in today’s siliconcentric in-
formation processing paradigm. The paradigm tends to judge
perceptually mediated information about objects as more impor-
tant or even more real than socially mediated information about
conspecifics. This is probably because many of the paradigm’s
metaphors are computer-inspired. Computers don’t yet have
emotions or social norms, and so don’t yet use many cues from
their conspecifics to modulate their behavior. However, the fact
that information processing theorists are computer geeks does not
negate the fact that carbon-based information processors dance.
Perhaps I have misread the intent of this article. Perhaps, as
their title suggests, the authors’ goal was never to proclaim a new
paradigm in language or communication research in general, but
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only to underscore that some old and well-studied themes from
human language research have been underemphasized by ape
language researchers. If that is the case, I’d just like to add for their
benefit: As surely as an elephant is a cold smooth pillar, language
is information processing.
A multichannel information-processing
system is simpler and more easily tested
Thomas R. Zentall
Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506.
Zentall@uky.edu
http://www.uky.edu/AS/Psychology/faculty/tzentall.html
Abstract: The dance metaphor for the communication between two or-
ganisms may be an appealing image because it appears to capture the in-
tricate synchronization of their interaction; however, it is neither parsimo-
nious nor easily tested. Instead, a multichannel information-processing
model, even one that can process only serial events, provides all of the flex-
ibility required to account for the complex temporal coordinated action
observed.
Shanker & King (S&K) use a dance metaphor to describe the com-
munication between two organisms because a coordinated dance
between two people gives the impression of a single organism in
movement. But is it accurate? The transmission of a television im-
age provides the illusion of three dimensions moving seamlessly
through time. But in reality it is a linear, one-dimensional trans-
mission. To create this illusion, a serial signal sweeps across 
the screen and back again almost 300 times a second. And then
that static image is repeated with minor variations so quickly that
it gives the further illusion of a moving picture. Similarly, the 
interaction between two organisms gives the appearance of a co-
ordinated dance when in reality it is very likely the continuous re-
sponse by one organism to a stream of stimulus input (informa-
tion) from the other (and the rest of the environment).
The oversimplified information processing model presented as
a foil by S&K is analogous to a single-channel communication sys-
tem used by some push-to-talk communication systems. These
relatively simple systems can send or receive information but can-
not do both at the same time. Thus, the listener must wait to re-
spond until the sender has completed his part of the communica-
tion. A better, but still oversimplified system, is a typical telephone
line that allows the sender to be verbally interrupted by the lis-
tener at any time. Although this system does not allow for the rich
visual channel provided by face-to-face communication it does al-
low for simultaneous (auditory) input and (oral) output. Such a
dual-channel processing system could involve the parallel pro-
cessing of input and output (listening while speaking) but it is also
quite possible that a single central processor could switch rapidly
between output and input channels, thereby giving the impression
of parallel processing. The functioning of such a system would be
facilitated by input and output buffers that briefly store informa-
tion to be acted on the next time that processing attention is
switched back. Such rapid shifting between output and input
channels of a serial processor can provide all that is needed for the
coordinated dance described by S&K.
According to S&K, communication can take two forms, the
transmission of factual information and the communication of de-
sires, intentions, fears, warnings, invitations, attitudes, and emo-
tions. Although S&K claim that information-processing models
deal with the transmission of factual information whereas dynamic
models include the communication of emotions, an information-
processing model can handle both kinds of communication. Knowl-
edge and emotion may differ in content but there is no reason for
the processes that underlie them to be different.
S&K propose that an example of the information processing ap-
proach is the use of traditional instrumental training procedures
(e.g., Rumbaugh 1977), whereas dynamic systems use a more
functional approach involving the communication of needs which
produce reinforcers specific to those needs. This distinction is re-
ally not useful. When conditions are arranged such that the out-
come that follows a response is specific to that response, it is typ-
ically called a differential outcomes procedure. This is a very
effective training procedure that generally facilitates acquisition
and yields improved retention in a variety of species (see, e.g.,
Trapold 1970), but a dynamic model is not needed to explain it. It
is explained more simply in terms of the added cue value of the
expectancy of differential reinforcement at the time of choice.
A more serious problem with the dance metaphor is that it takes
on a magical, poetical quality. We don’t ask how the graceful ball-
room dancers manage to coordinate their movements to produce
the elegant results of that orchestration. To do so would be to spoil
the beauty of the performance. We can also marvel at the beauty of
Kanzi’s language skills but it doesn’t further our understanding of
the mechanisms involved in those skills in either chimpanzees or
humans. It may make us feel good to view the complex symbolic and
gestural communications between the young chimp and the exper-
imenter as an elegant dance, but it is not likely to be a productive
research strategy. In fact, it is quite clear from the section that de-
scribes (in great detail and in quite human terms) the complex in-
teractions between Kanzi and his trainers (target article, sect. 4) that
the dynamic approach takes great liberties in drawing analogies be-
tween the interactive behavior of a young chimpanzee and that of a
young child. Thus, the real danger inherent in this dynamic systems
approach is not in its appreciation of the beauty of the interaction
between organisms but in its appeal to anthropomorphism. To draw
on a counterexample to illustrate this point, when an African grey
parrot is presented with an array of objects that differ in shape,
color, and material and the parrot is asked, “How many green?”
(Pepperberg 1999), what is impressive about the response is not
that it is given in clearly understandable English that could easily be
mistaken for that of a young child, but that when asked a question
about category and number to which there are many possible an-
swers but only one is correct, the parrot answers correctly!
The scenarios described by S&K are sufficiently ambiguous
that they provide ample opportunity for alternative explanation.
And although the described interactions certainly reflect a high
level of cognitive functioning, there is no reason why an informa-
tion-processing account could not provide an equally reasonable
and perhaps more easily testable account of the behavior. Al-
though in the future it may be demonstrated that the language
skills acquired by Kanzi are beyond the scope of an information-
processing account, I would want to be sure that a less caricatured
version of information processing was exhausted before abandon-
ing it to a vaguely formulated dynamic systems approach.
Authors’ Response
The emergence of a new paradigm in ape
language research: Beyond interactionism
Stuart G. Shankera and Barbara J. Kingb
aDepartments of Philosophy and Psychology, York University, North York,
Ontario, Canada M4S 1B4; bDepartment of Anthropology, College of William
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Abstract: We group the issues raised in the commentaries into
five major sections. In the first, section R1, we consider some of
the antecedents to dynamic systems (DS) in psychology, biology,
anthropology, and primatology and note the key changes that have
occurred in DS over the past ten years. Next, in section R2, we ex-
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plain the ways in which co-regulation differs markedly from in-
teractional synchrony, focusing in particular on the creation of
meaning inherent in co-regulated communication. The following
section (R3) clarifies the challenge that DS poses to Cartesian as-
sumptions about the nature of communication and contrasts this
position with behaviorism. In the next section (R4) we reject the
notion that IP and DS may be, in fact, compatible paradigms. 
Finally, we explain the exciting future we envision for using DS 
to facilitate consideration of evolutionary questions, particularly
those concerning the comparative evolutionary development of
socio-emotional dynamics between partners (section R5).
We are grateful that so many colleagues provided com-
mentary on our target article. Our contrasting of the infor-
mation-processing (IP) and dynamic systems (DS) models
in the context of ALR clearly touched on issues central 
to many diverse disciplines. In organizing our response
around five major questions, we hope to clarify our position
on key concepts, introduce some new material to support
our portrayal of DS as contrasted with IP, and respond to a
number of more specific points raised in the commentaries.
R1. Is our paradigm really so new?
In commentaries representing a wide range of viewpoints,
including polar-opposite opinions, we were struck by the
number that converged on the point that DS is by no means
a recent phenomenon (Bonvillian & Patterson, Gram-
mer, Ingold, Kuczaj, Ramos & Paulos [henceforth Ku-
czaj et al.], Locke, Westbury). We certainly do not wish
to deny the antecedents of DS. Gilbert Gottlieb has written
an invaluable book (Gottlieb 1992) surveying the develop-
ment of dynamic systems ideas in biology through such crit-
ical figures as August Weisman, Sewall Wright, and Zing-
Yang Kuo (see in particular Kuo’s highly influential The
Dynamics of Behavior Development: An Epigenetic View;
Kuo [1976]).
Equally, the last thing we wanted to suggest is that the
psychological interest in DS originates with Alan Fogel’s
seminal work, Developing through Relationships (1993).
Fogel himself would be the first to stress the importance of
the thought of Jerome Bruner on his own development, as
is the case for SGS. Moreover, we would strongly support
the argument that dynamic systems owes much to the work
of developmental interactionists tracing back to Vygotsky
(and we are grateful here to Ingold for bringing to our at-
tention the work of Volosinov and Schutz); indeed, we have
argued for this position in print as well (see, e.g., Shanker
2002). We would also note here that we embrace the four
factors that Myin & Smets talk about, which we have ad-
dressed in varying degrees in other places, and agree with
them that the work on multi-causality done by DST devel-
opmentalists over the past decade adds considerable sup-
port to our argument; and we welcome Sessle & Yao’s
neuro-synopsis, which also strengthens our perspective
considerably.
Coming from anthropology, King credits her theoretical
development to the work of G. Bateson and others (see e.g.,
King 2002). Though the DS perspective is newer in prima-
tology, antecedents are clearly visible in the work of Hinde
(1985) and Bateson (1978). That some anthropologically
trained primatologists today are at the forefront of the in-
terdisciplinary push to apply DST to the study of the be-
havior of monkeys and apes outside the ALR context (John-
son; see King & Shanker 2003), attests to the significance
of these roots.
Concerning nonhuman language research, our reason for
confining the discussion to the studies conducted at the
Language Research Center relates to the fact that, as we
spelled out in the target article, the differences between
Deacon’s and Savage-Rumbaugh’s views of the goals and
methodology of the Animal Model Project and the Kanzi
research are particularly illuminating for the stated pur-
poses of our paper. We are pleased to acknowledge the im-
portant work of Gardner and Fouts with the chimpanzee
Washoe, Bonvillian & Patterson with the gorilla Koko,
and Pepperberg with the parrot Alex. Elements of DS are
starting to emerge in these research programs; however,
they have operated in the absence of any formal commit-
ment to working out DS principles.
Having noted some important precursors of dynamic sys-
tems theory, we reiterate our contention that there has
been a significant shift in dynamic systems writings in biol-
ogy, psychology, philosophy, evolutionary theory, and an-
thropology over the past ten years. From this shift may de-
velop the “imminent revolution” predicted by Leavens.
We identify, in the next sections, further questions arising
from the commentaries in order to discuss some of the key
issues related to this shift.
R2. Isn’t co-regulation the same as interactional
synchrony?
The interdisciplinary shift towards a new understanding of
DS is owed in part to the growing recognition of the dis-
tinction between the concepts of co-regulation and inter-
actional synchrony. Given attempts to conflate the two
(Bonvillian & Patterson, Grammer, Rendall & Vasey,
Visetti & Rosenthal, Zentall), we wish to review the ba-
sis for drawing this distinction.
As some of the commentators have noted, developmen-
tal interest in the mutual social bond and its expres-
sion in human infants and their caretakers can be traced
back to Bowlby’s theory of attachment (Bowlby 1969) and
to early research on dyadic interaction (e.g., Trevarthen’s
proto-conversations [Trevarthen 1979] and Bruner’s for-
mats [Bruner 1983]). Both of these research programs take
into account the nuanced back-and-forth between human
infants and their caretakers and are united in their use of
some version of an interactional synchrony (IS) framework.
Condon and Sanders, in an influential paper in Science,
defined the shared rhythmicity of IS as occurring when “the
configurational organizations or ‘units’ of the listener’s body
motion are synchronous with the speaker’s speech” (Con-
don & Sanders 1974; see Fogel 1993 for analysis of possi-
ble flaws with Condon & Sanders’ data). Though these 
authors intend IS to refer primarily to bodily actions in re-
lation to speech, the term is frequently extended to include
other synchronies (for example, body motion to body mo-
tion, or vocalization to vocalization). Though the definitions
of IS may vary in emphasis, as Fogel (1993) makes clear, IS
in its focus on combining elements from two individuals
misses out on aspects of social relating that are critically im-
portant in co-regulation.
Members of a dyad are said to be in IS when they are in
a similar affective state and attuned to one another’s com-
municative behaviors. In normal dyadic interactions this is
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thought to occur 30% of the time; the other 70% of the time
the caregiver and infant are “out of sync” with one another
and thus experience interactional dissonance (Tronick
1982). Attentive caregivers are said to be highly sensitive to
these periodic breakdowns and good at restoring IS. When
a caregiver is poor at repairing these breakdowns – say, be-
cause of internal or external stresses – or an infant has what
is referred to as a “problem temperament,” there is a
marked decline in IS.
Co-regulation differs from IS in its recognition that so-
cial partners do not just synchronize or harmonize when
they communicate, but actually make meaning as they act
together. We can do no better by way of explanation of this
point than to refer back to Waters & Wilcox, whom we
thank for pushing to the foreground this aspect of DS. Co-
regulation highlights the role of creativity as social partners
transform each other’s behavior, in a way that IS does not.
It is a mistake to equate the two. Research methodologies
formulated on the IS framework will not allow for the same
questions to be asked of ALR that might get asked on the
DS framework. We can see this if we consider claims that
turn-taking is inherently sequential (Kuczaj et al., Mik-
lósi, Waters & Wilcox). In one sense, say, measuring mi-
cro-movements using a finely calibrated time clock, it is at
times true that movements follow one upon another with
short lags in between. That this is not invariably the case is
clear from observing any interaction in which two social
partners are intimately engaged with each other: the part-
ners’ vocalizing (or verbalizing) and gesturing may overlap,
and when turn-taking is preserved, it is marked by contin-
gency and co-construction. DS emphasizes, not microtem-
porality (as does IS, and as does Zentall in his claim that
rapid shifting between input and output of a serial proces-
sor is sufficient to create a coordinated dance), but the mu-
tual transformation in the thought and actions of two part-
ners who are seen as a single unit with internally related
elements.
Furthermore, co-regulation fundamentally alters the
manner in which we view interactional dissonance. IS at-
tempts to determine which of the two partners is “respon-
sible” for periodic breakdowns, that is, to ascertain if the
caregiver is inattentive or insensitive to the infant’s cues, or
if the problems are due to the infant’s temperament. But
co-regulation looks, not at the individuals per se, but at the
sorts of patterns that have evolved in a dyadic relationship.
That is, it sees breakdowns, not as the result of the care-
giver’s poor parenting skills or the child’s problem tem-
perament, but rather as the result of the patterns that have
developed in a dyad, that, over time, may become increas-
ingly entrenched.
R3. What about mental representations?
One of the key respects in which there has been a pro-
nounced shift in dynamic systems thinking over the past ten
years lies in the attempts that have been made, as Johnson
spells out, to develop DST within the broader framework
of a nonCartesian epistemology (see Shanker 2001). In this
respect, one of us (Shanker) would almost be tempted to
cite Wittgenstein here as yet another extremely important
precursor of DST, were it not for Wittgenstein’s well-known
antipathy to any suggestion that his philosophy is tainted
with theory-construction. In place of models of what must
be going on inside an agent’s mind/brain when they per-
form some action, DS places the focus on agents and the
skills they must acquire in order to master their society’s
normative practices. For this reason, we strongly agree with
Symons that it is critical that DST theorists develop a 
comprehensive response to the “rules and representations”
model of cognitive phenomena. We particularly welcome
Cangelosi’s noting that the computational approach, with
its focus on autonomous agents, complements our DS ap-
proach; we agree that the two dovetail nicely, each adding
power to the other. Similarly, we recognize the value in
Thompson & Valsiner’s concept of “peraction,” though
we feel that co-regulation itself sufficiently reflects the con-
cept of agency.
Our focus on agents relates also to a palpable concern ex-
pressed in some of the commentaries that we are in danger
of relapsing into behaviorism. One way in which this charge
is expressed is that we seek to ban all talk of mental repre-
sentations (Russon & Begun, Kako). But, in fact, our con-
cern was to clarify what it is that developmentalists or com-
parative primatologists have in mind when they speak of a
subject’s “representational capacities” by looking carefully
at how a nonhuman primate or a child behaves in socially-
constructed activities. Such behaviors and propensities
serve as criteria for describing the nonhuman primate or
child’s capacities, not as evidence of an “underlying repre-
sentation” that enables them to do such-and-such (see
Coulter 1983).
The point of such an exercise is not, however, to demon-
strate the “inter-translatability” of Cartesianism – which en-
compasses both behaviorism and cognitivism (see Shanker
1998) – and DS; rather, it is to clarify how the framework
of Cartesian assumptions about the nature of cognition and
communication “has lead both human and comparative
cognitive research down many a garden path,” as Johnson
puts it. A short list of the sorts of garden paths she likely has
in mind here would include: attempts to develop reduc-
tionist and even eliminativist models of cognition and 
communication; to postulate models of the preconscious
“inferential processes” that must, according to cognitivist
theories, enable a subject to do such-and-such; to see the
mind as compartmentalized into separate faculties or mod-
ules, each of which operates according to its own internal
logic; to treat development as a maturational process that 
is guided by internal biological constraints; to treat cogni-
tive and emotional processes as independent phenomena
(where the latter are seen as complex reflexes that impinge
upon the former); to restrict the role of emotional develop-
ment on the growth of the mind to motivational factors that
can impede or promote cognitive development, but have no
intrinsic bearing on the nature of cognitive development
(see Greenspan 1997); to search for discontinuities to the
exclusion of continuities, whether these be between non-
human primates and humans, or between prelinguistic and
linguistic children, or between imitation and “mindread-
ing,” and so on; to treat enculturated abilities and skills as
generative processes; and so on.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, we actually received
enthusiastic support from one commentator for what are
seen as our behaviorist proclivities. Pear’s commentary
serves as a salutary reminder that Skinner’s views about
verbal behavior were, perhaps, too peremptorily dismissed
by the linguistic and psycholinguistic communities (see
Skinner 1956). Skinner’s critique of mentalism undoubt-
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edly deserves more careful reading than has hitherto been
the case. Certainly we would agree with Skinner’s opposi-
tion to the use of terms such as “idea,” “meaning,” and “in-
formation” as referring to inner things that are transmitted
through speech. But that hardly means that psychologists
should be barred from using these mental terms.
Wittgensteinian philosophers have gone to some lengths
to clarify the important differences between the type of be-
haviorist approach that Pear sketches and the Wittgen-
steinian critique of Cartesian epistemology (see Shanker
1998). We will restrict ourselves here to commenting on
two of the points that Pear raises. First, to argue that A’s
telling B that there is gold in the Klondike does not amount
to the same thing as saying that the knowledge or informa-
tion about gold in the Klondike has been transmitted to B,
does not entail that A may not, in fact, convey some piece
of knowledge or information to B. But whether or not A
conveys such information to B depends on what B knows
about the Klondike, not what is going on inside the mind of
A. What we are challenging is the Cartesian view of epis-
temic terms, but certainly not the use of epistemic terms
(see Hacker 1990). Second, we would argue that, not only
is it difficult to see how the “prediction and control of ver-
bal behavior could flow from the DST paradigm,” but, in
fact, such an outlook runs completely contrary to the DST
paradigm, for the reasons spelled out in the target article.
Certainly there are many situations in the study of animal
communication in which one does indeed have to scrutinize
whether the use of epistemic terms is warranted. Rendall
& Vasey illustrate the importance of this point with their
rat pup example. The upshot of their biological explanation
of the rat pups’ behavior is that it forces us to consider in
what sense the rat pups are communicating that they are
cold. If a laptop starts to beep, is it communicating that its
battery is almost spent? Such a comparison is precisely the
sort of example that made the IP approach so appealing; for
here one would argue that both are communicating in ex-
actly the same sense and that great ape and human com-
munication are just more complex manifestations of this
signal transmission process. By presenting such a thorough
biological explanation – one that, as they explain, removes
any role for the concept of meaning (or epistemic opera-
tors) – Rendall & Vasey show how, as we list at the top of
our chart, there is a categorial difference between this me-
chanical use of “communication” and the co-regulated ac-
tivity of communicating thoughts, desires, intentions, and
so on. What makes this issue particularly complex is that
there are gray areas where it is not at all clear whether the
behavior in question is closer to the mechanical or the in-
tentional sense of “communicate.”
Related to this point is Grammer’s defense of a version
of the continuum picture, which he sees as ranging from
simple information processing systems “at one end of the
communicative spectrum,” to complex dynamic processing
systems at the other. The continuum here is supposed to be
both phylogenetic and characteristic of the various ele-
ments involved in the communicative acts of higher social
creatures. It is not entirely clear whether Grammer regards
the latter as simply a more complex, hierarchically-struc-
tured matrix of multiple information-processing channels
that somehow interact with one another dynamically, or
whether he sees the latter as a dynamic process accompa-
nied and influenced by sub-information-processing sys-
tems. Both ideas are interesting. The fundamental problem
with this argument from the DST perspective that we have
sketched is that, to defend this more sophisticated version
of the continuum picture, Grammer treats the “primitive”
acts of communication in inferential, linear terms. Thus,
lower organisms are treated as inferring the internal states
of other organisms from overt signals and then responding.
In the case of humans, there is a subtle shift from describ-
ing the brain as making such inferences about an observer’s
intentions, which raises the specter of the “Homunculus
Fallacy,” to describing the actor as unconsciously making
these inferences, which raises the specter of the “cognitive
unconscious” (see Shanker 1998).
The examples that Grammer cites from his research
about how the unconscious patterning of movements af-
fects agents’ hedonic state, or their behaviors, are fascinat-
ing; however, the argument that we presented in the target
article is that these reflexive elements of communication
are to be explained, not in the inferential, linear terms of
the information-processing framework, but in terms of an
agent’s developmental history and the co-regulated nature
of dynamic interactions (which, as Grammer explains, are
both pair-specific and context-specific). This was the point
that we sought to clarify in the discussion of the develop-
ment of facial expressions. Co-regulated facial expressions
of affect are not only a critical example of the kind of move-
ment patterns that Grammer is discussing, but indeed, one
of the primary mechanisms in a child’s functional emotional
development (see Greenspan & Shanker, in press). We
agree with Grammer that these micro-elements play an in-
tegral role in linguistic communication, and for that reason,
that it is fundamentally misguided to attempt to segregate
“linguistic” from paralinguistic and nonlinguistic factors in
the analysis of speech acts (see Toolan 1996).
A second respect in which we are charged with harbor-
ing dangerous behaviorist proclivities is in our failure to ac-
knowledge the compositional nature of language and the
role that constraints must play in a child’s acquisition of lan-
guage (Hahn). In regards to the former, it is absolutely cor-
rect that we wish to challenge the compositional theory of
meaning and a generativist view of syntax. For reasons that
are familiar in the literature, we are uneasy about attempts
to model the nature of language on the paradigm of read-
ing (Kuhlmeier & Bloom; see, e.g., Harris 1980b). The
skills involved in the former gravitate, in John Austin’s justly
celebrated phrase, around learning how to do things with
words. What we have to keep in mind when we speak about
a child as learning “how to do things with words” is that
what a child comes to acquire are cultural techniques. That
is, a child is not simply learning how to put words together
according to certain kinds of rules in order to express dif-
ferent kinds of thoughts; a child is learning the ways of be-
having that count, within the cultural environment, as the
performance of particular culturally conceived acts. A child
learns those forms of behavior that those in the culture
speak of as particular kinds of acts (see Shanker 2002;
Shanker & Taylor 2001; Taylor 1997). Therefore, the dif-
ference between a child describing how cookies are better
than milk, and how milk is better than cookies, does not re-
duce to syntax. Without taking into account such factors as
tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, and other actions,
we cannot describe the child as having mastered these dif-
ferent moves in the language game of describing one’s pref-
erences – a point, incidentally, which the critics of ape lan-
guage research made quite forcefully (see Wallman 1992).
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In regards to “internal constraints,” we must direct the
reader to other publications in which we look at this issue in
much greater detail (see e.g., Shanker 2001). Here we would
point out that Hahn’s substitution of “information theory”
(which he discusses) for “information processing” (which we
discuss) may be the reason why he urges us to pursue the
very issues that DS would steer us away from (e.g., “mecha-
nisms” by which language is “acquired” and social “cues” that
impact this process). In fact, we see the demand for “inter-
nal constraints” as one of the hallmarks of a Cartesian view
of language development. In this view, the child is construed
as engaged in a “translation” process (a “mapping” problem),
which would be radically underdetermined were it not con-
strained by innate concepts or word-learning biases. But
what if we should abandon the Cartesian premise that mean-
ing and reference are primate mental phenomena, on which
this picture of language acquisition rests, and instead view
children developing language skills as learning the tech-
niques required to engage in different kinds of practices?
Children develop their communicative intentions within a
richly structured interactional context, which involves a
“continuous unfolding of individual action that is susceptible
to being continuously modified by the continuously chang-
ing actions of the partner” (Fogel 1993). By such a non-
Cartesian outlook, the child is seen, not as inferring what
adults mean when they use such-and-such a word, but
rather, as participating in joint activities that involve a con-
tinuous process of mutual adjustment. The child acquires
through this co-regulated process those skills that we de-
scribe as “language skills” (Hymes 1974; Taylor 1997).
This brings us to another of the major issues raised in the
commentaries: the implications of DST for our views about
the nature of language development (Hahn, Kuhlmeier &
Bloom, Locke). We were delighted that Locke contributed
a commentary, as we see his work as pivotal to the dynamic
systems approach to language development. It is beyond the
scope of this response to explore the intricacies of this issue
in any detail; for present purposes we would merely note that
we fully agree with the emphasis that Locke places on the
secondary altriciality of our species for our understanding 
of the processes involved in language development (see
Shanker & Taylor 2001). In fact, it was Locke’s A Child’s Path
to Spoken Language (Locke 1993) that first brought the im-
portance of this issue to our attention. For dynamic systems
theorists, there is a particularly interesting parallel between
Locke’s research on how a fetus becomes attuned to the
characteristic speech sounds of its community, and Gottlieb’s
experiments on wood ducklings (see Gottlieb 1997), in
which Gottlieb demonstrated how the expression of what
would normally be classified as instinctive or innate behav-
ior in newborns is in fact regulated in nonobvious ways by
prenatal experience (in particular, how the duckling’s audi-
tory experience of its siblings’ vocalizations during the em-
bryonic period contributes to its identification of the mater-
nal call of its species). Clearly, much important work remains
to be done here on how language development and social-
ization begins very early – long before the child begins to
babble, let alone utters or even understands their first words.
R4. Are IP and DS compatible paradigms?
At this point it should be abundantly clear that we cannot
subscribe to the suggestion by Bonvillian & Patterson,
Spurrett, and Westbury that IP and DS are in fact com-
plementary paradigms. Not only do they ask different ques-
tions of the phenomena under study, IP and DS are also
based on different primary principles, as we have shown
and as is reflected in the commentary by Fogel, de Koeyer,
Secrist & Nagy (Fogel et al.). To the points we made in
R2, we add only some remarks in response to Rendall &
Vasey. It is a misunderstanding of co-regulation to assume
it requires symmetry, or that mutual attunement always re-
sults in cooperation. Social events between children and
their caretakers typically include elements of pronounced
asymmetry; that adults have everything from greater motor
control to greater social power is recognized and incorpo-
rated into DS-grounded studies of both nonhuman primates
(King 2002) and humans (see Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-
Warnery 1999 for an additional example to Fogel 1993).
Whereas DS seeks joint maintenance of action (and trans-
formation of action as we have outlined) between social
partners, it does not insist on equivalence of action.
Similarly, the fact that asymmetry within primate social
relationships may involve conflict as well as cooperation is
wholly accommodated by DS. One reading of our dance
metaphor suggests a focus on “positive” outcomes via co-
operation, but in fact we intended a broader perspective.
One of us (King), having assessed hundreds of hours of
filmed social interactions in captive bonobos and gorillas for
the presence of co-regulation, readily finds co-regulation
between social partners engaged in conflict. The contin-
gency and creativity so intrinsic to a dance are just as fun-
damental to a threat-mediated aggressive interaction or to
an outright fight (King, in preparation) Indeed, if DS were
not equipped to embrace conflict as well as cooperation,
and asymmetric as well as egalitarian events, it would be of
limited use for understanding the inevitable power differ-
entials that characterize social communication in primates,
nonhuman and human.
R5. Does DS facilitate consideration of
evolutionary questions?
Russon & Begun suggest that the DS paradigm creates an
impasse for the study of cognitive and evolutionary dimen-
sions of communication because “no basis is available for
comparing communicative processes across species or as-
sessing their relationship to one another.” We see, on the
contrary, enormous potential in DS for illuminating evolu-
tionary issues. It is for this reason – and not because of any
a priori judgments about the quality of comparative social
communication – that we have limited our work to analysis
within the primate lineage. Indeed, we welcome sugges-
tions that co-regulation exists in the social communication
of other mammals and birds (Pepperberg, Vauclair).
Within primatology, we badly need fine-grained, qualita-
tive work describing details of the contingency and creativ-
ity that mark co-regulation in great ape vocalizations, ges-
tures, and body movements, both in spontaneous ape-ape
interactions in the wild and captivity, and in the patterned
routines that emerge between enculturated apes and their
human caregivers. Armstrong and Leavens clearly grasp
the need for richly descriptive ethnographies of ape social
lives. In highlighting the importance of studying sponta-
neous communication between apes, though, we mean to
acknowledge our disagreement with Armstrong’s sugges-
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tion that communication can be judged to exist only by hu-
mans’ interacting with another human or with an ape (King
& Shanker 2003).
In considering research methods, we would caution
against reducing rich qualitative research to the status of
“anecdote,” as does Miklósi, or assuming that “the pain” of
rigorous scientific work is linked differentially to statistical
analysis. In the experience of one of us (King), only quali-
tative work can answer certain questions about the contin-
gency and creativity of co-regulated primate social com-
munication. Further, when working from filmed records,
transcription and careful qualitative analysis is time-con-
suming, requiring immense attention to detail (King, in
preparation). Our intent, however, is not to dichotomize
qualitative versus quantitative methods. We envision a vital
role for quantitative research, for example, in documenting
the relative proportions of co-regulated versus more rigid,
noncreative social events across various contexts. We envi-
sion a collective enterprise aimed at discovering which con-
ditions promote, and which constrain, full expression of 
co-regulated social communication in primates and other
animals.
Given the principles of DS, key evolutionary questions
would not prioritize tracing either the development of in-
dividual cognitive capacities that support mental represen-
tations, or the path by which certain human vocalizations or
gestures might have developed from precursors in our
closest living relatives. In line with DS’s shift away from the
transmitted signal “in the head” of the individual, primary
attention would be given to the comparative evolutionary
development of socio-emotional dynamics between part-
ners. Unlike Russon & Begun, we do not wall off the study
of such socio-emotionality from the study of cognition, and
believe that the study of one would greatly enhance under-
standing of the other.
Applying DS to primate communication will, we predict,
lead to a series of “articulated propositions” (Latour 2000),
that is, propositions able to establish connections across ele-
ments of a system in new ways. In sum, just as we acknowl-
edge a robust history for the development of the DS frame-
work, now emerging as a genuine and vital paradigm, we
envision an exciting future in which various DS-inspired ap-
proaches (a blend of qualitative, quantitative, computational,
and other methods) discover unexpected riches in ALR and
the study of primate social communication in general.
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